950 Ill5 50-51691
Hahnemann
Modern acids explained.

Keep Your Card in This Pocket

Books will be issued only on presentation of proper library cards.

Unless labeled otherwise, books may be retained for two weeks. Borrowers finding books marked defaced or mutilated are expected to report same at library desk; otherwise the last borrower will be held responsible for all imperfections discovered.

The card holder is responsible for all books drawn on this card.

Penalty for over-due books 2c a day plus cost of notices.

Lost cards and change of residence must be reported promptly.

Public Library
Kansas City, Mo.

TENSION ENVELOPE CORP.


KANSAS CITY, MO PUBLIC LIBRARY
0 0001 0359185 5

MODERN ASIA EXPLAINED

To

all those young people east of Suez

whom I have tried to teach and like to call my friends

Modern Asia Explained

By W. R. McAULIFFE, *M.A.*
Author of
"Modern Europe Explained"
"The Making of the Modern World"
"Europe 1750-1950"

The Philosophical Library Inc.

Published, 1952,
by the Philosophical Library, Inc.,
15 East 40th Street,
New York 16, N. Y.

All rights reserved.

Printed by A. S. Lindsay at the Villafield Press, Bishopbriggs
Printed in Great Britain

PREFACE

In these days of aeroplanes and national service, when every other person of any age has sojourned at some time in some odd corner of the globe, it is strange that popular conceptions of the East should lag half a century behind reality. Arabia is no longer a preserve of sheikhs and desert nomads; India of rajahs and fire-eating colonels; China of silken mandarins; Japan of geishas and cherry blossom—if they ever were. For better or worse, East and West have met, and traditional ways in the Orient, among the younger generations in the cities at least, have passed into interesting antiquity, as has the *grand seigneur* in Europe, or the Colonial pioneer in the United States and British Dominions.

At the same time, Asia is still neither Europe nor America, much as it has borrowed from each. Understanding of Asia, in so far as an occidental can understand that complex mystery, requires a balanced assessment of a synthesis of West and East. This book is a modest attempt to give in simple language some account of the development and aspirations of the Asiatic states which have recently freed themselves, or been freed, from Western colonization and economic penetration. Some effort has been made to sketch the historical, social, and religious backgrounds to this development. In so short a compass, and in such simple terms, the task has not been easy, and I am fully conscious of the limitations and deficiencies which have arisen from condensation and simplification.

With simplicity in mind, in transliterating from the Arabic script, in which, with modifications, Persian and Urdu are also written, I have avoided the apostrophes and inverted apostrophes more pedantically used to denote Arabic *Ain* and *Hamzah*. To Arabic scholars they are redundant, and to others meaningless and irritating. In other names, I have employed the commonly accepted versions, as in the columns of the London *Times*. These are not necessarily " correct " (for changing place names is a favourite pastime of newly emancipated peoples), but they are comprehensible, which *Kanpur* for *Cawnpore* and *Islamabad* for *Chittagong* might not be.

I have deliberately omitted a bibliography, contenting myself with footnote reference to some few books which are adequate, comparatively simple, interesting and readily obtainable. Readers requiring more scholarly reference should avail themselves of the several comprehensive professional bibliographies now published both in London and New York.

In so far as possible I have confined myself to record of fact. Where an explanation of some particular religion or brand of political opinion seemed essential, I have commented solely in terms of the country concerned. Such explanations, transferred to any country other than that of their origins, obviously might need modification. Again my views commit in no way the authorities of the various Universities and Public Service Commissions in Egypt, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Burma with which I have from time to time been associated.

W. R. McA.

Baile-athe-Cliath
1952

CONTENTS

CHAP.		Page
	INTRODUCTION	1
I.	THE NEAR EAST	6–48
	Islam and the Arabs	6
	Saudi Arabia	14
	Iraq	17
	Jordan	20
	Egypt and the Sudan	22
	Yemen, Aden, Hadramaut, and the Gulf Sultanates	30
	Turkey	32
	Syria and Lebanon	37
	Israel	39
	Oil in the Near East	43
II.	CENTRAL AND HIGH ASIA	49–69
	Iran	49
	Afghanistan	60
	Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang	63
	Soviet Asia	65
III.	THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE	70–117
	India	70
	Pakistan	96

CHAP.		Page
	Indo-Pakistan Relations	105
	Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan	111
	Ceylon	113
IV.	SOUTH EAST ASIA	118–141
	South East Asia: General	118
	Burma	121
	Thailand	129
	French Indo-China	131
	British Malaya and British Borneo	132
	Indonesia	136
	The Philippine Islands	140
V	THE FAR EAST	142–158
	Japan	142
	China	146
	Formosa	154
	Korea	155
	Asia and Communism	156
	INDEX	159

MAPS

	Page
1. *The Near East and S.W. Asia, 1952*	12
2. *Soviet Asia, 1952*	67
3. *India and Pakistan, 1952*	86
4. *Asia, 1939, showing colonial areas*	114
5. *Asia, 1952; spheres of political influence*	115
6. *S.E. Asia: Indonesia, 1952*	139
7. *China, Korea, and Japan, 1932–1952*	147

INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest consequences of the two World Wars (which really were one war with a twenty-year armistice in the middle), perhaps the greatest consequence, was the development of Asiatic nationalism, and the achievement of independence by most of the many states of this, the greatest of the continents in which lives more than half the world's population.

Despite antiquity in culture which pre-dates history, and Imperial greatness when Europe was barbaric, most of Asia, from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, was under the direct rule, or at least the very considerable influence of the great European Powers. Great Britain held in fee India, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, and parts of Arabia and China; France had Indo-China; Holland the East Indies; Portugal scattered possessions relic of greater glory. Even the United States ruled in the Philippines and Turkey in Arabia. China, as empire and republic, was subject to humiliating trade concessions, and Japan, before her spectacular emergence in the late nineteenth century, was a sealed and isolated chain of islands.

The First World War shook to their foundations these Western Empires. The Arab States and Afghanistan secured at least nominal independence in 1920–21, and the rest of Asia began to give voice to national aspirations. The Second World War destroyed for ever the legend of the essential

superiority of the white man. When the Japanese entered the conflict in December 1941, the British, representatives of a mighty power whose invincible fleets and great wealth had straddled the globe, were ignominiously chased out of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Burma, and the United States, her fleet crippled at Pearl Harbour, from the Philippines. The Japanese demonstrated to all Asia that, given the weapons, a yellow man was match and more for a white, and what yellow men had done, brown and black men determined to do.

It is true that subsequent events, weight of resources, and atomic knowledge later utterly destroyed the Japanese Empire; but the way had been shown, the lesson learnt, and when the war ended in 1945 Asia was by no means prepared to re-enter colonial subjugation. Making virtue of necessity, the British Government speedily relinquished control of the sub-continent of India, which divided into the Dominions of Ceylon and Pakistan, and the Republic of India. Burma became an independent Republic. Holland, much more reluctantly, followed suit in the East Indies, and the Republic of Indonesia came into being. Only France sought to retain a precarious foothold in Indo-China, and Portugal in scattered outposts which had really ceased to matter. China, freed in the First War from European concessions, and by the Second from Japanese penetration, threw out Marshal Chiang Kai-shek in favour of a Communist regime.

In four years, all Asia was free, save for the British in Malaya, the French in Indo-China, and the U.S. occupation of Japan.

Asia is a continent, and as such houses not a people but a diversity of peoples, a multiplicity of races, of languages,

and of at least four main creeds.[1] Nearest to Europe come the brown-skinned Arabs who follow the teachings of the Prophet Mahomet; across the Central Asian plateau and High Asia are Persians and Afghans, also Muslim, and the nomadic and semi-nomadic Mongol tribes who reach across to China, some Muslims, some Buddhists, and some, like the Chinese, followers of Confucius. To the south, Pakistan is Muslim, and India is a continent to herself, with over 300 million people, twelve major languages, and almost every creed known to man, with Brahminical Hinduism predominating. Ceylon, Burma, and Siam are mostly Buddhist; Malaya and Indonesia a Muslim-Buddhist-pagan mixture; Japan has a curiously complex faith, partly Buddhist, of her own. In subsequent sections some attempt will be made to explain these religions, since religion is still perhaps the most vital force in Asia, and inextricably intermingled with politics and national aspirations.

As regards culture, this great expanse of the Earth's surface contains the heirs of Chinese and Indian civilizations almost as old as time; northern nomads whose ways have not changed for four thousand years; and jungle aborigines who are but little developed above the beast. All are Asiatics.

The common factor throughout the Continent is that of over-population. One of the earliest economists, Malthus, postulated the theory that, as the world's population was increasing faster than its food supply, the planet was heading rapidly towards starvation. There are many fallacies in this doctrine, but in Asia at the moment, superficially at least, it appears to be a demonstrable fact. In India, China, and

[1] REFERENCE: W. G. East and O. H. K. Spate, *The Changing Map of Asia* (1950).

Japan, populations swarm, and the means to feed them remain static or dwindle. To-day, half the population of the world—the Asiatic half—are on the level of bare subsistence, or below. Despite the glamour of the East, and the legendary gold and jewels of its potentates, Asia is subject to abject, grinding poverty; to disease; to appalling housing conditions; to malnutrition and a life of soul-destroying labour with little reward. That factor must always be in mind. The desire for social ease and national security lies behind many of the problems of the East to-day, and it is over-easy to dismiss it with the tag of " Communism ".

Nevertheless, much of Asia is so labelled and, just as it is necessary to try to understand the ancient creeds of the East, so it is desirable to have some clear idea of this twentieth-century economic-political-social doctrine which has replaced formalized or revealed religion over a great part of the surface of the globe. Russian Communism is based largely on the writings of Karl Marx (1818–83), who visualized a state in which there would be no classes, and no private ownership of the means by which food and goods are obtained, (land, mines, factories, railways, and the like). Each man was to produce as much as he was able, and to receive as reward as much as he needed. Socialists also have these ideas, but whereas Socialists think that such a state can be achieved gradually without a revolution, Communists hold that the ideal can only come about through a violent seizure of power from the capitalists. Communists demand revolution because they believe that no other means can bring about the property-less, class-less state. Their aim, therefore, is to set up a disciplined revolutionary body capable of establishing a proletarian dictatorship, which in

time will give way to a real government of the workers. This ultimate stage of perfection has not yet been reached, and shows no sign of being reached, in Soviet Russia, which adopted Communism in 1918. Such briefly is the doctrine which has reached out from Leningrad across the north of the world and down to the remote islands of South-East Asia. It is a doctrine contrary to the whole philosophy of individualism of the nineteenth century, as represented to-day by the United States of America, and it is equally alien to most of the traditions of the Orient. But it is a doctrine which feeds on poverty and despair, and the impact of Communism on hungry Asia may well change the whole character of the Asiatic Renaissance, and with it the face of the world.

CHAPTER I

The Near East

Islam and the Arabs.[1]

That part of the world stretching from the bottom of the Red Sea to the Caspian, and thence westward to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, is known as the Near East,[2] and it is here that the life of man began. Scholars place the Garden of Eden (of the Christian Bible and the Muslim Koran) between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, in what was once Babylonia, and then Mesopotamia, and is now called Iraq. Eden itself is a Babylonian word meaning *plain*. Back in 2000 B.C. Egypt was in the Twelfth Dynasty of her Pharaohs ruling a great military and naval empire, highly developed in the arts and in science. In Mesopotamia, King Hammurabi was drawing up his codes of laws. By 1500 B.C. Egypt and Babylon were still flourishing, and the

[1] REFERENCE: H. Gibbs, *Crescent in Shadow* (1952).
Sir T. Arnold, *Islamic Faith* (1928).
A. Guillaume, *Traditions of Islam* (1924).
G. E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (1948).
P. K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History* (1948).
M. V. Seton-Williams, *Britain and the Arab States* (1948).

[2] The expressions Near East, Middle East, and Far East are used here as follows:—Near East: Turkey—Iran (25°–60° long. E.); Middle East: Baluchistan—Burma (60°–100° long. E.); Far East: Thailand—Japan (100°–160° long. E.). (See Map 4.) For the term " Near East " as it is used in this book, " Middle East " is frequently seen elsewhere, especially in daily newspapers, which continue to use the terminology of the Allied forces in this area during the Second World War.

Assyrian Empire had arisen. By 800 B.C. this Assyrian Empire had subdued all others, and by 500 B.C. itself gave way to the Persian Empire of Darius, which stretched from Greece to the plains of North India. Thereafter came the glory of Greece and the grandeur of Rome. It was not until A.D. 550 that Western civilization, as we know it, began at all, and not until the Renaissance of A.D. 1450 that it could compare with the Near Eastern Empires of two thousand years before.

Three great religions were cradled in the Near East: Jewry in Iraq with Abraham at Ur of the Chaldees; Christianity in Palestine with Jesus at Jerusalem; Islam in Saudi Arabia at Mecca, the seat of Mahomet.

For these reasons alone the Near East should be of absorbing interest. In addition, there must be considered vast and almost untouched mineral resources, the explosive nature of the national states which were established there in 1919, and the proximity of Soviet Russia.

In all these lands there dwell Arabs. Arabs are by no means all of one race, any more than are the citizens of the United States; nor do they even speak one language. Just as Latin has developed into French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, so classical Arabic has become one language in Baghdad and quite another in Cairo.[1] Yet, despite its divergences, classical Arabic, the language of the Koran, is one great link between these peoples. The other is the Koran itself, or, more properly, the religion of Islam or Mohammedanism. Religion may have ceased to play a very vital part in the lives of some people in the West, but in

[1] Dialects are: Maltese, Moroccan, Algerian, Egyptian, Syrian, Yemenite, Iraqui, Omani, and the Coast Arabic of East Africa.

Arabia the teachings of the seventh-century camel-driver Mahomet are of the utmost daily consequence, in politics, social life, and even economics.

All Muslims believe that the Koran, the Holy Book, was dictated by God himself (Allah) through the Archangel Gabriel to Mahomet over a period of twenty-three years. Like the Christian Bible, it contains detailed regulations of the religious duties of Man, of ultimate retribution, of social custom, and also of historical narratives, some of them close parallels to those of the Bible. It is also the basis of all theology and law, and it remains the sole study of the great El Azhar University in Cairo.[1] Islamic belief may be summed up as follows:

(*a*) Belief in one God—Allah—who wills all things, sees all things, prearranges all things, who is incomprehensible to Man, and has no equals. Jesus was a Prophet, who was born of a Virgin, and carried up into Heaven; but he was not the Son of God, nor was he crucified.[2]

(*b*) Belief in angels who are the guardians of men.

(*c*) Belief in the Koran, the Book of God, which contains all the previous revelations of God, as to Adam, Abraham, Moses, or Jesus.

(*d*) Belief in the Prophets, of whom twenty-five including Jesus are mentioned in the Koran, with Mahomet the last and greatest.

[1] Rodwell's *Translation of the Koran* in the *Everyman Library* is perhaps the best English version readily obtainable. See also *Islam Today* (1943) by A. J. Arberry and Rom Landau.

[2] Tradition has it that Judas was substituted for Him on the Cross.

(*e*) Belief in the literal resurrection of the body on the last day, which will be marked by the second coming of Jesus, not to judge men, but to be judged, after which Muslims, having been cleansed of sin, will enter Paradise.

(*f*) Belief that everything that happens is by direct will of Allah. This is pre-destination (for good or evil), fatalism, Kismet; whatever you do was decreed in Eternity and cannot be altered. This has an immense effect on the character of the Muslim, and causes him to accept fortune and catastrophe equally placidly, and to refuse to strive to better conditions, his own or other people's.

The True Believer must pray five times a day after ritual washing, in special postures, meticulously observed. He must fast in the daylight hours of Ramadan, the ninth month of the lunar year. This is a real hardship, since he may not even swallow his own saliva, and thirst becomes raging when Ramadan falls in the hot season.[1] He must, if he can possibly afford it, make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once, and donate 5 per cent of his all in alms to the poor. He must also be prepared to take part in *jihad*—holy war—in defence of Islam.

It will thus be seen that Mohammedanism is a very hard religion, making great demands on its followers. It is also a very live religion, and even educated or "modern" or "enlightened" Muslims are far more influenced thereby than they like to believe. The Muslim in his heart really

[1] The lunar year is ten days shorter than the solar, and Ramadan moves completely through the Western calendar once in 33 years.

has no time for non-Muslims, which is why national Muslim states so easily fall victim to xenophobia.[1]

Despite this, there is less sympathy between modern Muslim states than might reasonably be expected. Pan-Islamism is no more than a sentiment, and not a very influential sentiment at that, as is shown by the splits in the Arab League, and the adhesion of Muslim Afghanistan with Hindu India against Muslim Pakistan, clear indications that in the twentieth century greed transcends creed.

Like Christianity, Islam has split into sects. These differ not on the Koran, but on the interpretations of the Koran, called the traditions. The Sunnis accept the traditions of the Great Caliphs, and formerly followed the Sultan of Turkey. The Shiahs (Persia) teach the traditions of Hassan and Hussein, the martyred nephews of Mahomet, and are particularly anti-Jewish and anti-Christian. The Wahhabis (Saudi Arabia) are the strictest and most puritanical of all. There are other minor sects such as that of the Khojas (Bombay, East Africa, and the Levant), led by the Aga Khan.

Despite the predominance of Islam, there are considerable Christian communities in the Near East, with which the Arabs do not interfere. Lebanon is predominantly Christian; in Syria there are about 100,000; in Iraq 80,000. Even 8 per cent of the population of Israel is Christian. These Christians are of various communions. In 1054, the Patriarch of Constantinople declined to bow to the Bishop of Rome, and the schismatic Greek (Orthodox) Church came into being. Before that, in the fifth century, various small bodies had broken away—Jacobites, Copts, Armenians,

[1] Hatred of foreigners.

and Nestorians. Some of these, the Syrian Catholic, the Chaldean Catholic, the Armenian Catholic, and the Maronite have since returned to Rome, and are known as the Uniate Churches. In addition, there are converts made by various Protestant bodies. The result is confusion, and annual unedifying scenes in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, when various types of Christians are prevented from slaughtering each other over the very tomb of Christ by Muslim soldiers.

After the first successful advance of Islam, the Arabs sank into lethargy, and were easily dominated by the Ottoman Turks in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At its height, centred in Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire embraced all the Near East, all Egypt and North Africa, and Eastern Europe to the very gates of Vienna. By the nineteenth century the Turks were very much in decline and their empire began to fade away. Egypt went first under Mehemet Ali, the Albanian cigarette-hawker, who founded the present Egyptian Dynasty after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. Then the various Balkan states threw off the Turkish yoke. In 1895, the first Arab National Committee was set up in Paris, and, in 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, self-interest led the Arabs to side with the Allies (Great Britain, France, and Russia) against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, and Turkey). Stimulated by British promises of independence after the war, made in correspondence between Sir Henry MacMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca,[1] the Arabs took up arms beside the British Marshal Allenby against the Turks.

[1] Sherif: descendant of Mahomet's daughter.

MAP I

THE NEAR EAST
AND S.W. ASIA: 1952
U. S. S. R.
INDIA
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
SINKIANG (CHINA)
WEST PUNJAB
CASPIAN SEA
BAKU
BATUM
TURKEY
SYRIA
MOSUL
IRAQ
IRAN
ABADAN
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONES
BAHRAIN
QATAR
TRUCIAL COAST
PERSIAN GULF
OMAN
GULF OF OMAN
ARABIAN SEA
HADRAMAUT
NEJD
SAUDI ARABIA
HEJAZ
YEMEN
ADEN
EGYPT
SUDAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
CANAL ZONE
RED SEA
0 MILES 300
OIL FIELDS
PIPE LINES

The MacMahon Correspondence quite clearly promised that all Arab lands in Asia, save Aden, should be recognized as independent, subject to certain commercial and military privileges to Great Britain. Yet in 1916 Great Britain concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France and Russia whereby, of the former Ottoman Empire, Russia was to have Constantinople; France—Syria, S. Anatolia, and part of Iraq; Great Britain—Haifa, Acre, Palestine, and the rest of Iraq. When this secret understanding was published by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917, the Arabs were not unnaturally furious. Still worse was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 which, by offering Palestine (an Arab area) as a national home for the Jews, was an attempt by Great Britain to placate the strong Jewish elements of newly Bolshevist Russia, and the influential Jews of the United States. When the Treaty of Versailles came into force in 1920, the Arabs did not get their independence, despite the determined efforts of Colonel Lawrence.[1] Iraq and Palestine became British, and Syria and Lebanon French mandates.[2]

Before this decision was made known, the Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian Arabs declared their independence under the Amir Feisal, and the Iraqi Arabs elected Feisal's

[1] Lawrence of Arabia was one of the British leaders of the Revolt of the Desert against the Turks. Others, equally important, were Kirkbride, later British Minister in Jordan and Cyrenaica, Joyce, Winterton, Newcombe, Peake, and Brig.-Gen. Glubb Pasha, who still commands the 15,000 strong Jordan Arab Legion. But Lawrence had a genius for publicity, although he affected to shun it. At Versailles, for example, he habitually wore Arab dress, and later, professedly disgusted with the "betrayal of the Arabs", renounced his rank and decorations and joined the R.A.F. as an Aircraftsman in the name of T. E. Shaw. As a Fellow of All Souls', Oxford, after the war, he wrote a magnificent book, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, which at least does not underestimate his own admittedly brilliant guerilla attacks on the Turkish lines of communication.

[2] Mandate: a territory entrusted for administration to one or other of the powers by the League of Nations—in effect, a colony.

brother Abdullah as their king. The French soon expelled Feisal, and the British put down a revolt in Iraq, compensating Abdullah by making him Amir of Transjordan with a considerable cash subsidy. Syria and Lebanon thus duly became French, and Iraq and Palestine British, although in Iraq Feisal, third son of the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, was set up as puppet king.

To the south in Arabia proper, Ibn Saud became King of Saudi Arabia, and the Sherif Hussein himself King of the Hejaz and Caliph.[1] Hussein, however, disgusted by the mandates, declined to recognize either the Treaty of Versailles or the League of Nations, and consequently lost British support. The Caliphate had ceased to be of any importance, and the Hejaz was absorbed by Ibn Saud into Saudi Arabia in 1925. The Sherif-Caliph died at his son's court in Jordan in 1931.

Independence came to all these countries (save Palestine) by 1941, and in 1945 this emancipation was proved by the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League between Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen. The next chapters trace the development of these states in greater detail.

Saudi Arabia.

Area: 927,000 square miles
Population: 6·5 millions

Jazirat al Arab, the Island of the Arabs, Arabia, is a million square miles in area, one third of the size of the United States, or one quarter the size of Europe, a good deal of it arid sand, the *Rub al-Khali* (Empty Quarter) being

[1] Caliph: Commander of the Faithful, the spiritual leader of Islam, for centuries the Sultan of Turkey.

definitely uninhabitable. Apart from the south coastal states of Yemen, Hadramaut, Oman, and Kuwait, and the British Protectorate of Aden, this vast area forms the kingdom of Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, who is known as Ibn Saud. He was recognized as independent in 1927 by Great Britain (Treaty of Jedda).

Back in 1703, when Arabian Mohammedanism had become very debased, a reformer, Abdul Wahhab, arose, preaching a fanatical return to the exact ways of the Prophet. He received support from the then Amir Ibn Saud of Nejd, and Wahhabism became so strong as to arouse the jealousy of the Sultan in Constantinople. A Turkish expeditionary force moved in, and Ibn Saud's grandson was executed, 1815. The Sauds were banished, and in 1891, young Ibn Saud was living with the Sultan of Kuwait. Here he came into contact with the West, and particularly with Great Britain, for whose methods he conceived some admiration. In 1901, the young man led a forlorn hope across the desert, and succeeded by guile and good generalship in capturing Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and expelling the usurping Rashids.

Once re-established as Amir, Ibn Saud led a reversion to Wahhabism,[1] through a Society of *Ikhwan* (Brothers); he induced these supporters to sell their camels, abandon their nomadic life, and settle in villages around the wells as agriculturists. These settled, fanatical *Ikhwan*, like Cromwell's Ironsides, now form the backbone of Ibn Saud's regime.

In 1914, the Amir was master of only a small corner of

[1] REFERENCE: H. St. J. B. Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (1928).
K. S. Twitchell and E. J. Jurgi, *Saudi Arabia* (1947).

N.E. Arabia. Mecca, the Holy City of Islam, where Mahomet was born, situated directly under Allah's throne, where stands the Kaaba, the sacred stone which fell from heaven; and Medina, where Mahomet died, were ruled by the Sherif Hussein Ibn Ali who, as controller of the Mecca Pilgrimage, was, next to the Caliph, the most important man in Islam. It was this Hussein whom Great Britain favoured as King of Arabia in 1919, until he refused to accept the mandate provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. As the protégé of Westminster, Hussein was exceedingly arrogant to Ibn Saud, and, when the British withdrew their support, Ibn Saud attacked Mecca with the *Ikhwan*. Hussein fled, leaving his rival master of all Arabia, which is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

King Ibn Saud's first act was to purge the manifold abuses of Mecca and properly to regulate the Pilgrimage, but he retained Riyadh as his capital. He is an austere monarch. Absence from prayer or mosque is punished with flogging; silks and jewels are forbidden; the use of alcohol is punishable with death. But his government is efficient and just, and he has brought discipline and order to this desert land, where people range in development from the purely nomadic tribes of Nejd to the urban merchant communities of the Hejaz.

Although technically governed under the " constitution " of 1926, the administration of Ibn Saud is paternal rather than democratic. His position is greatly strengthened by the revenues which accrue from the Mecca Pilgrimage (about 10 million pounds in gold annually), and from oil royalties, which render his government independent of taxation. This is just as well, since very few of the popula-

tion have much to tax. Although the king shows preference for American advisers, his relations with Great Britain are cordial, and his army is British trained. In 1937, he settled his disputes with Yemen, and in 1942 signed an agreement with Kuwait.

Iraq.[1]

Area: 116,600 square miles
Population: 4·8 millions

In 1914, Mesopotamia was an integral part of the Turkish Empire, and there was little, if any, sentiment of Arab nationalism. Great Britain invaded Iraq in the First War to protect the oil wells of Abadan and the Suez Canal, and to stabilize Muslim feelings in India, which was disturbed by the Sultan of Turkey's declaration of *jihad*—holy war. Thus in 1918 Great Britain was in military occupation of the whole country, and, as a compromise between the MacMahon Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Pact, proceeded to set up Prince Feisal, son of the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, as titular king (Cairo Conference 1921), although the country became in international law and in fact a British mandate.

The new kingdom was entirely artificial, and mostly tribal. There were many divisions and much animosity: Kurd against Arab, tribesman against townsman, Shiah against Sunni, north against south, pro-British against pro-Turkish. Despite this the British advisers introduced popular suffrage,[2] courts, parliament, army, air force, and

[1] REFERENCE: H. A. Foster, *The Making of Modern Iraq* (1936).
E. Main, *Iraq from Mandate to Independence* (1935).

[2] Less than 20 per cent of the population are literate; in 1938 in the Basra municipal elections each candidate received more votes than the total number of voters registered!

educational system on the Western model, long before the country was ready for these things, and before it was economically independent. It was to King Feisal's credit that his patience welded the differences of his tribesmen, persuaded the *mullahs*[1] to accept sweeping changes, and at the same time kept on the right side of his British advisers. General order was secured; public health vastly improved; and education, especially the education of girls, certainly flourished.

In 1932, King Feisal convinced Great Britain that his country was ready for real independence and membership of the League of Nations. Great Britain withdrew her garrisons and most of her advisers. No sooner had the mandate been relinquished than the Christian Assyrian minority, some 40,000 strong, demanded autonomous territory. Several thousand of these Assyrians had served in the British levies and represented a compact armed force, which broke into open revolt. King Feisal was in Switzerland, and in his absence the anti-British Kurd, Bekr Sidqi Pasha, suppressed the revolt and disarmed and murdered 400 Assyrians in cold blood (Someil Massacre). Possibly as a result of this, relations between Iraqis and Assyrians have since been tranquil.

King Feisal died in 1933. His son Ghazi, the second king, was accidentally killed in 1939, and was succeeded by Feisal's grandson, Feisal II, a four-year-old boy, under the Regency of Abdul Ilah, a statesman with strong British leanings.

In 1935, a treaty was concluded between Iraq and Saudia,

[1] *Mullah:* religious teacher in the mosques, usually fanatical and reactionary.

and in 1937 the Saadabad Pact composed long outstanding differences with Iran, and included Turkey and Afghanistan.

In 1941, when the Nazi thrust into the Balkans was taking shape with its threat to Palestine and the Suez Canal, Great Britain took advantage of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 to land troops near Baghdad.[1] The Iraqi Government had fallen into the hands of a group of army officers called the Golden Square, led by the pro-Nazi anti-Semitic Rashid Ali, who opposed by force the British landings and attempted to seize the airfield. Had the Germans not been held up for six weeks in Greece, this might have been the end of the British in the Near East. As it was, a British armoured regiment and two companies of infantry not only retained the airfield, but defeated Rashid Ali, reinstated the Regent, and, for the rest of the war, Iraq was again British occupied.

The revenue of Iraq is about £6 million, of which £2 million comes from oil royalties. Oil is the economic salvation of the Near East, and the reason for Anglo-American interest in these barren lands. Even in Turkish days oil was discovered in great quantities in Kirkuk in Iraq, and in 1934 the world's longest welded pipe-line (1150 miles to Haifa) was opened. By 1942, 24 million tons of oil had been pumped into tankers at Haifa and Tripoli. These installations are worked by British engineers, since few Iraqis possess the necessary technical skill, a fact which is not relished by the nationalists, despite the very generous 50 per cent royalty paid, the highest in the world. As in Saudia, this revenue revolutionizes Iraqi economy, although the oil concessions

[1] For a sympathetic account of the war in the Near East, and of Young Arab nationalism in general (Aden, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Iraq) see *East is West* (1945) by the inimitable Miss Freya Stark.

certainly mean some dependence on Great Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States.

Following the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in Persia, and the withdrawal by Great Britain from the Abadan refineries, the Iraqi Government in October 1951 requested a favourable revision of its treaty with Britain. The proposal, however, was made in proper diplomatic form, and suggested amendment by amicable consultation.

Jordan.

Area: 34,750 square miles
Population: 1,200,000

The Amirate of Transjordan, now the Hashimite[1] Kingdom of Jordan, was the scene of most of Col. Lawrence's picturesque manœuvres in the First World War. Having received a mandate from the League of Nations (1922), Great Britain set up Abdullah, brother of King Feisal of Iraq, as Amir of Transjordan, on much the same conditions as prevailed in Iraq. Partial independence was granted in 1933, and in the Second World War Transjordan troops co-operated with British in the suppression of the pro-German rising in Iraq, and in the occupation of Syria. Throughout King Abdullah showed himself to be staunchly pro-British, even in 1940, when the rest of the world thought that Britain's day was done. This was partly due to the absence of oil royalties to make him financially independent, and the consequent usefulness of the British subsidy, and partly to the presence of the 15,000 strong Arab Legion, raised and commanded by the British Brigadier Glubb

[1] The king is rightly proud of his descent from the ancient Hashimite Royal House.

Pasha, the only effective striking force in the Arab world; but the main reason was undoubtedly King Abdullah's personal loyalty to his friends.[1]

Although Jordan signed the protocol of the Arab League in 1944, the state was by no means in accord with the hot-head aims of some of the other members, even when the Amirate became completely independent in 1946. King Abdullah assumed the title of king, and immediately concluded a 20-year treaty with Great Britain.

In the Arab-Jew war which followed the surrender of the British mandate in Palestine, Abdullah's Arab Legion was the only unit of the Arab League's forces to put up any show in the field, and, in consequence, when the new state of Israel was established, certain areas west of the Jordan, including the Old City of Jerusalem, were incorporated into Transjordan. The prefix " Trans " was dropped, and the country became Jordan. This amalgamation of East and West Jordan was recognized by Great Britain (with certain reservations covering Jerusalem) in 1950.

King Abdullah was assassinated in July 1951, as he was leaving a Mosque in Jerusalem, an incident which inevitably caused a further deterioration of Arab-Jew relations, the more so since the king was not only himself a moderate, but had great personal influence with King Farouk of Egypt. The assassin was not a Jew, but an extremist Arab, an adherent of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who opposed the king's moderation to Israel and his pro-British views. The death of the king was a sad blow not only to Jordan, but also to the whole position in the Near East, particularly in so far as it

[1] REFERENCE: *Memoirs: Abdullah, King of Transjordan* (1950).
Jon Kimche: *Seven Fallen Pillars* (1950).

affected Great Britain. Owing to his prolonged ill-health, the accession of the Amir Talal was not unanimously welcome, and for months Amman, the capital, overflowed with intrigue.

Nor were the member states of the Arab League united in the crisis. Iraq sought a union of the two kingdoms under Feisal. King Ibn Saud took the opportunity of promoting his traditional rivalry with the Hashimites by backing a plan for a Jordanian merger with Syria into a republic ruled from Damascus. Only Egypt supported the accession of the murdered King's sick son, in the possible hope that, under the influence of the ex-Mufti, a consummate politician wise in the ways of Eastern intrigue, Arab Palestine, if not all Jordan, would become an Egyptian satellite. Moreover, the Palestinian Arabs, now a vocal, active, discontented majority of Jordan's population, do not get on well with Abdullah's original Trans-Jordanians.

Eventually, King Talal was accepted, and his government publicly affirmed its adherence to the British alliance, but there is no doubt that by the assassination of Abdullah Great Britain lost her best friend in the Near East at a time when further decline in influence could least be afforded.

Egypt and the Sudan.

Area: 386,198 square miles (13,500 cultivated)
Population: 19 millions

Egypt is not in Asia at all, but its affinities are with the Near East rather than with Africa and, as a member of the Arab League, the country is included here.

It should be unnecessary to mention the antiquity of Egyptian civilization. The 1st Dynasty is usually dated about 3000 B.C., and the 31st Dynasty about 332 B.C., when

Alexander the Great set up the Ptolemies. After the Greeks came the Romans, and after the Romans the Arabs. From A.D. 640 Egypt was a province of the Caliphate, and from 1517 to 1879 (nominally 1914) of the Ottoman Empire.

It is from 1805 that the history of modern Egypt begins. In that year the Albanian adventurer Mehemet Ali became Pasha of Cairo and, from this position, after a lifetime of campaigning, sometimes for, and more often against the Sublime Porte,[1] he secured the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt and the Sudan.

The misfortunes of his grandson Ismail (1863–79) brought a new foreign domination to Egypt even before the Turks had really gone. Ismail has been accused of extravagance and incompetence; in fact, he became caught up in various development schemes, notably the Suez Canal, railways, and irrigation, far too ambitious for his revenues, with the result that he became the pawn of none too scrupulous European financial interests. In addition his relations with the Porte amounted to blackmail rather than tribute. To secure the passage of the Pashalik to his eldest son, in the Western rather than the Muslim way, and the title of Khedive, cost him 500 million francs in bribes to Constantinople, but by so doing he established the present Royal House. Further expenses were incurred in his efforts to settle the Sudan, in which he employed British generals, notably "Chinese" Gordon, who was murdered by the Mahdi in Khartoum.

After his bankruptcy in 1876, the Khedive Ismail was compelled to accept European financial "advisers" and the new penetration of Egypt began. Ismail attempted to resist,

[1] Literally "Heavenly Gate", the Government of the Sultan of Turkey.

upon which Great Britain brought pressure to bear upon the Sultan, who deposed Ismail in 1879 in favour of his son, Taufik. Thereafter, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), the British Financial Agent, was the real ruler of Egypt.

General discontent with this situation broke out in 1882 in the revolt of Arabi Bey, a low-bred adventurer, who for a time seized the government. A British squadron bombarded Alexandria and British troops landed at Suez, defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, and occupied Cairo. Sent temporarily to re-establish order, they remained for fifty-four years,[1] despite the fact that until 1914 Egypt was nominally a Turkish province. Europeans in Egypt were exempt from taxation and from Egyptian justice, having the right under the " capitulations " to trial before their own consuls.

It is indisputable that Egypt made immense headway under the able Cromer and his successors (1907) Gorst and Kitchener. The plantation of cotton stepped up the revenue; irrigation works and dams removed for ever the haunting fear of drought in Lower Egypt; the Sudan was retaken and settled and Ismail's debts assumed, so that the Anglo-French Debt Commission, the only restraint on the British " Consul-General ", was dissolved. Even in 1914, however, Egyptian nationalism did not welcome these benefits brought by an alien hand.

In 1914, Britain at last formally declared a protectorate over Egypt, which she had in practice exercised from 1879.

[1] In the Suez Canal Zone they were still there in 1952. The Suez Canal, connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and thereby saving the long Cape route to the East, is run by an international company (British, French, Egyptian). As it runs through exclusively Egyptian territory, the Egyptian Nationalists demand complete control. Although less important than it was before the days of air travel, the Canal is still of the first strategic interest to Britain, and strongly garrisoned for defence.

The Khedive Abbas was deposed, and his uncle Hussein proclaimed Sultan, to be succeeded in 1917 by Fuad. In consequence of the nationalist (*Wafd*) agitations and revolt, Great Britain abolished the protectorate in 1922, and proclaimed Fuad king, retaining the right to garrison Egypt and to administer the Sudan. This compromise was acceptable to the king but not to the *Wafd*, and Egyptian politics became a struggle between the *Wafd*, representing nationalist and anti-British constitutionalism, and the Crown, which, owing its existence to Great Britain, was compelled to support the British position. Eventually in 1936 a treaty of perpetual alliance was signed between Great Britain and Egypt, whereby Egypt became completely sovereign, but even then Britain retained the right for 20 years to garrison the Canal Zone, and the continuance of the dual control of the Sudan, which duality is in effect a British administration. The treaty was followed by admission of Egypt into the League of Nations, and by the abolition of capitulations.

In the Second War, Egypt remained non-belligerent, but, somewhat reluctantly adhering to her treaty obligations, permitted the country to be used as an Allied base. In effect, she had no option, and the cities of Cairo and Alexandria prospered mightily as a result of the presence of great numbers of British and American troops. A further advantage was the accrument of £450 million sterling balances, that is, debts incurred by Great Britain for expenses during the use of Egyptian territory. Thus the creditor power which had come into Egypt in 1879 to secure her dues, went out in 1946 heavily in Egypt's debt.

In 1946, Great Britain voluntarily withdrew the garrison of Cairo and the naval base in Alexandria, but the Egyptians

pressed for complete military evacuation, including the Canal Zone, and for the recognition of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan. These were the demands of the *Wafd* in the three-cornered struggle between the *Wafd*, the Palace, and the British, which has been the dominant feature of Egyptian politics for thirty years. The *Wafd* (the word means " representative delegation ") somewhat resembles India's Congress. It is a national and popular party, but includes wealthy business men and intellectuals, as well as artisans and labourers. It has been led for twenty years by Nahas Pasha, burly, hearty, and talkative, the son of a poor *fellah*, and one of the few Egyptian leaders who have risen from humble origins in a society dominated by great wealth, great families, and inherited influence. He represents the students, the cities, the young *effendis*, and the mobs, but is as far apart from the ruling classes of Egypt as they themselves are distinct, even racially, from the mass of the people. The Cairo patricians, heirs of the Ottoman Pashas and Beys, are of mixed Turkish, Albanian, and Syrian descent, and look towards Europe, and particularly to France, for their culture.

Separate again are the great mass of the people, the agriculturists, the *fellaheen*, upon whose miserable labours the great wealth of the Pashas and the existence of the demagogues alike depend. These peasants, poverty-stricken, diseased, debilitated, illiterate, have only so much interest in politics as can be whipped into them by agitators, and it is indubitable that in recent years the *Wafd* cry of " Egypt for the Egyptians "[1] has served the ruling classes well as

[1] The Christian Copts, now in a small minority, are the heirs of the original Egyptians, but no one suggests Egypt should be returned to them (as Palestine has been to the Jews), since they are as a group inarticulate and self-effacing.

a means of diverting attention from manifold social injustices.

In October 1951, obviously inspired at least in part by the withdrawal of the British from Abadan in Persia, and spurred on by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Government announced unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, proclaimed Farouk King of the Sudan, and demanded immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone. The *démarche* was made on the very eve of proposals from Great Britain, the United States, France, and Turkey which would have included Egypt as an equal partner in a five-legged Middle East Defence Command, based on the Suez Canal, probably with a titular Egyptian Commander-in-Chief.

Deluded by the apparent British diplomatic defeat in Persia, and overlooking the fact that, unlike Persia, Egypt was completely surrounded by British-controlled territory and had no land frontier with the Soviet Union, the Government of Nahas Pasha arrogantly refused to consider such an offer until Great Britain evacuated both the Canal Zone and the Sudan. These questions, which the Egyptians chose to regard as one, were in effect completely separate. The security of the Suez Canal is a vital interest of the West in general, and of the British Commonwealth in particular. Its control is essential to British connexion with India, Malaya, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand, and for United States traffic with her Near East oil concessions. In consequence, Great Britain declined to entertain evacuation, seized strategic points by armed force, and greatly reinforced her military and naval establishments in the Zone. In this action, she had the approval of Australia,

New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, France, and Turkey, and it was thus made abundantly clear to the Egyptian Government that the United Nations, if not Great Britain alone, intended to retain control of the Canal.

The *Wafd* and Muslim Brotherhood demands in the Sudan were more exclusively a matter for Anglo-Egyptian negotiation.

The **Sudan** is a vast area stretching from the Egyptian frontier to Equatorial Africa. The peoples are Nubian, Bantu, and Negro—entirely non-Egyptian. It is important to Britain as an immense source of raw cotton, and to Egypt as controlling the head-waters of the Nile, which could, were the Sudan in hostile hands, be dammed, in which case the whole of Egypt would starve. The Sudan was conquered originally by Mehemet Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, in the first half of the nineteenth century, and used by them as slave-hunting grounds. Towards the end of the century, the whole area was overrun by the Mahdi, a fanatical Muslim leader, whose rule was so brutal as almost to halve the population. It was reconquered by British and Egyptian forces, under the command of British generals, notably the famous Lord Kitchener, but there was never any doubt that these officers were seconded from the British Army and employed by the ruler of Egypt. Historically and legally, then, there is basis for the Egyptian claim to sole rule in the Sudan, rather than for joint control, the so-called *condominium*, in effect a British preserve. It is, however, indisputable and undisputed that the British administration of the Sudan—an area larger than Europe—has been first class, and, at any rate since the end of the Second World War, the intention has been very clear—the eventual handing

over of control, not to the Egyptians, but to the Sudanese.

To this end, the British Government has supported the Umma (Sudanese Nationalist) party of H. H. Sayyid Sir Abdul Rahman el Mahdi Pasha, the grandson of the Mahdi, the obvious choice for first king of a national Sudanese State under British influence. Such a policy was not unsuccessful in the Near East after 1919, and was again followed by the British Government in the former Italian colony of Libya, now (1952) a kingdom under the pro-British King Idris I, former Amir of Cyrenaica.

After the sudden demand for the surrender of the Sudan in 1951, and as a riposte thereto, the British Governor-General hurried on the formation of a Sudanese Constituent Assembly, and promised political independence for an autonomous Sudanese (not Egyptian) Government " before the end of 1952 ".

In point of fact, it is at least doubtful whether the Egyptians, however clamorous they may appear to be, really want the trouble of administering the Sudan, which they regard as a backward area. So long as it can be sure of the security of the head-waters of the Nile (which in its heart it knows it can so long as they are in British hands), the Egyptian government probably does not really covet the Sudan, which it could not possibly hold for long, but the parrot cry " Sovereignty of the Nile Valley " is a convenient method of diverting the attention of 16 million *fellaheen*, all in a condition of abject poverty, from the urgent need for social reform at home. So far from the British Sudan becoming part of Egypt, the *fellaheen* would be far better off if Egypt became part of the British Sudan, and the Egyptian government is anxious to prevent their realizing it.

In fine, both the points of the Nationalist demands on Great Britain are probably made with tongue in cheek, out of oriental love of bargaining and natural delight in twisting the tail of the once mighty Lion. Egypt is a close oligarchy, in which not more than a quarter of a million rich men own 90 per cent of the wealth of the land. If there ever comes a time when Egypt must take definite sides in an ideological conflict between Communist totalitarianism and democratic individualism, there can be no doubt where the sympathies of the present Egyptian governing class would lie, whatever their views on the Canal, the Sudan, and the status of Israel. This is particularly true of King Farouk himself, a long-headed and autocratic monarch, who knows that Egyptian defence is only possible with Western aid. He proved this very clearly in January 1952 by dismissing out of hand Nahas Pasha, and forming a more moderate Cabinet under Maher Pasha. He resigned after a month, however, in face of pressure from the *Wafd*, and was replaced by Hilaly Pasha, another moderate Independent and Royal nominee. Thus there is reason to anticipate eventual *rapprochement*, if not between Cairo and Whitehall, at least between Egypt and the Atlantic Treaty Powers.

Yemen, Aden, Hadramaut, and the Gulf Sultanates.

Yemen, with an area of 75,000 square miles, and a population of 3½ millions, is very different physically from the rest of Arabia. In between 10,000-foot mountain ranges lie plateaux which yield lush fruits of all kinds; the valleys produce wheat and barley, and the mountain slopes Mocha coffee and the much prized drug *kat*. It is in consequence the base of a very considerable dhow trade with Ethiopia

and Somalia, in which dubious cargoes still pass—slaves to the Yemen and guns to Ethiopia.

Freed from Turkish domination by the First World War, the Imam of Yemen made several efforts to expand into Aden and Saudia territory. In the former case he was subdued by R.A.F. activity, and concluded a treaty of friendship with Great Britain in 1934 which gave him the title of king. In the latter case his raids provoked open war in 1934 from Ibn Saud, after which a Saudia-Yemen treaty delineated the frontiers and established peace.

The barren, fire-baked rock of **Aden**, 1800 feet high, is of the greatest strategic importance to Great Britain as a link in the route to the East, and as a coaling and oiling station. It was seized from the Sultan of Lahej in 1839, since when defence has necessitated occupation of the coastal belt towards the Persian Gulf, which is called the Aden Protectorate.

North of this, and south of Saudia, lies the **Hadramaut,**[1] a mainly arid area divided between the Quaiti and Kathiri Sultanates. Its people have close connexion with the East Indies, and Hadramaut Arabs control considerable business interests in Bombay and Singapore. The personal bodyguard of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the premier prince of India, is also recruited here.

The **Gulf Sultanates** comprise Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the seven Sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast, which is the old Pirate Coast. Despite their situation in the hottest part of the world, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar may be called the Isles of the Blessed; Bahrain is rich with pearls and oil, and Kuwait with oil, so that, almost alone in the

[1] Reference may profitably be made to the magnificent books of Miss Freya Stark, available in the cheap *Penguin Library*.

world, the 100,000 Arabs who live in each are not bothered by taxation, yet enjoy all the fruits of free education, hospitalization, and other benefits of the modern paternal state. The Sultan of Bahrain receives £25,000 a day from his oil royalties (£9 million a year), and much of this goes to the welfare of his people. Evidence of this new wealth is apparent to the most casual tourist. The bazaars are crammed with worth-while goods, and clean little children can actually be seen at play—*at play* in Arabia where babies of eight crouch over sewing machines in dark hovels in the bazaars. This opulence is not without its dangers. The oil revenues of Bahrain are greater than those of Saudia, and such wealth must attract envy. Persia makes no secret of her claims to the Gulf Sultanates, and she is not alone in casting covetous eyes.

Great Britain has been established in the Persian Gulf for 300 years and, apart from the oil, the whole area is of the foremost strategic importance. All these petty principalities have been in close alliance with Great Britain since the nineteenth century, and British residents advise the respective rulers; relations are extremely friendly. The loss of India and Pakistan as a reliable Asiatic base, and the 1951 troubles with Persia over the status of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, make this surveillance doubly necessary, and so far it has been managed with the hearty co-operation of the various rulers.

Turkey.

Area: Europe—9256 square miles. Asia—285,246 square miles
Population: Europe—1·5 millions. Asia—17·25 millions

Nowadays Turkey, although geographically mainly in Asia Minor, is more European than Asiatic in temper. Yet

until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sultan controlled a vast Eastern Empire, and until 1919 was the Caliph of Islam. In the years immediately preceding 1914, Turkey was stripped of all her European possessions save only Constantinople, and in 1919, of the four conquered states, Turkey seemed the most utterly prostrate. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) took away half her population and two-thirds of her territory, and distributed Asiatic Turkey among the Allies.

The last Sultan-Caliph, Mehmed VI, accepted this, but not so Mustafa Kemal Pasha,[1] the general who defeated the British at Gallipoli. He formed a nationalist government in Ankara, obtained arms from the Bolshevist Russians, and marched against the French in Syria and the Greeks in Smyrna. Driving the Greeks into the sea, Kemal turned on Constantinople, deposed the Sultan (1920–21), and denounced the Treaty of Sèvres.

Short of war, there was now no question of enforcing its terms, and France, Italy, and the British Dominions (excepting Australia and New Zealand) made it clear that if Great Britain fought Turkey she would do so alone. In consequence, by the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey retained Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and Kemal became first President of the Turkish Republic (October 1923).

Kemal was an extraordinary man. Throughout the First War, a lonely, insubordinate figure, when Turkey was allied with Germany, he persistently opposed the extension of German influence, and only his great ability as a general saved his career and probably his life. From this time dates his aggressive xenophobia. He disliked Europeans, for he realized that the decay of Ottoman Turkey was largely due

[1] REFERENCE: H. C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf* (1934).

to the manner in which the Sultans had allowed real control to pass into Western hands. But he admired European methods, and the Westernization of Turkey became the keynote of his policy. To this task he brought a single-minded determination which made him invincible. He spared no one and no thing. Once established within the boundaries of Turkey proper, he abolished the Caliphate and the framework of Islam round which the Sultanate had been built. The power of the *mullahs* was broken, and control of schools and law-courts transferred to the state.

The attack on religion did not go unchallenged. In 1925 the Kurds rebelled, and were crushed with remorseless severity. Kemal suppressed the Dervish monasteries, and outlawed the fez, the cup-shaped cap without a brim which enables the Muslim to pray in the proper posture with his head covered and his forehead on the ground. The Western calendar was introduced, and polygamy made illegal. Realizing that Imperial Istanbul was the seat of the hated foreign domination and too impregnated with the spirit of the Sultans to be changed, he transferred the capital to Ankara, and the new state took on the nature of that harsh mountain citadel rather than of the enervating glories of Byzantium. These changes were as unpopular with the older Turks as they were pleasing to the vigorous rising generation, and in 1927, 1931, and 1935 Kemal Ataturk (Father of the Turks) was re-elected President-Dictator.

One of his greatest feats was the emancipation of women. He freed them from the harem and the veil, gave them (1931) equal civil rights with men, and made open to them almost all civilian careers as in the West.

In 1927, 92 per cent of the population were illiterate.

Kemal introduced compulsory education in secular schools, the metric system, and the Latin alphabet, and there grew up a generation free from reactionary Islam, and the sprawling, difficult, back-handed (but very beautiful) Arabic script. Kemal himself found time to conduct examinations in schools, and to instruct (with soldiers armed with whips standing by) up-country peasants in the Roman script. In these circumstances, they learnt remarkably quickly.

In 1919, there was only one railway in Turkey, and by Western standards no roads at all. Kemal opened up the whole country with a system of excellent communications. In 1919, there were 150 factories in Turkey; in 1933, 2000, while the Turkish Five Year Plan encouraged heavy industry still further. The banking system was reorganized, and the Ottoman Public Debt (which Kemal was wise enough and honest enough not to repudiate) refunded. All this was achieved without further borrowing and (from 1931) with balanced budgets, for Turkey is a country comparatively rich in natural resources and well able to stand development on these lines.

In foreign affairs Kemal destroyed the legend of the " Terrible Turk ". He concluded a treaty with the despised Greeks in 1930; made no efforts to regain sovereignty over the lost African and Asiatic provinces; and joined the League of Nations in 1932. He even rejected the temptations of the Mosul and Syrian oil-fields, to which in justice Turkey has a very considerable claim. This was the more remarkable since Turkey, by the fortune of war, is an oil-less island surrounded by oil lands (Rumania, Russia, Iraq, Iran, Syria). The recently opened deposits in S.E. Anatolia provide barely enough for the home market.

Kemal Pasha was a dictator, but his regime was based on no abstract ideology, either Communist or Fascist. He created no private party, used no hysterical methods. He worked single-handed and he worked like a demon on reconstruction and Westernization, and his greatness lay in his knowledge of his country's limitations. He realized that the old Ottoman Empire had been an incubus, not an asset, to Turkey proper, and he was content to accept the frontiers of 1922, and within them construct a sound, progressive, solvent, nation-state. Although probably 35 million Turks live under foreign flags, he raised no plaints concerning the dishonour of minorities. Once the power of the mosques was broken, there was no religious persecution, and very little internal oppression. A man of most immoral private life, the cold, cynical Ataturk was essentially a realist. He knew the difference between the practical and the desirable, and limited his objectives to those which could be lastingly achieved, without Western help and without Western capital. In this he differed greatly from contemporary dictators in the West, and from the new national states which were his neighbours to south and south-east. That is why he died honoured, successful, and even loved, and his Turkey continues to flourish, a monument to industry and common sense.

He was succeeded by his lieutenant, Ismet Inönü (1938), who was re-elected in 1943 and 1946, but not in 1949. By then, Turkish political institutions had matured sufficiently for a stable two-party system to operate, and Inönü was constitutionally replaced by a moderate opposition in the British manner.

Turkey remained neutral in the Second World War until

February 1945, when she joined the United Nations. She thus escaped the ravages which overtook most of the other belligerents. Since 1945, the face of the Turkish Government has been resolutely turned Westwards. Her sympathy with the Anglo-American bloc made possible in late 1951 a Middle Eastern Pact (Great Britain, U.S.A., France, and Turkey) as a Levantine extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in itself a further proof of Turkish determination to remain a compact industrial power, and to eschew the weaknesses and romantic glories of Asia.

Syria[1] and Lebanon.

Area: Syria—66,000 square miles. Lebanon—3400 square miles

Population: Syria—3 millions. Lebanon—1·25 millions

In 1920, at the San Remo Conference, Syria and Lebanon came under French mandate, despite the fact that the General Syrian Congress of Arabs declared from Damascus the independence of Syria under the Amir Feisal. French troops forcibly occupied Damascus, enlarged Lebanon at the expense of Syria, and divided the rest into four states: Latakia, Jebel Druse, Alexandretta, and Syria, each separate, but all under direct French control. This division was possibly wise, since Syria and Lebanon, cooler, mountainous, and far more fertile than lands to south or east, have mixed populations of Muslims, various kinds of Christians,[2] Jews and Druses, Lebanon being predominantly Christian and Syria Muslim.

[1] REFERENCE: W. T. F. Castle, *Syrian Pageant* (1948).

[2] Maronite (Latin) in Lebanon, Jacobites and Nestorians (schismatic) in Syria.

The Druses are a curious sect whose rites are utterly secret, following an eleventh-century Muslim Caliph of Egypt, Al Hakim bi Amr Allah, who proclaimed himself to be a reincarnation of God. Reincarnation is the basis of the Druse belief, a soul (of which there are a fixed number) going through seventy-two reincarnations before God finally triumphs and the soul becomes a star in heaven. The Druses have in their time (1860) united with Muslims to massacre Christians, but latterly they have been politically favoured by Britain. France, however, preferred the Lebanese Maronites. This caused the Druse rebellion of 1925, and the French bombardment of Damascus, which embittered the whole Near East. Thereafter, there were sporadic rebellions until in 1936 the Blum Government of Paris made treaties with both Syria and Lebanon by which independence was promised in 1939. This undertaking was nullified by the War of that year.

With the collapse of France in 1940, the presence of Vichy-controlled (pro-German) troops in Syria, with Syrian airfields being used by the Nazis, was a constant threat to British Palestine, so that British and Fighting French troops formally occupied the mandates on the 8th June 1941, when General Catroux guaranteed them sovereign status. This was implemented by the withdrawal of French troops in 1946, since when Lebanon has been tranquil, but Syria has suffered several *coups d'état* and changes of regime. Both states are members of the Arab League, and the disputed Syrian-Israel frontier is a constant source of provocation both to Damascus and Tel Aviv.

Israel.[1]

Area: 8050 square miles

Population:		
	Jews	1,014,000
	Muslims[2] ..	120,000
	Christians ..	35,000
	Druses ..	5,000
	Total	1,174,000

Palestine, now called Israel, is a small country not much larger than Wales. The "flowing with milk and honey" description of the Biblical Promised Land[3] was surely written in contrast with the barren Wilderness (Sinai Desert), for Israel is neither particularly fertile (until irrigated) nor particularly attractive.

It was, of course, the original home of the Jews until they were scattered first by the Romans,[4] and then by Arab Islam (A.D. 634), and finally by the Ottomans. It is only in the last sixty years that any definite move towards Jewish colonization of Palestine (Zionism) has taken shape. Even to-day, Zionism is a sentiment rather than a practical desire. Prosperous Jews of Britain and America contribute to the Jewish National Fund to help other Jews to go to Palestine, but few dream of going themselves. That is a privilege for victims of Tsarist and Nazi pogroms, and for displaced persons.

[1] REFERENCE: A. Revusky, *The Jews in Palestine* (1935).
J. Parkes, *A History of Palestine* (1949).
Douglas Reed, *Somewhere South of Suez* (1950), an interesting but very biased view of Zionism.

[2] Excluding at least 5 million Muslim refugees who fled to Iraq and Syria.

[3] *Exodus* 3, viii.

[4] Titus, afterwards Roman Emperor, destroyed Jerusalem and Solomon's Temple in A.D. 70.

It was in 1881 that Russian Jews founded the first Zionist Colony in Turkish Palestine, then inhabited by 350,000 Arabs and 30,000 Oriental Jews, all desperately poor. At first these colonies were supported entirely by Rothschild charity[1] until, in 1897, Dr. Theodor Herzl launched the first Zionist Conference in Basle, aimed at securing from the Sultan a separate Jewish political entity. By 1914, there were 100,000 Jews in Palestine. From the start Great Britain was sympathetic,[2] and in 1917 produced the Balfour Declaration, directly contrary to the MacMahon promises to the Arabs, and very difficult to justify except on grounds of expediency.

From 1920 to 1932, Jewish immigration increased by 10,000 annually, until, with Hitler's advent, in 1934 it jumped to 66,000. Mandated Palestine improved by leaps and bounds. The city of Tel Aviv, in 1906 a stretch of sand, now boasts 200,000 inhabitants, among them some of the most distinguished scholars in the world, and gaunt streets of most impressive modernistic buildings.

Modern Zionism is subdivided. The Chasidim, strictly orthodox, mostly Polish and Russian, sport the *kaftan*, fur caps, and long greasy side curls of the Ghetto. The Mizrachi, still orthodox, are less severe. The Cultural Zionists, centred round the University of Mount Scopus, are less interested in religion than in learning, and are readily willing to co-operate with the Arabs. The Economic Zionists include Marxist Communists and the *Histadrut* (Trade Unionists) who are responsible for collective farming and

[1] The Rothschilds were an immensely rich family of international bankers.

[2] In 1903 large tracts of (then) useless land in Uganda were offered as an alternative to Palestine, which the Zionists refused.

co-operative trading, strictly disciplined but unhindered by any religious convictions. There are terrorist Revisionists who seek to drive out every Arab, not only from Israel, but also from Jordan. Finally there are Oriental Jews, mainly from Yemen, dark of skin, whose standards are those of the tenth century, having far more in common with the Arabs (save only religion) than they have with the flashy young Westerners of the *Histadrut*, or the California and Berlin Ph.D.s of the Hebrew University.

In the conflict between Jews and Arabs, the brains, the money, and Western influence are all on the side of the Jews. Yet the Arab himself has dwelt in these lands from time immemorial, before and after the Jews were dispersed. In the last years of the British protectorate, Jewish terrorism reached levels which made compromise impossible; neither did the intransigence of the Arab Grand Mufti of Jerusalem help. Islam has no priesthood, and the Grand Mufti is just one of thousands of Sayyids, and in effect no more than a kind of superior attorney inferior to the religious Sheikhs and the *qadis* (judges). El Haj[1] Amin el Husseini's influence is based on his capacity for intrigue, his control of the funds of the *waqfs* (religious foundations), his chairmanship of the Arab Higher Committee, and his acceptance by the British at his own much inflated valuation. Some might call him mischievous and intolerant, and incapable of constructive statecraft.

In 1948, the British Government, weary of an expensive and thankless task, which cost the lives of soldiers[2] and earned

[1] The title of *Haj* is given to anyone who has made the Mecca pilgrimage.

[2] See *The Revolt* (1951) by Menachem Begin, the head of *Irgun*, the Jewish Terrorist Organization.

the unqualified abuse of the whole world, especially of the United States, abandoned the Palestine mandate, leaving the solution of the Arab-Jew problem to the United Nations Organization.

The Jewish National Council proclaimed a national state of Israel with David Ben Gurion as Prime Minister. On the same day, the new state was invaded by Syria and Lebanon from the north, by Transjordan and Iraq from the east, and by Egypt from the south. Unfortunately for the Arab League, despite their predominance in numbers and reputation, their troops, with the exception of the Transjordan Legion, proved no match for the Jewish army, illicitly equipped and supplied on a large scale by Western Jewry and other officially unidentified sources. At Gaza, the Egyptian Army (at that time loudly proclaiming its ability to defend the Suez Canal) showed itself particularly inept and made no progress at all into Palestine. King Farouk was compelled to burn the special issue of stamps struck to commemorate his entry into Jerusalem.

The intervention of the United Nations Organization, after the assassination by Jews of the first mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte,[1] secured the cessation of hostilities and virtually recognized the *status quo*. Of the 10,000 square miles of mandated Palestine, 8000 remained to Israel; the remainder, except for the small Gaza strip occupied by Egypt, was incorporated into Jordan. The internationalization of Jerusalem intended by U.N.O. remained in abeyance, the city being partitioned between Israel and Jordan. The new state of Israel was recognized by most of the world in 1939, but no formal treaties have yet delineated its boundaries,

[1] See *To Jerusalem* by Count Folke Bernadotte (English translation, 1951).

and it has incurred the undying hostility of the Arab League. For all this, and despite its smallness, Israel has undoubtedly come to stay, and its frontiers provide yet one more area of discontent in a troubled world.

Oil in the Near East.[1]

Almost all the Arab and quasi-Arab states of the Near East, although politically independent, are, to a greater or less extent, economically dependent on American or British financial interests. The oil companies form states within states, little Western commercial empires, really independent of their nominal rulers and generally possessed of far greater resources. This is because the drilling of oil wells, the building of refineries, and the construction of tanker fleets require capital to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds, and call for large-scale engineering corps, both of which, formerly and even to-day, are only available from the West, especially the United States and Great Britain. Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Gulf Sultanates rely for their revenue on their oil royalties and, since as yet they have lacked sufficient technicians to operate the fields themselves, they have had to tolerate Anglo-American enclaves on their soil. They have not always done so with very good grace.

In 1901, the Englishman William d'Arcy secured a 66-year contract for all the oil in Persia. In 1909, the Anglo-Persian (now Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company was formed to exploit d'Arcy's concession, and in this enterprise the British Government came to possess the majority of shares. The company's money built the great settlements of Abadan,

[1] REFERENCE: Sir Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power* (1951).

Ahwaz, and Shahabad, little bits of Britain set down on the alluvial soil of the Shatt-al-Arab. The establishment after the First World War of a strong central government in Teheran was followed in 1932 by the cancellation of this concession. The British Government appealed to the League of Nations, and secured the renewal of the contract on less advantageous terms (20 per cent royalties instead of 16 per cent, the limitation of the area to 100,000 square miles around Abadan, and the training of Persian personnel). After the Second World War, when Great Britain was starved for dollars, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company became doubly important as the only world source of " sterling oil ", that is, oil available to the Western world against payment in pounds and not American dollars. (Venezuela, the only other world oil exporting area, is in the dollar bloc.) When in 1951 the strongly nationalist government of Dr. Mossadeq again cancelled the Anglo-Iranian oil concession and demanded complete control of the oil-fields, the matter was serious for reasons of defence as well as finance, for oil is perhaps the most important of the sinews of war.

In Tsarist days, the great Russian fields at Baku were also developed with Anglo-American capital privately subscribed. When in 1921 the Soviet Government displaced the White Russians (and the British) from Baku, they nationalized the oil-fields without compensation. For a time, the other oil companies maintained a boycott of this " stolen " Baku oil, but its cheapness soon overcame scruples. American engineers (but not U.S. capital) found their way to Baku, Grozny, and Maikop, and in 1933 Russia was second only to the U.S.A. in the output of oil.

The Mosul oil-field was originally developed by the so-

called Turkish Petroleum Company (1914), which was financed with British and German money. Not unnaturally the Mosul field was claimed by Turkey at the Conference of Lausanne, and British opinion, war-weary, would probably have conceded the demand but for the indomitable Marquess Curzon, the British plenipotentiary, who really knew the Near East and its peoples. Rejecting firmly the absurd suggestion that the Mosul Kurds were Turks, and the equally absurd idea that these illiterate nomads were capable of a plebiscite, Curzon manœuvred the matter before the League of Nations, and in 1926 Turkey finally agreed to Mosul's incorporation into Iraq. The Turkish Petroleum Company became the Iraq Petroleum Company (¼ French; ¼ American; ½ British). A double pipe-line was constructed to Haifa (British) and Tripoli (French). In addition to this, another company, Mosul Oil Fields Ltd., predominantly Italian, operated west of the Tigris. When, in 1936, British and Italian interests conflicted sharply over the question of Ethiopia, the six Italian and one German director of this company " retired ". How it was achieved is one of the many mysteries of oil politics, but Mosul Oil Fields became a subsidiary of Anglo-Iranian.

The development of the great South Arabian oil-field centred on the three islands of Bahrain is another mystery of oil politics. Bahrain oil was discovered by an Englishman, Major Holmes. Bahrain is a British protectorate; the British Admiralty requires nothing so much as oil from British (rather than Persian) territory. Yet both the Admiralty and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company turned down the Bahrain concession, which is now worked (1937) by the California and Texas Oil Company. Still more strange is it

that this American company employs 70 per cent British engineers, and the British "adviser" in Bahrain seems perfectly happy about the American infiltration.

It is possible that the British Foreign Office considered it wise not to accept an oil concession on an island to which Iran lays claim, in view of the difficulties already being experienced over Persian oil. Similarly, the United States, although always willing to capitalize commercial ventures, is seldom agreeable to providing armed protection therefor. (In 1938, the U.S. withdrew from the Iraq fields for this reason.) It might seem that a nominally American company benefiting by the *pax Britannica* in the Persian Gulf was the ideal combination to secure Bahrain oil without raising cries of British Imperialism, and if this be so (and it is really inconceivable that otherwise the British Admiralty would have let the opportunity slip), Anglo-American co-operation, so successful in World War II, had already begun in 1938.

The oil wealth of the Near East is but one factor in its importance. The strategic value of the Near East lies in its position as a bastion between the Middle East and the West, and particularly between Soviet Russia and the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. It is important to realize that Pan-Islamism is very much a sentiment, and that ties of religion have very little bearing on the relations between the Near Eastern states. This is one of the consequences of the lapse of the Caliphate. The Wahhabite Ibn Saud, the Sunni Farouk of Egypt, and the Arab nationalist ex-Mufti of Jerusalem would all like to claim this position, and all are mutually unacceptable, especially to the Shiah-ite Persians, who never recognized the Caliphate at all.

Similarly, Pan-Arabia is a dream of no particular incidence in practical politics. No less a person than Miss Gertrude Bell, one of the founders of Iraq and for a long time the chief adviser of King Feisal I, said: " There is no such thing as an Arab nation." The Near Eastern states are trying to form a united front against threats from without, from Russia in particular and the West in general. That explains Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabian sentiments; the Saadabad Pact of 1937 between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and the Arab League. Even so, there is much in Islam which is weak and discordant. The Saadabad Pact is a shadowy concept, and even the hatred of Zionism in Arab minds fails to make the Arab League an effective instrument. Irredentist feeling in Afghanistan has been increased, not allayed, by the creation of Pakistan. The foci of present differences are mainly these:

(*a*) Turkey-Iraq over the possession of Mosul.

(*b*) Iraq-Jordan over an exact frontier.

(*c*) Jordan-Israel over possession of Jerusalem.

(*d*) Iraq-Iran over control of the Shatt-al-Arab, which waterway is Iraq's sole outlet to the sea and Iran's only sea-route from the Abadan oil-fields, although there are other Persian ports on the Gulf.

(*e*) General suspicions of the intentions of that inscrutable person King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

(*f*) The whole question of the Hebrews in Israel at all, which particularly interests Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

Even if the Near East were not so caught up strategically and economically in the cold war between Russia and the

Anglo-American bloc, these problems, and many others of lesser account, would still remain, and it is exceedingly doubtful whether, even without the hidden hands of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, there could be any real cohesion between the successor states of the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER II

Central and High Asia

Iran (Persia).[1]

Area: 628,000 square miles
Population: 13 millions

Geographically perhaps Iran (or Persia)[2] belongs to the Near East, but by temper and background the empire is better included in the Central Asian group. There is, nevertheless, a certain similarity between Turkey and Persia. Both were empires in decay; both were victims of exploitation by the victorious Powers; between the wars, a strong man appeared in each to retrieve the situation. There the similarity ends.

Even in decay there was a certain continuity in Ottoman autocracy. In Iran there was constant change. After the Mongols, there came the Safavids; then the short Afghan domination; then the cruel Turkoman Nadir Shah; then the usurping General Kerim Khan. After him came the Turkish Kajars (1796–1926). Similarly, the seat of government was constantly altering. There was no security, and

[1] REFERENCE: L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Modern Iran* (1942).
V. Sackville West, *Passenger to Teheran* (1943).
W. S. Haas, *Iran* (1945).
Olive Sunagra, *I Sing in the Wilderness* (1951).

[2] *Fars*, from which the name Persia is derived, is but one province. Persia is to Iran as England is to Great Britain.

the common denominator of all these rulers was oppression and corruption, factors which, over centuries, produced a weak-willed people, charming in personal manners, but easily dominated, shiftless, idle, impossible to use, by tradition incapable of backing up (as did the Turks) a ruler who sought to lead them from the morass.

The backbone of Iran is its peasant population, yet the land is owned by a few absentee landlords, drawing as by right half the produce, with no middle class to intervene between the powerful and the oppressed, since trade is in the hands of Armenians, Jews, and low-type Europeans. Before 1914, as a result of the Shah's borrowings, Iran was in effect divided into British and Russian spheres of influence, and in the 1914–18 war this arrangement was officially recognized in secret treaty between St. Petersburg and London. The publication of this treaty by the Bolsheviks in 1918, and the complete encirclement of Persia by British troops, aroused great anti-British feeling in the country, which was by no means allayed by the British refusal to admit Persia to the Versailles Conference, or by the Curzon Treaty of 1919 which, if implemented, would have placed Persia in the same position as Egypt, as a British protectorate in all but name.

The treaty also irritated the Americans considerably, and this, together with the withdrawal of British troops before the Bolshevist Russians, emboldened the Persian Majlis (Parliament) to refuse ratification. Then appeared Persia's strong man—Reza Khan, a Colonel of Cossacks who, in 1921, marched on Teheran, denounced the Curzon Treaty, and concluded a most advantageous agreement with Bolshevist Russia, which surrendered to Persia all the Tsarist

concessions and capitulations (bank, railways, roads, and quays) save only the fishery rights of the Caspian Sea. Reza Khan became War Minister in 1921, Prime Minister in 1923, and in 1926 deposed the last Kajar Prince and made himself Shah with the dynastic title of Reza Shah Pahlevi.

Reza Shah's first preoccupation was with the army, which he developed and with which he subdued rebellious Sheikhs and unruly tribes and established public order for the first time for centuries. With Russia and Britain both gone, he had no money, and he turned to the United States, negotiated a loan, and accepted (1922) an American Administrator-General of Finance (Dr. A. C. Millspaugh).

The undoubted efficiency of this gentleman was considerably handicapped by the almost total lack of finance to administer. When the Soviets withdrew, they retained the fishing rights of the Caspian Sea which had been Russian for 200 years. When Reza Shah proved intractable over this, the U.S.S.R. boycotted Persian trade, refusing all imports (80 per cent of Persia's total exports), and allowing no Baku [1] petroleum into Persia. Moreover, American reforms, proper collection of taxes, abolition of family sinecures and of graft, aroused the whole country against them. In 1926, the army, which had not been paid for eight months, mutinied, and Millspaugh refused the Shah the money from his own treasury to pay up. In 1927, the Americans went, and Reza Shah concluded a comprehensive trade agreement with Russia.

As is not unusual with those who accept friendship from the Soviet Union, the Shah soon found that the bulk of

[1] There was as yet no road from Anglo-Iranian oil in the south.

benefit went to Russia, and he embarked upon a policy to make his country, if not self-sufficient, at least independent of Russian trade. The Trans-Iranian Railway was extended, and the caravan route to Trebizond reopened, to provide non-Russian channels of export; advisers were taken from small powers and dismissed as soon as they had trained in some measure Iranians; industrialization was put in hand. These measures were dictated by nationalist, not economic, motives, and their effect was to weaken, not strengthen, the economic structure of the country. It is typical of all the new nation states of the East, especially those that follow Islam, that, either through ignorance or sheer stubborn pride, they will almost always sacrifice material gain for nationalist independence.[1]

All the same, in the ten years following the withdrawal of the Americans, immense progress was made. Canals were cut; 12,000 miles of good roads built; factories established; an 800-mile railway laid, against every difficulty of mountains and Soviet opposition, from the Caspian to the Gulf. Teheran was almost rebuilt. The whole business was Reza Shah's. He was Persia, and by various means, usually " free gifts ", vast areas of private land passed into his personal possession.[2] Although Persia has a complicated constitution and a bicameral legislature to which the cabinet is nominally responsible, in effect, so long as Reza Shah reigned, he was absolute dictator, and his undoubted efficiency, punctuality, and ruthlessness made him a figure of terror for more than easy-going Persian officialdom.

[1] Compare the Indo-Pakistan Trade War (1949–51) (page 107), and the Burmese discrimination against the oil and teak interests (page 127).

[2] In an effort to check the growth of Communism, his son Mohammed Reza Shah shared these among the peasants in 1950.

Apart from technical development, everything Western was vigorously avoided, even to the extent of refusing transliteration of Arabic script on notices right in the cosmopolitan heart of Teheran. Reza Shah's Iran was based on the traditions of the remote past of Cyrus and Darius, rather than those of Shah Abbas, and even Islam was only permitted in so far as it was a unifying influence. Not only the Shah, but every Iranian was, and is, consciously anti-European.[1] Gradually, posts and telegraphs, harbours, electricity, banking were brought under Iranian control.

The necessary imports of Western machinery for these purposes had to be paid for by exports—oil and carpets, but mainly agricultural produce—and, partly because of the Shah's dislike of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, a good deal of this (1923–40) (except the British-controlled oil) went to Germany. The development of the country may be seen by comparison of budget figures:

	Income	*Expenditure*
1923–24:	£5,250,000	£5,500,000
1941–42:	£45,000,000	£54,000,000

Socially and culturally, the Shah followed more cautiously the trail blazed by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. By example, and finally by law (1926), *purdah* was abolished, and women admitted to comparative equality with men before the law; education in all its branches was fostered and the hold of the *mullahs* relaxed. With the example of Amanullah of Afghanistan (page 60) before him, Reza Shah went cautiously, but the present Persian attitude towards religion may be judged by the alliance of the Sunni and Shiah sects represented by

[1] The utter tactlessness of Dr. Millspaugh's American Financial Mission had a lot to do with this.

the Crown Prince's marriage[1] to an Egyptian princess, and by toleration, almost encouragement, of the ancient Persian fire-worship (Zoroastrianism). Jews and Armenians came off less well, for the real religion of Pahlevi's Iran was nationalism, and more conventional forms of worship were only tolerated in so far as they were cohesive forces in the Pahlevi state.

Iran was admitted to the League of Nations in 1919, and subscribed to most of the international conventions between the two wars (including acceptance of the International Court of Justice in 1932). Persia's relations with Great Britain since 1919 steadily deteriorated:

(*a*) 1925: Britain's belated, and therefore unsuccessful, stand when Reza Shah virtually kidnapped, and retained in Teheran until his death, Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, ruler of one of the British protected Gulf Sultanates.

(*b*) 1929, 30, 34, 36: Iranian claims to Bahrain, which was Persian until 1783, but is now a British protected naval base and U.S. oil concession.

(*c*) Dissatisfaction over the concession held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which is in effect a British Government concern.[2] In 1932, the Shah cancelled this concession, largely because he was suspicious that royalty accounts were being " cooked " and that output was being limited for the advantage of the Company's other interests in Iraq and South America. After Britain's appeal to the League of Nations, and

[1] Afterwards dissolved.

[2] His Majesty's Government holds £11¾ million Ordinary shares (out of £20 million), and about £5½ million Preference shares (out of £7¼ million), representing 55·55 per cent of votes in the Company.

a naval demonstration in the Gulf, the concession was renewed (1933) for sixty years.

Despite the treaty of 1921, and the trade convention of 1931, Russian commercial penetration of Persia continued insidiously between the wars, although there were frequent disputes and temporary stoppages of trade, until in 1939 30 per cent of Iran's external commerce was with Russia. There was still no friendliness between the governments, because of the Shah's perpetual suspicion (not unreasonable) of the disinterestedness of the Soviet's motives, in view of their urgent desire for a warm water port on the Persian Gulf.

On the other hand, relations with Germany were unshadowed by memories of former Imperialism, and were until 1940 very close. The Nazi authoritarian regime was congenial to Pahlevi personally, and Hitler's racial programme to all Persians, who fancy themselves somewhat quaintly as the " original Aryans ". German propaganda was therefore remarkably successful in Iran and, despite the Shah's declaration of neutrality in 1939, and again at the outbreak of the Russo-German War, German technicians continued to swarm and multiply in neutral Persia. The Shah's position was understandable. He well knew that his country could not alone withstand direct attack from any one of the belligerent powers, so he sought to give least offence to the one which appeared to be winning, which, in 1941, was undoubtedly Germany. Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union (22nd June 1941) rendered this pro-German neutrality insupportable to the Western allies. Not only was the Gulf-Caspian Railroad the only line of

communication between Britain and Russia (now allies),[1] but Persia formed the Soviet rear and the British flank in the Near East, as well as the route to India and the oil-wells of the Gulf. In August 1941, British and Soviet troops entered Persia. After a three days' token resistance the old Shah abdicated.[2] His son, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi mounted the Peacock throne virtually as an Allied puppet, although the Teheran Conference (November 1943) promised renewed independence and economic aid after the defeat of Germany.

Indeed, the evacuation of Persia was the first matter discussed by the United Nations Organization after its inception. When this was eventually achieved in 1946, Persia found herself greatly changed. The stable authoritarian government of the first Reza Shah gave place to a succession of weak and corrupt parliamentary administrations, and inflation, due to the enormous war-time Allied expenditure [3] and the Russian occupation of the fertile north, dislocated the country's economy.

Such conditions are ideal for the propagation of Communism, and the Tudeh Party, originally made up of political prisoners released on the abdication of Reza Shah, came into being, and very soon showed its hand by supporting the Soviet demand for oil concessions (1944), and for the autonomy (by which was meant cession to the Soviet Union) of the province of Azerbaijan. For a time this northern province did attain virtual independence, but the central

[1] Except for the Murmansk sea-route, immensely costly in men and ships.

[2] He died in exile in Johannesburg in 1944.

[3] The cost of living increased 1000 per cent.

government restored its authority by military action in December 1946, and, after an attempt upon the life of the Shah, the Tudeh Party was dissolved in February 1949. Official dissolution does not mean disintegration. The party continued to flourish underground and social discontent grew.

This was not allayed by the belated distribution among the peasants of some of the vast areas of land appropriated by the Shah's father, nor did the Indian and American tours of the Shah (1949–50) succeed in their object of raising substantial loans. With government and army salaries months in arrears and an empty treasury, the aged, sick, and very eccentric Prime Minister Mossadeq, himself a large landowner, took advantage of anti-British sentiment to attempt to blackmail the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company into an immense increase of royalties (June 1951). When he failed, or rather before his attempt had had time to succeed, he announced the nationalization of Iranian oil, and the substitution of a Persian Oil Board for the Anglo-Iranian Company.

Dr. Mossadeq's timing was bad. His expropriation, based on the conviction that, if British engineers withdrew, Soviet technicians would gladly replace them, coincided with a Soviet demarche to end the Korean War, and also with the beginning of a period when world oil supplies were beginning to show signs of equalling demand, so that cessation of the output of the Abadan refineries was less serious than it might have been.

In these circumstances, Anglo-Iranian Oil, that is the British Government, tried to counter bluff with bluff, refused the Nationalist terms, evacuated its personnel, and

withdrew its tanker fleet. This last was the strongest card. By far the greater part of the world's tanker fleet is British or American, so that, even could Persians themselves operate the refineries, there would be no means of getting the oil away to Western markets.

But if Dr. Mossadeq misjudged the time, the British Government, with the barest of majorities in the House of Commons and about to face a General Election, hopelessly misinterpreted the Persian mind. Even after Teheran had flatly rejected a decision of the International Court at The Hague, satisfied that time would inexorably show to the Persians the economic impossibility of their position, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Morrison (having first abruptly broken off negotiations with the Mossadeq Government, and sent a substantial fleet to the Shatt-al-Arab), executed a *volte face* in violation of his own declared policy by withdrawing all remaining engineers from Abadan and abandoning the oil-fields, the while he appealed to the U.N.O.

Dr. Mossadeq himself appeared before the Council in New York, and there secured delay of a decision which had in effect been made, for the British had left, and the fields were Persian.

That it was exceedingly unlikely that technicians would be available to work them, or tankers to ship the oil, was immaterial. That the treasury was empty, and the country's economy running down, did not matter. " Face " had been gained, and that was enough. This is the oriental way.

Throughout the negotiations, the British thought logically of economic and commercial possibilities. The Persians dreamed of nationalism and prestige and Islam. The British Minister Stokes and the American envoy Harriman were

realists; Mossadeq a mystic. There was no common ground. Probably, indeed, Dr. Mossadeq was not even very sure of what he did want; but there were others in Persia who were.

The Communists knew what they wanted, and saw a harvest ripening for their sickles in the collapse of Persian economy. Abolghassem Kashani, the fanatic xenophobe *mullah*, whose part in the assassination (1950) of the moderate General Razmara gave him religious proponderance as well as political influence, realized that the same circumstances gave a chance to reaffirm the still powerful Persian feudal system and the power of the mosques. The landlords saw in the external quarrel a ready-made means of diverting attention from very necessary internal reforms. The young *effendis* thought they would like to have a shot at playing oil-men, sure that when they failed they could ask the foreigner to come back, without destroying the illusion of progress they had created. The Shah, in fear of life and throne, remained aloof in correct constitutional isolation. A few moderates, such as Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Taba-Tabai, the leader of the National Will Party, were similarly held back by fear of the mob and of National Front terrorists.

Most important, no one in Persia believed that either Britain or the U.S.A. would ever allow the threatened Soviet intervention to materialize without rushing to the rescue. It is in this irrational, feckless way that the oriental nationalist mind works. It is irritating, but understandable, part of the inalienable determination of man to mismanage his own affairs.

One concrete factor emerges: the future of Persia, economic and political, depends very largely on its ability to get its prime asset, the oil industry, in proper working order

again. Whether it does or not, it is important to realize that to many, probably to most, Persians, prosperity is well lost if national "face" be gained.

Afghanistan.

Area: 250,000 square miles
Population: 10–12 millions

Afghanistan is a primitive mountain state lying between Pakistan and Soviet Russia and as such is of prime strategic importance as a possible Russian route to India. This consideration was much more prominent in the nineteenth century than it is now, when there are so many other points of potential Soviet penetration. In consequence the Imperial Indian Government took steps to secure control of Afghanistan (First [1839–42] and Second [1879–80] Afghan Wars). This control lasted until the accession of the Amir Amanullah in 1919 and the Third Afghan War, in which, although he was defeated in the field and sacrificed the British annual subsidy, Amanullah secured recognition of independence. The revenue of Afghanistan at that time did not exceed £2½ million,[1] and this sum Amanullah tried to stretch to cover the expense of legations overseas, the employment of foreign experts, the improvement of communications, and the building of a new Kabul. He failed, of course, and, instead of maintaining strict economy and checking corruption at home, Amanullah embarked upon a lavish foreign tour (1927). He returned, having seen Ataturk, Hitler, and Reza Shah, full of ideas for Westernization and dictatorship. He set out full tilt on the emancipation of women, introduction of Western dress, all the externals of Turkey without

[1] It is still only £5 million.

the basic efficiency of administration and industrialization. Above all, he omitted to pay the army or to curb the power of the *mullahs*.

The consequent rebellion, led (January 1929) by Bacha-i-Saqao, the Son of the Water-carrier, an uncouth bandit, brought about the flight of Amanullah and his family. Bacha-i-Saqao "reigned" for some ten months, a period of great cruelty and confusion, until he was ejected by Nadir Shah and his brothers (Hashim Shah, Wali Shah, and Shah Mahmoud), all collaterals of the former Royal House.

Nadir Shah was proclaimed king in 1929, and made some attempt to reform the administration. He established a nominal constitution with an elected assembly, promulgated a code of Shariat (Islamic) law, and brought the *mullahs* under some control by paying them small monthly salaries. He realized that his position depended upon the army, and he accepted a British subsidy which enabled him to train and pay a reasonable striking force of 30,000 men. This purchased friendship with Great Britain necessitated his maintenance of peace among the turbulent tribes on the Afghan side of the Durand Line—the demarcated N.W. Frontier of what was then British India. His efforts to do this brought about his assassination in 1933.

He was succeeded by his son, Zahir Shah, but the government in effect passed into the hands of the young king's uncles, the marshal brothers of Nadir Shah, who since then have alternated as Prime Minister and ambassadors in London and Washington. From 1935, a very cautious policy of reform was attempted, but the administration remained (and remains) tragically corrupt and inefficient. In 1939, Afghanistan, like Persia, showed distinct Nazi leanings which

lasted until the turn of the tide of war in 1942, when Germans and Italians were expelled from the country.

Present-day Afghanistan is very much a police state. The administration is based upon a large army and police force, and is centralized in the hands of the Royal House which, through monopoly corporations, exercises rigid control over the commercial and economic life of the country. The land is held in feudal tenure by a few landowners, and the peasants are for the most part grindingly poor. The system of domestic employment is very little distinguishable from slavery—benevolent slavery, perhaps, but still slavery.

Foreign technicians are needed to organize limited engineering and technical programmes, and, in an attempt to prevent the penetration of any one power, these contracts are spread among Americans (engineering), British (education and air force), French (medicine), and Turks (army). Certain menial and technical tasks are performed by Italians and Czechs.

The importance of Afghanistan as a buffer state has greatly declined as a result of the independence of India and the extension and reorientation of Soviet policy. In 1947, when the Indian sub-continent was in the throes of partition, the Afghan Foreign Office, taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Pakistan, repudiated the Durand Line and claimed Pathan territory as far as Peshawar, a claim which was probably never serious, but which was supported by continual anti-Pakistan propaganda over Radio Kabul and by the tacit support of the signatories of the Saadabad Pact. As reprisal, Pakistan abrogated the commercial privileges formerly conceded to Afghanistan by the viceregal government.

Sardar Nazibullah Khan, an Afghan princeling, failing to compose these differences with Pakistan, went off to New Delhi and signed (1949–50) commercial and general alliances with India, at that time almost at open war with Pakistan. This adhesion of Muslim Afghanistan with Hindu India against Muslim Pakistan shows very clearly the limitations of Pan-Islamism. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan deteriorated still further after the assassination (in October 1951) of the Pakistani Prime Minister at the hands of a reputed Afghan national.

If Afghanistan is a police state, it is also a spy state, and there is little chance at the moment for the open development of parties in opposition to the Monarchy. Yet the poverty of the people and the oppression and corruption of the military autocracy make the threat of Communism very real. The Young Afghan Party, composed of men educated for the most part in the United States, has strong leanings towards the Soviet Union, and not a few of its members forsake their ill-paid allegiance to Zahir Shah to slip across the northern frontiers to Merv and Samarkand. Should the Soviet ever decide to march, or Red China infiltrate from Tibet; even should Marshals Wali Shah and Shah Mahmoud, the king's uncles, die, there might be very little opposition to Communism in Afghanistan.

Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang.

The vast land mass of High Asia, the roof of the world, stretches from Afghanistan to the Japanese Sea (3000 miles), south of Soviet Asia and north of India and China proper. It is cut off from the rest of the world by high mountains, great distance, and inaccessible communications. The

climate, alternately very hot and very cold, is hostile, and the population sparse and nomadic or semi-nomadic. To all intents and purposes, this vast area is either controlled by, or under the direct influence of, either Soviet Russia or Communist China.

Tibet,[1] larger than France and the Low Countries combined (463,000 sq. miles), has an approximate population of 3 million, 1 million of whom are Buddhist monks, and a curious theocratic government headed by two hierarchs, the Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama. These are usually young boys, for they are held to be reincarnations both of the Buddha and of their predecessors, and are, therefore, chosen soon after birth, and, somehow, rarely seem to live on into manhood.

In the eighteenth century, Tibet passed under the nominal rule of the Manchu Emperors of China and, taking advantage of the weakness of Tibet following the British punitive expedition of 1904, from 1906 the Chinese extended their authority. The Tibetans never recognized this Chinese suzerainty, cast it off at the Chinese Revolution of 1912, and have resisted Chinese pressure ever since. When a Communist government was installed in China, one of its first actions (1950) was to announce its intentions of " liberating " Tibet, and to some extent this was done, bringing, with the partial corruption of Nepal, Communism to the very borders of India.

Mongolia[2] is an entirely unsurveyed tract of land, two

[1] REFERENCE: A. Guibaut, *Tibetan Venture* (1947).
Kingdon Ward, *A Plant Hunter in Tibet* (1934).

[2] REFERENCE: Peter Fleming, *Red Star over Asia* and *One's Company* (1934).
O. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (1950).

million square miles of it, with a population of possibly three million nomads, bounded by Siberia, Sinkiang, Manchuria, and the Great Wall of China. The great Gobi Desert forms one third of this area, and the Gobi caravan routes, upon which the centres of population depend, are now financed by Soviet Russia. Until 1915, Mongolia was nominally Chinese, but the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1945 recognized the complete independence of Outer Mongolia, for what it is worth, between Red Russia and Red China. Inner Mongolia remains Chinese.

Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, is in most respects similar to Mongolia. It is largely desert, and has been under Chinese influence since 1878.

Soviet Asia.[1]

Area: 6·3 million square miles ($\frac{1}{8}$ of the land surface of the world, and $\frac{2}{5}$ of Asia)

Population: 41·24 millions

Soviet Asia stretches west-east for 4000 and north-south for 3000 miles. It is flanked by the Arctic, the Pacific, Central Asia, and European Russia, and is separated from the United States and Canada only by the 55 miles (frozen in winter) of the Bering Straits. This area, comprising all climates, by no means all " frozen " as is the popular conception of " Siberia ", provides an immense land frontier for potential penetration into Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Japan, and, via Red China, into S.E. Asia.

The last twenty years of Soviet policy have seen a revolu-

[1] REFERENCE: R. A. Davies and A. J. Steiger, *Soviet Asia* (1943).
E. S. Bates, *Soviet Asia* (1942).
G. Krist, *Alone Through the Forbidden Land* (1943).

tion in Russian Asiatic development. From being a mere colonial dependency, the area has become the essential base of Russian industry, especially war potential, far from European reach and insulated by distance even from effective atomic attack. There are mineral and oil[1] reserves, uranium,[2] precious and non-ferrous metals. The forests, although transportation provides difficulties, are almost inexhaustible, and valuable agricultural raw materials (cotton and raw silk) are available, together with wheat and oats, millet, barley, and flax. The economy of Soviet Asia has been developed as an integral part of the Soviet Union, and not only escaped war damage, but was actually stimulated from 1939 to 1945.

The administration of Soviet Asia was reorganized in the 1930's on a basis of nationality and administrative efficiency, in the following units, which are set out in decreasing order of autonomy:

(*a*) Union Republics (S.S.R.)
(*b*) Autonomous Republics (A.S.S.R.)
(*c*) Autonomous Oblasts (A.O.)
(*d*) Okrugs. (See Map 2.)

The old Tsarist policy of Russianization has been abolished by Stalin. The Asiatic Republics have full and equal representation in the Moscow Chamber of Nationalities, the second chamber of the Supreme Soviet; their national development is encouraged, and there is no reason to suppose that these divergent race groups represent anything but strength to the Soviet Union.

[1] 1950: 90 million tons of coal; $\frac{3}{4}$ of Russian oil.

[2] In Kirkiz S.S.R. Uranium is an essential substance for the production of nuclear power.

MAP 2

SOVIET ASIA : 1952
SCALE 0 1000 MILES
INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS
EURO-ASIATIC SOVIET BOUNDARY
INTERNAL FRONTIERS
A GEORGIAN S.S.R.
B ARMENIAN S.S.R.
C AZERBAIJAN S.S.R.
D JEWISH AUTONOMOUS OBLAST
I W. SIBERIA
II E. SIBERIA
III FAR EAST
RUSSIA IN EUROPE
URAL INDUSTRIAL REGION
KAZAKHSTAN S.S.R.
CASPIAN SEA
BLACK SEA
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
PERSIAN GULF
TURKMEN S.S.R.
UZBEK S.S.R.
TAJIK S.S.R.
KIRGIZ S.S.R.
OMSK OBLAST
KRASNOYARSK KRAI
NOVOSIBIRSK OBLAST
ALTAI KRAI
YAKUT A.S.S.R.
IRKUTSK OBLAST
BURYAT MONGOL A.S.S.R.
CHITA OBLAST
KHABAROVSK
AMUR
UPPER KOLYMA
KAMCHATKA OBLAST
MARITIME KRAI
MANCHURIA
KOREA
MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
SINKIANG (CHINA)
CHINA
JAPAN

The external relations of Soviet Asia are, of course, those of the Kremlin, but they can be conveniently divided into spheres of penetration:

(*a*) S.W. Asia, which forms for the Soviet an outer defence zone of weak states under Western influence, and also provides the attraction of North and South Persian oil.

(*b*) High Asia where, in Mongolia and Sinkiang, Soviet prestige stands very high because of the comparative prosperity of the inhabitants of Soviet Asia. This is a Soviet sphere of military interest as the route to the Far East and the protection of the very vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway.

(*c*) Far East: By the Yalta Agreement of 1945,[1] the U.S.S.R. regained the Kurile Islands, Port Arthur, and a privileged position in Manchuria, with its stocks of grain, edible oils, and iron ore. Outer Mongolia, nominally independent, is now an exclusively Soviet reserve, and the Soviet position here has been immeasurably improved by the destruction of Japan, and the installation of a Red government in China.

(*d*) The Arctic: The proximity of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands (U.S.A.) to the Soviet Kuriles has already suggested to the United States and to Canada the possibility of Arctic warfare. At the moment, the northern sea-route and Polar aerial flights are Russian preserves, but the frozen land north of latitude 55 may well be one day what the Western Desert was in the Second World War.

[1] White Paper 6735, H.M.S.O. (1946).

The defensive strength of Soviet Asia lies in its inaccessibility to an ocean invader, its ever-increasing man-power, and its self-sufficiency in supplies. Now that Germany and Japan have been overthrown, the Soviet Union emerges from the Second World War as the greatest land power in the globe, dominating not only Eastern Europe, but also Euro-Asia. It is ponderable that a mere thousand miles air-range from Soviet Asia includes Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, Ankara, Istanbul, Iraq, Tripoli, Haifa, the Persian Gulf, Karachi, Delhi, Korea, Japan, Alaska, Nanking, Shanghai, and Chungking. By contrast, very few of the basic centres of this sprawling land mass are within present practical range of Western aircraft. It is not without reason that Russia has turned its face East. Peter the Great regarded St. Petersburg as "a window to Europe". Marshal Stalin sees Asiatic Russia as an open door to the world.

CHAPTER III

The Successor States of the Indian Empire

India (Bharat or Hindustan).

Area: 1,055,812 square miles

Population: 318 millions. (Density 282 per square mile.)

The warmth and fertility of the Indian [1] peninsula have from the earliest times attracted immigration or invasion from the sterner north. It is thought that about 2500 B.C. the earliest-known Indus civilization, akin to the Sumarian, was invaded by Dravidians, who entered India probably from Baluchistan. These people in turn were driven south (1500 B.C.) by the Indo-Aryans, and became the ancestors of the dark-skinned Tamils of South India. The fair-skinned Aryans expanded to the east, and intermingled with the dark-skinned Dasyu (slaves) whom they found along the Ganges River. Numerically, they were swamped by these Dasyu, their Indo-Aryan blood became diluted, and their religion merged into aboriginal Hinduism.

The difference in colour and status between Indo-Aryans and Dasyu gave rise to the system of caste (Portuguese:

[1] " India " and " Indian " are necessarily used ambiguously here. In the past, they denoted a geographical sub-continent. Now they denote the Indian republic when used politically, and the Indian sub-continent when used geographically. No general term is available to cover the whole geographic area save the clumsy Indo-Pakistan.

purity). There are four main castes, Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (merchants), and Sudras (labourers), with far beneath them, unfit to mix with the caste Indo-Aryans, aboriginals outside caste, the Untouchables whom Gandhi renamed *harijans*, children of God. As the centuries passed, the superior castes broke into innumerable sub-castes mainly based on occupation, each having its own strict place in the social scheme and never intermingling. Of these castes the Brahmins were (and are) supreme, being accorded infinite respect and spreading a thin veneer of sacerdotalism all over India.

It is impossible in a paragraph, or even a volume, to explain Hinduism, yet no comprehension of India is possible without some idea of this creed, which is perhaps not a creed at all as it has no definite dogma. Hinduism is the most embracing of all religions; it is a vast sponge which absorbs all without ceasing to be itself. It is more than a religion, for the caste system makes it a complete social and economic organization. It is impossible to become a Hindu without being admitted into a caste. The cult includes primitive hill tribes, the simplest animists [1] who worship innumerable gods and spirits, good and evil, without any clear idea of why. The general run of Hindus accept the many gods of the Hindu pantheon (may even actually worship the material idols representing these gods), and believe more or less the fantastic legends surrounding them, just as, in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era, the man-in-the-Roman-street accepted the gods of Homer and Virgil. There are more cultivated Hindus, worshipping the trinity of Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the

[1] Animism: the theory that holds that all objects have natural life.

Preserver, and Siva the Destroyer, but recognizing as no more than pleasant stories the great bulk of Hindu mythology. There are monotheistic Hindus.[1] There are ascetic votaries who recognize no god at all, but merely a set of abstract principles. There are " enlightened " Hindus who cynically reject the whole business, but still subscribe to the outward forms.

In short, Hinduism ranges from the crudest magic to the highest exposition of esoteric metaphysics, and through all runs the limitations, inhibitions, prohibitions, and taboos of caste, which all to a greater or less extent observe.

There emerges one great standard explanation of the *fact* of life that organic existence is a series of rebirths, a wandering cycle (*sansara*) in which the destiny of each individual is determined by the inexorable consequences of deeds, good and bad (*karma*), from which release may be had by ascetic practices and technique (*yoga*). Put crudely, it means that misery in this life will lead first to a better reincarnation, and finally to perfection, to reabsorption into God, and release from further wearisome reincarnation. The caste of Brahmins are nearest to this perfection, hence their sanctity. Five centuries before Christ, these Brahmins developed a most complicated ritual and code of laws and conduct really only known to themselves and imposed on other castes by fear that disobedience will incur divine wrath and reincarnation in some sub-human form, and consequent relapse by centuries back along the painful road to perfection. The Brah-

[1] REFERENCE: M. A. McAuliffe, *The Sikh Religion* (1908).
J. N. Farquhar, *Primer of Hinduism* (1911).
P. Spear, *India, Pakistan, and the West* (1949).
F. Yeats-Brown, *Lancer at Large* (1937) and *Bengal Lancer* (1930).
Santha Rama Rau, *Home to India* (1946).

mins made rules, the Brahmins made caste rigid, the Brahmins bled India white, but the Brahmins survived, mainly because of this fear, and probably to-day Brahminism is the one vital force left in India. There were revolts, of course. Buddhism is a "middle way" attempting to get away from idolatry and too rigid ritual; Jainism seeks even greater severity; Sikhism eschews polytheism and the Brahmins altogether; but taken by and large, the rich complex ritual of Brahminism suits the subtle and litigious Hindu mind, as its all-embracing character, in which almost any belief can be made orthodox so long as the outward forms are observed, suits the vast and differing areas over which Hinduism obtains.

The point to notice is that Hinduism and its reformed offshoots, Buddhism and Jainism, are pacifist religions. To kill anything at all is absolutely repugnant to a caste-Hindu. More, the whole theory of reincarnation leads to a preoccupation with the next world, so that the things of this world appear to be of relatively little importance. To a Hindu, Brahma, God, is within him. The divine spark is not affected by external success, may indeed be corrupted by worldly success, so that Hindu India turns *inward* to the soul, whereas Western materialism turns *outward* to the world.

Such doctrines can lead neither to valour nor efficiency, and the enervating climate of India causes still further degeneration. In the first thousand years of the Christian era, India was divided socially into castes, and politically into small principalities.[1] Nowhere was there union. The

[1] There were, of course, great Hindu Empires and Kingdoms, into the detail of which it is not necessary to go.

case was very different with Islam, a very simple and forthright creed, based on one God, the Brotherhood of all Muslims, strict conformity to clearly stated dogma, and immediate joy in paradise awaiting a True Believer who is so fortunate as to be killed in war against the Infidel. Islam is so very definite. You can *catalogue* Islam; Hinduism you can only *feel.*

It is not surprising that Hindu India, numerically so strong, passed almost without resistance beneath the control of Muslims: Mahmoud of Ghazni (1024); Mohammed Ghori (1191); Kutb-ud-din (1206), who conquered Bengal and founded the Sultanate of Delhi; and finally the Mogul Empire founded by Barbar Shah (1524), which lasted nominally until 1858, but collapsed in effect with the sack of Delhi by the Persians in 1739.

The effect of nine hundred years of Muslim immigration and rule was to establish Islam strongly beside Hinduism, but the two remained incompatible. The Muslims despised the Hindus as conquerors will always despise the conquered, and sneered at their supposed idolatry. Hindus feared the Muslim sword, but were secretly contemptuous of the simple Islamic belief and the lack of subtlety of its followers. The Brahmin caste offends the Muslim conception of equality, and the Hindu use of music in worship, an anathema in Islam, is a constant source of provocation. The Hindu worships the cow, and the Muslim reviles the pig—small externals, perhaps, but sure causes of communal riots. The two creeds, not necessarily in the beginning incompatible,[1]

[1] In the early days of Islamic penetration, many Hindus were converted, some forcibly, but others for material advantage, a good job at court being worth the mosque. In Bengal some Muslim families retain their Hindu names in pride of their Brahmin lineage.

were made incompatible by the fanaticism of some of the Mogul Emperors and by the intransigence of the Brahmins. What began as two religions finished as two widely separate national and racial groups, differing not only in belief, but in culture, traditions, and sense of values, dress, customs, food, codes of conduct, and ideals. A Muslim can never feel really at home beside a Hindu.

There is also a potent material factor for antipathy. The Hindu is a financier; the Muslim an agriculturist and a soldier. Hence the Muslim is usually poorer than the Hindu, and, when the British came, watched with jealousy the state in which he had once been lord become an anglicized industrial economy, which meant a Hindu economy.

The sixteenth-century expansion of the West brought Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British to India, in search of trade rather than empire. The Portuguese did not last long, and the Dutch were more interested in the East Indian islands, but France and Great Britain concentrated on India. The British East India Company was chartered by Queen Elizabeth I in 1600. It established trading stations in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, and almost immediately found it necessary to further trade by force of arms, so that the original commercial company became a war-like sovereign state of itself, nominally subject to the Crown of Great Britain and to the Grand Mogul in India, but actually largely independent of either. The first wars of the Company were waged against the French. In the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715), Colbert established trading stations at Pondichéri and Mauritius. In 1742, Dupleix became Governor of Pondichéri, and very soon secured considerable influence in South India. This was made possible by the confused

state of the decayed Mogul Empire, where every petty chieftain, taking advantage of Mahratta and Afghan attacks on the emperor, raised a private army for his own advantage. Dupleix, in alliance with the princes of the Carnatic, and using sepoys, or native levies, took Madras from the British and for a time became master of the Carnatic and the Deccan.

His power was destroyed by the campaigns of the Englishman Robert Clive, and in 1754 Dupleix was recalled, and the East India Company reigned supreme, first in alliance with native princes, and then of itself by assuming government of whole provinces as trading needs dictated. The battle of Plassey (1756) gave the Company command of Bengal, a province of long navigable waterways ideal for the conquest of the northern plains.

The Company's dominions were now so wide as to require definite governmental organization, and this was supplied by Warren Hastings in 1772. As Governor of Bengal, he maintained the Company against the French in the south and the Mahrattas of the north, and greatly increased its commercial activities, to the enrichment of the City of London and incidentally of himself.

Warren Hastings was succeeded by two men—Lord Wellesley and Lord Hastings—whose work established the East India Company as the dominant power in India. Wellesley (1797–1806) finally excluded the French from the south by drawing up treaties with the Nizam of Hyderabad, and by replacing the Sultan of Mysore with a Hindu rajah of British sympathies. Hastings (1813–23) conquered the Mahratta princes of the north-west, thus linking Bengal with the Punjab and the Carnatic. By 1818, there was no

ruler of any consequence who had not signed treaties with the British, and the steady annexation of native states created the Central Provinces, which linked Bombay and Bengal. British India was gradually being pieced together, a gigantic jigsaw of conquered provinces ruled directly, and allied native princes. To consolidate their position, the British began to develop communications, and to establish orderly systems of finance, administration, and justice. Schools were established, and missionary societies of all denominations took advantage of the Company's peace to propagate Christianity.[1]

Much of the power of the East India Company was based on its Bengali sepoy army, and by 1850 considerable disaffection spread among these troops due to discontent over promotion and pay. The rapid British advance naturally aroused opposition from native rulers, and the reforms consequent upon it antagonized the powerful Brahmin caste, who were infuriated by this assumption of authority by those who, to them, were Untouchables. In 1857, the sepoys were issued with a new muzzle-loading rifle, the cartridge of which had to be torn open with the teeth. The rumour spread that this cartridge was greased with cow's or pig's fat, the touch of which is forbidden to Hindus and Muslims respectively. The result was the Great Mutiny. In May 1857, the Bengali sepoys revolted and marched off to offer their services to the almost forgotten Grand Mogul in Delhi. Fortunately for the Company, the Madras and Bombay Regiments remained loyal under General Havelock,

[1] South India was originally proselytized in the very early days of Christianity. The Syro-Malankarans claim to have been founded by St. Thomas in A.D. 59. Catholic priests came with the Portuguese. Now others followed.

who was thus able to relieve the beleaguered cantonment of Cawnpore, take Delhi, and with it the person of the last Mogul, Bahadur Shah. Sir Colin Campbell relieved Lucknow, while Sir Hugh Rose reduced the Mahratta districts. By 1858, the Company's position was completely re-established, but not without considerable loss of life and prestige.

The Mutiny made it clear to Queen Victoria's government that a great sub-continent could no longer be exploited by a semi-official commercial concern. The Company's charter was revoked, and direct colonial government established in the various provinces, under the central administration of a Viceroy. The Queen herself guaranteed the thrones of those rulers who still remained, and India settled down to steady development as a British possession.

From the Mutiny to the First World War was the hey-day of British India. Under successive Viceroys public order was established and a uniform penal code introduced; communal strife was held in check and the frontiers policed; schools, universities, and medical services were inaugurated; railways built and the land developed. Provinces were divided out under Lieutenant-Governors, and their administration entrusted to career civil servants recruited by open examination in London. It is not generally realized that, even in the twentieth century, the Indian Civil Service never exceeded a thousand members, many of them Indians, and that the majority of the armed forces were also Indians, officered by British. This tiny garrison maintained effective control for over a century by skilful use of the disunion of the country.[1] Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, of many

[1] Before partition (1941 census), there were 388,997,955 Indians of whom 66 per cent were agriculturists. 65 per cent were Hindus, 24 per

races and languages, split into numerous political divisions under jealous native princes, could never unite for common action against the European overlord. The many divisions of India made the British task both difficult and easy, difficult to keep so many people reasonably contented, easy because of the opportunities for a strong central government to play off princes, races, and religious groups one against the other on the old Roman and Habsburg principle: divide and rule.

The princes, for the most part, were sincere in their loyalty to Britain because they realized that if British paramountcy checked the more outrageous manifestations of their autocracy and prevented wars of aggrandizement, it also guaranteed in perpetuity their existing powers and lands—or so they thought then. The native army was loyal. It was well-trained and well-handled by officers who knew their men and their jobs, and, in a country of grinding poverty, offered a secure and honourable career. For the most part, the peasants thought well of the *sircar*, if they thought at all. They sought only internal peace and the chance to scratch some kind of living from their miserable little bits of land, and this security was provided by an efficient British bureaucracy. As the British interfered little, if at all, with religion, there was no trouble from the Brahmins or the *mullahs*.[1]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when Im-

cent Muslims, and the rest Buddhists, Christians, Jains, Parsees, Jews, and plain pagans. There were, exclusive of dialects, 225 languages, of which 12 were major languages. One third of the land and one sixth of the population were ruled by native princes, whose territories varied in size from Hyderabad, the equivalent of England and Wales, to Baoni, a few hundred acres.

[1] When the first Anglican Bishop arrived in Calcutta in 1814, Brahmin spies were sent out to watch him, and when they discovered that he lived in state like the Governor, or any other rich European, they had no further fears, deciding that he had no religion worth the name.

perialism was fashionable and Britain really worthy of the adjective Great, Indian skies seemed set fair.

On the 1st January 1877, Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India in Delhi, and the seal was set upon an occupation which had begun with commercial penetration two and a half centuries before. The British now set themselves to maintain an efficient government, and to raise the level of the Indian peoples until they could themselves share in this government.[1] Gradually, Indians were admitted as members of the administrative services and as officers of the army and navy. They became members of Governors' Advisory Councils, and, much more important, they gained Western education and insight into Western methods, both in Indian universities and overseas. This occidental education was the beginning of the end of British India. The Hindus especially availed themselves of the chance, and there arose a class of literate Indians who were at first absorbed happily enough into the public services. Very soon the supply of university graduates (of a sort) outstripped the demand for clerks and junior executives, and men who had strained for years to obtain the qualifications for a soft job now found themselves unemployed, unable to obtain any work which they considered fitting to their dignity.

The attitude of some of the British administrators did not help. They maintained themselves strictly apart from the brown men whom they ruled. They were efficient; they were just; they were incorruptible; they were frigidly polite. They were even sympathetic in their own queer way, but they certainly were not friendly. This attitude of self-conscious superiority was more maddening than any blows,

[1] REFERENCE: Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India* (1915).

and drove the educated sections of the populace straight into the nationalist camp, into the Indian Congress. Gandhi himself, a London-trained barrister, showed no anti-British sentiments before the First War in South Africa, until he became embittered and humiliated by the white South Africans' attitude to coloured men. It was in Natal that Gandhi, the pro-British barrister, became Gandhi, the Indian rebel.

Founded in 1885 as a mild debating society, even with a British president (Sir William Wedderburn), Congress gradually became the cultural and political voice of the new India, seeking equality of brown skins with white. After 1905, when Curzon's first partition of Bengal stirred angry feelings, Congress undertook public agitation, and it was Congress which capitalized the tension of the First World War.

Congress as it was between the wars was the creation of Mahatma Gandhi, a remarkable man who preached a curiously conflicting set of doctrines. On the one hand he sought a return to simple, ascetic life, untrammelled by caste, British or Brahmin.[1] He synthesized Western humanitarianism and egalitarianism with Hinduism, and made Congress the symbol of social betterment, and the champion of the Untouchable *harijans*—children of God. This was the Gandhi of the home-spun loin-cloth, the holy man of poverty, asceticism, and devotion, who won the adherence of the peasants to Congress, up to now a middle-class movement.

Although he was contemptuous of most of the outward trappings and inhibitions of Hinduism, Gandhi held to the

[1] Gandhi was not a Brahmin, although most of his immediate associates were.

main doctrine of non-violence, and preached passive resistance (*ahimsa*), boycott, and non-co-operation to drive the British from India. This was the Gandhi whose followers lay down in their thousands in the roads and offered themselves for arrest without resistance, the Gandhi who developed a highly successful technique of blackmail, both of government and his own followers, by " fasts until death " until he got his own way. There was also the Gandhi who had been trained in London, the cunning intriguing lawyer, of infinite guile and infinite patience, who was determined to repay the young Boer lout who had ejected him from a railway carriage in Durban by throwing the British out of India.

Gandhi's combination of Eastern and Western characteristics transformed Congress from a Western political body to a national cultural one; he attracted all classes, save the extremely orthodox and the Communists. Like Hinduism itself, Congress became all-embracing. There was room in its ranks for the mysticism of Gandhi; for Western democracy and the secularism of the smooth Nehru; for the militant Hinduism of the dictatorial Vallabhbhai Patel; for the Brahminized liberalism of Rajagopalachari. The capitalist class were attracted by support of their interests under the name of economic nationalism. Even the princes, many of whom were turning to constitutionalism on the pattern of eighteenth-century enlightened despotism, began to abate their hostility. The no-tax and no-rent campaigns, and much publicized and superficial sympathy with the depressed classes, attracted the peasants to a man. In 1942, Congress was strong enough to threaten a government in the middle of a war and backed by a million troops.

The Indian Empire responded loyally to the needs of the

First World War, and Congress in 1919 expected nothing less than immediate *Swaraj* (self-rule). It did not get it, and the history of the next twenty years is that of the long struggle of Congress by all means short of violence to secure an independent India. The desirability of such an ideal was not denied by the British. The difference of opinion lay in the speed with which self-government could be introduced. In the meantime, the viceregal government embarked upon a steady process of Indianization. In 1919–21, the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms divided the provinces of British India (as distinct from the princely states) into two classes: those ruled directly by a Governor, and those with ministries responsible to local legislatures. A central legislature was also set up in Delhi, but both Viceroy and Governors retained the right of veto.

In 1927, this system was revised by a commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon, which proposed full parliamentary government for British India, but only for the central administration if the princes would come into the scheme. A series of round-table conferences made it clear that the princes were willing to co-operate, and the Government of India Act created a federal constitution with a responsible parliament at Delhi. Both the conferences and the act were boycotted by Congress, who stood out for complete independence, and by the Muslim League, which sought an independent autonomous Muslim state in the north. However, in the subsequent elections,[1] Congress

[1] Elections in India are very complicated. In a country of innumerable minorities, racial and religious, direct voting would be unfair, so that seats have to be reserved for non-Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, etc. With a largely illiterate population, actual polling is difficult, and there are very numerous opportunities for unscrupulous politicians to mislead voters and gerrymander results.

secured control of eight out of the eleven provinces, and finally consented to assume office on condition that the Governors did not use their powers of veto.

The outbreak of war in 1939 completely altered the picture. In the first instance, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, declared war on Germany (as was his right) without consulting the legislature. The Congress ministers, huffed, resigned, and demanded complete independence as the price of participation in the war. As a result the provinces lapsed into direct gubernatorial rule. The princes again rallied to the Crown, and recruiting for the Services was never larger nor more easy. Nevertheless, the initial successes of Japan in Hong Kong, in the Philippines, in Singapore, in Burma, and the German advance in Europe, convinced Congress that Britain's day was done. Gandhi maintained his attitude of passive resistance, but others developed sabotage tactics, and Subhas Neterji Bose, a Bengali extremist, actually recruited an Indian National Army to fight side by side with Japan.

As India was a vital base and arsenal of the Asiatic War and Britain's second largest source of man-power, something had to be done. The British Socialist minister, Sir Stafford Cripps, arrived in India, and proposed Dominion status based on a constitution to be written by Indians. Both Congress and the Muslim League rejected the offer, and the Viceroy was left no alternative but to intern the Congress Working Committee. The situation was not improved by the Bengal famine of 1943, but the beating off of the Japanese from the frontiers of Assam, and the subsequent reconquest of Burma, enabled the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, to maintain the *status quo* until the end of the war (1945).

In the 1946 elections, Congress again secured control of eight provinces, and the Muslim League of all the Muslim seats. Both parties rejected the suggestions of Lord Pethick-Lawrence for compromise, and the new British Socialist Government announced its intention of withdrawing from India by 1948, whatever the conditions might be.

In March 1947, Earl Mountbatten of Burma was sent out as Viceroy in a last attempt to end British paramountcy with a minimum of confusion. He had the advantage of being a royal prince, with the prestige of the conqueror of S.E. Asia as well as considerable personal charm, political acumen, and energy. He saw that unless India was to lapse into civil war, something had to be done, and that before the time limit of 1948. His urgency, and the absolute determination of the Muslim League leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, convinced Gandhi and Congress that Hindus and Mussulmen could never live in free amity in one state, and of the necessity of dividing the sub-continent into two, the Dominion of India (Hindu) and the Dominion of Pakistan, a much smaller Muslim state in two parts—W. Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the N.W. Frontier Province in the north-west, and half Bengal in the north-east. The boundaries were drawn by the Radcliffe Commission (see Map 3), and the partition became operative on the 15th August 1947, when the Empire of India disappeared from the map. The military and civil resources of the Imperial Government were divided between the two new Dominions, and the British armed forces and administrators withdrew, although both states remained within the British Commonwealth, with Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General of India, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah of Pakistan.

Interested parties, and the more reactionary British press,

MAP 3



INDIA AND PAKISTAN: 1952

SCALE IN MILES 0 500

INDIAN PROVINCES

INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS

INDO-PAKISTAN FRONTIER

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

STATES ACCEDED TO INDIA

PAKISTAN PROVINCES

STATES ACCEDED TO PAKISTAN

had long foretold hideous chaos and slaughter if the British withdrew from India. This prophecy was not wholly fulfilled. The south of India was completely unaffected. The frontier areas were naturally disturbed. The Radcliffe Award divided the Punjab along the Sutlej and Ravi rivers, and there was mass migration[1], accompanied by atrocities on both sides, of Hindus and Sikhs from the West Punjab, and Muslims from the East Punjab. These, together with inevitable temporary dislocation of the administrative machinery, produced chaotic conditions. Trains ceased to run, supplies failed, famine and pestilence appeared in certain areas, and life became uncertain. Apart from the complete rehabilitation of refugees and Indo-Pakistan relations, these matters adjusted themselves during 1948. In Calcutta there were riots and loss of life, but generally Bengal was partitioned with less loss and smaller migrations. This was largely due to the efforts of Gandhi, who toured indefatigably counselling moderation. By so doing, he aroused the animosity of Hindu extremists, by whom he was assassinated in January 1948.

Lord Mountbatten was succeeded as Governor-General of India by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, former Prime Minister of Madras, but the real hand at the helm of India was that of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, master of Congress and Prime Minister. Nehru is a Kashmiri Brahmin, the highest caste even among the Brahmins. He is also a very rich man, son of an opulent barrister. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, and called to the English bar from the Inner Temple. In short, he is very much an aristocrat. He is also an exceedingly able man. If he lacks the sympathy with the

[1] At least 10 million refugees in the autumn of 1947, between Lahore-Amritsar, and Karachi-Bombay.

Indian masses of Gandhi, he also lacks the Mahatma's theatrical asceticism and intransigence. Nehru is a born administrator, who combines the natural guile of the Hindu with a spirit of realism and compromise learnt in Britain. He is essentially a moderate, with a tendency if anything towards conservatism, and his leadership of India was wise, if not spectacular. Indeed, the pattern of India to-day has so closely followed the British model that one unversed in the ways of nationalism might well ask the purpose of all the fuss about independence.

The first problem confronting the new state was the position of the princes. There were nearly 600 of these potentates, ruling a third of India, and, despite popular legend and certain exceptions, ruling it pretty well, better in some cases than in the Governor's provinces.[1] The treaties of these princes were personal with the King-Emperor, and the surrender of paramountcy left them free to accede to India or to Pakistan, or to remain independent. It so happened that most of the states fell geographically within India, and had Hindu populations and rajahs. These acceded naturally to India. There were three exceptions:

(*a*) With a predominantly Hindu population, Junagarh had a Muslim ruler, who attempted to accede to Pakistan. This he was not allowed to do, and the state was incorporated into Indian Kathiawar, although Pakistan refuses to acknowledge the annexation.

(*b*) The much larger state of Jammu and Kashmir presented the opposite problem. The Hindu maharajah of a (slightly) predominantly Muslim state acceded to

[1] Particularly Mysore.

India, and this time Pakistan tried to prevent the accession. (See page 106.)

(*c*) The Nizam of Hyderabad, Muslim ruler of 11 million people, mainly Hindu, in the Deccan, premier prince of India, and the richest man in the world, considered himself strong enough to remain outside any federation, as was his undoubted legal right. He did not succeed. Non-violence stopped short when Congress took power. In 1949, the Indian Army invaded Hyderabad, in a so-called " police action " which was a pure act of aggression, and forced the Nizam to accede to the Indian union.

This rounded off the whole of the south of the subcontinent into the Indian union, but it did not mean that these states were incorporated into the central government. India remained a federation; the British pattern was largely maintained.

(*a*) The central government continued in New Delhi, with a central legislature and cabinet, and with authority over finance, foreign affairs, and defence.

(*b*) The former British provinces (Bombay, Madras, West Bengal, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Assam) remained under Governors, with cabinets responsible to elected legislatures, and with jurisdiction over all matters save the three reserved in (*a*).

(*c*) The larger princely states (such as Mysore and Hyderabad) remained as unitary states under their own rulers, in the same relationship to New Delhi as

they had been in British days, save that they were pledged to constitutionalism and their privy purses were controlled.

(*d*) The lesser states were arbitrarily grouped together into six great unions—Vindhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Rajasthan, Saurashtra, Cochin and Travancore, Patiala and the East Punjab States Union (Pepsu). These amalgamations became " viable " states, with populations exceeding a million under a constitutional prince, and with separate representation at the centre. The most important prince in each area became the *Raj Pramukh* (Prince-President) for life. The lesser rajahs surrendered their sovereignty, but retained their rank and (limited) revenues, becoming as it were no more than great nobles. This consolidation was the work of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru's deputy and strong-arm man, and was a beneficial and necessary measure.

(*e*) Some lesser states were amalgamated with provinces.

(*f*) A few areas remained commissioner's provinces, ruled directly without legislatures. These are frontier states (Sikkim, Manipur, Cooch Behar, Tripura, Cutch, Himachal Pradesh), or Hindu states with Muslim rulers (Bhopal and Rampur).

(*g*) Of the 550 former states, there are now only 16 units. All the same, one third of India is still under direct rule, and the princes by and large have come off better than any of them could possibly have hoped.

(*h*) There remain a few Portuguese (Goa, Damao, Diu) and French (Mahé, Karikal, Yanaon) possessions, mere fossilized relics, which the present central government seems content to ignore. The former French Chandernagore, near Calcutta, went to India by plebiscite in June 1949.

The constitution of the new union was finally accepted in 1950. It provided for an elected President instead of a Governor-General, and established a " sovereign democratic republic ", but it was a republic which retained within itself hereditary princes, and itself remained within the monarchical British Commonwealth—a legal fiction which no one has yet cared to analyse, by which Queen Elizabeth II is recognized as head of the Commonwealth, but not as monarch. The former German Empire also contained republics, and Eire, within the Commonwealth, is in a similar position to India.

The rest of the constitution was equally conservative, retaining the old bureaucracy, the British penal code, and security ordinances. Indeed it failed to right many abuses which might very well have been altered, particularly the clumsy British system of local administration by which one man—the Deputy Commissioner or Collector—possesses executive, financial, and judicial authority within his area, and is so overworked as to cause shocking congestion in the lower courts, and inexcusable delays in the administration of justice. The Constitution also retained reservation of seats for minorities, guaranteed most of the rights of Anglo-Indians (Eurasians), and *nominally* removed the barriers of Untouchability. The clauses guaranteeing freedom of speech

and of the press were abrogated by Pandit Nehru in June 1951.

In the days of the British raj, Indian politicians had one aim—the expulsion of the alien military domination. Therefore, there was only one party—Congress—which naturally succeeded to government in 1947. Since then there have been no elections,[1] but, with the achievement of independence, quite naturally and properly other parties appeared. There are the Sikhs, who demand autonomy (Sikhistan). There are the semi-Fascist Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (R.S.S.) and Hindu Mahasabha, who want an end to toleration and a Hindu theocracy. There is the Socialist Party, and the anti-Congress Krishak Proja of West Bengal, and the Janata Congress Party of the United Provinces. There are, of course, Communists.

Strangely enough, Congress, which was so vehement about the suppression of liberty in British days, has, so far from welcoming a healthy political opposition as an integral part of workable democracy, entrenched itself behind the British security ordinances, which enable a man to be imprisoned without trial for indefinite periods for unspecified political offences, and proceeded to trample down its rivals. In 1948, Hindu nationalists were imprisoned throughout India, and in 1949 the Communists joined them in the cells. In 1951, the clauses securing freedom of press and speech were deleted from the Constitution. Such measures can in the long run only defeat their own ends, and it is not surprising that popular discontent grew.

The government of Pandit Nehru, although unexpectedly

[1] Elections have fallen due and been repeatedly postponed "for technical reasons". They were at last held in late 1951 and 1952, when Congress gained 363 seats against others' 134 (Communist 27).

sane and, taking into account its difficulties, amazingly successful, has hardly been dashing. A people who expected immediate social miracles from the departure of the British have seen instead the power of the princes confirmed, the industrialists secured in their wealth, the bureaucrats re-entrenched in their offices, the *zemindars* (large landowners) remain, and the village money-lenders continue to flourish. The Untouchables see no real sign of the breakdown of caste; the Brahmins no return to the Vedas; the Hindu extremists no persecution of Muslims.[1] Indeed, but for a general decline all round in the efficiency of the public services, and economic stringency brought about by the trade war with Pakistan, there are few signs that the "Satanic raj" has really gone. By Western standards, Nehru's caution is estimable, but India is disappointed, as a child is disappointed when an apparently luscious fruit, long desired, turns out to be sour and pithy.

In the circumstances, it is inevitable that the extremist parties of Right and Left should gain support, that Assam and Bengal should think of secession, and that Congress itself, formerly held together by a common aim, should, with that aim achieved, split into its component parts. The New Congress Party of 1951 is pledged to a programme of social betterment and reform within the Constitution, a programme which, ironically enough, was Nehru's own in British days, to which he must still personally subscribe, but to which he now finds himself by political circumstances apparently opposed. Nehru the revolutionary has been

[1] About 40 million Muslims still remain, mostly in Hyderabad, West Bengal, and the United Provinces. They are contented enough, and, apart from the very poor, show few signs of desire to share the joys of Pakistan.

forced despite himself into the role of Nehru the reactionary, and it is likely that this will be reflected one day at the polls, for the key to Indian internal affairs is the desperate grinding poverty of the bulk of the population.

Despite the jewels of the rajahs and the old-time glamour of the Orient, India is a poor country, grossly over-populated, with a population continuing to rise out of all proportion to its resources.[1] 66 per cent of this population are agriculturists, who exist just on the margin of subsistence in good years, and in bad go down into famine. They are oppressed by the bureaucrats, oppressed by the police, oppressed by the *zemindar*, oppressed by the money-lender, and perpetually ground down by economic circumstances. More often than not, they are riddled by disease,[2] and, if not actually diseased, enfeebled by malnutrition and fever. A healthy India might use its energy to become a wealthy India; that is, if it also became wise in the matter of numbers. These are the problems of India—poverty, disease, and over-population. Nobody realizes them more clearly than Pandit Nehru, and nobody knows better than he that no regime can long survive which cannot in some small way alleviate these conditions.[3]

To this end, in July 1951, Nehru announced a Five Year £1135 million project of industrialization and agricultural development, together with a drive to limit families. In this last aim, at any rate, he is sure to meet the severest opposition from orthodox Hinduism, but if these, or some

[1] In the last 70 years the population has doubled itself. A thousand babies an hour—imagine it!

[2] The average expectation of life is *25 years*!

[3] REFERENCE: Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951).

other measures, do not succeed in improving the lot of the masses, India's peasants within the next generation are likely to seek their own way, as have Marshal Mao's in China.

Despite these facts, India is probably at the moment the most powerful [1] single state in Southern Asia, and since 1947 Pandit Nehru's voice aspires to be heard in international affairs. Setting aside his relations with Pakistan (and Junagarh and Hyderabad), he sees himself as the apostle of peace and the protector of non-European races against Western exploitation. This second role has brought him into sharp conflict with the Union Government of South Africa, where the South African-born Indians of Natal are denied full rights of citizenship, and into somewhat reluctant support of the Viet Minh (Communist) rebels in Indo-China against the French. The first role led him to attempts to arbitrate in the Korean War, while he himself rejects all arbitration in the Kashmir dispute. Thus in external as well as internal affairs the Indian leader is being pulled both ways.

India itself is also at the cross-roads. The present orientation is towards democracy and industrialization. Now democracy implies equality of opportunity and industrialism efficiency, and both equality and efficiency are utterly alien to Hindu culture. It is clear that if India is to develop as she apparently at the moment intends to develop, Hinduism must be rejected. Whether three hundred and fifty years of Western influence can defeat three thousand five hundred years of Hindu tradition remains to be seen.

[1] India stands eighth in the list of the world's industrialized nations, and Tata's are the largest single iron and steel works in the world.

Pakistan.[1]

Area: 361,027 square miles
Population: 80 millions

The conception of Pakistan first sprang in 1930 from the brain of Mohammed Iqbal, the Urdu poet. The name was taken from the initial letters of Punjabis, Afghanis, Kashmiris, and Sindis, plus the suffix "stan", meaning state, although nowadays enthusiasts have translated it into "The Land of the Pure". Pakistan is the creation of the Muslim League and of the League's great leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The Muslim League was founded in 1907 to combat Hindu outcry over the first partition of Bengal. The activities of the League were always in direct proportion to the militancy of Hinduism, and when the Government of India Act (1936) made it clear that real independence for India was only a matter of time, the League took up the cry of Pakistan, for to Indian Muslims, inferior to Hindus in numbers, wealth, education, and ability, independence of the sub-continent meant Hindu independence and Muslim subjection. Probably they were right. Hindus have long memories, and the Mogul Emperors were hard taskmasters.

In consequence, in the Congress-League-Mountbatten discussions of 1947, Jinnah held out for the partition of India into Hindu and Muslim states, and in the urgent circumstances of that time he succeeded, although it is almost sure that Congress leaders agreed with mental reservations that the future might alter matters. Jinnah was a

[1] REFERENCE: O. H. K. Speke, *The Partition of India* (1948).
M. B. Pithawalla, *An Introduction to Pakistan* (1948).
R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (1950).

remarkable man. The son of a wealthy merchant, he was educated in England and called to the Bar. Becoming for a time a Presidency magistrate in Bombay, he abandoned British service for politics, and became the mouthpiece of Muslim India as Gandhi was for the Hindus. But there the similarity ended. Jinnah had no tricks of asceticism and fasting; no sentimentality for the oppressed. He was a clever lawyer, a shrewd politician, and a cultured Western gentleman, and he saw no reason to be ashamed of it, nor to attempt to disguise it with a loin-cloth and a goat. He was not even a very good Muslim by orthodox standards. His Western bias did not prevent his becoming the leader of the Muslims, the creator of Pakistan, and the master of Pakistan. Jinnah's strength was in his absolute integrity. He was probably the only man in India who had no axe to grind, and his opponents knew it. Jinnah stood for justice, efficiency, toleration, and brotherhood. Unfortunately for Pakistan, he died (1948) before the state of his creation was really launched on its way.

On paper, the Dominion of Pakistan is the largest unitary Muslim state in the world. In practice, it is certainly not unitary, hardly a state, and by no means wholly Muslim. It is a purely artificial creation with no historical or political entity. West Pakistan consists of the provinces of West Punjab, Sind, and the N.W. Frontier Province, with the dependent areas of Baluchistan and the tribal districts, and a few former Native States. East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by 950 miles of Indian territory, comprises East Bengal. These were the areas adjudged to be predominantly Muslim by the Radcliffe Commission, and as such assigned to Pakistan.

The Dominion is not unitary because of these five provinces, differing widely in language, culture, aspirations, and economic conditions. The irrigated Punjab is fertile; Sind and the N.W. Frontier largely desert; the tribal areas incubi rather than assets. E. Bengal, wholly separate and utterly different, is dealt with later.

Pakistan would like to be a purely Islamic state, but it is not. Before 1947, 42·9 per cent of the population of the Punjab were non-Muslim. These have migrated to India. They had to, or die. But the 45·3 per cent Hindu minority in East Bengal remain, and represent the most prosperous and active part of the population. So long as they remain (and the present policy of genocide of the East Bengal Government is making it very difficult for them to remain) Pakistan can never be an Islamic state.

In 1947, it seemed very unlikely that Pakistan would become a state at all. Its weaknesses and problems were stupendous:

(*a*) The military and civilian resources of Imperial India were divided between the successor states in proportion to their size, and naturally India received the lion's share.

(*b*) The Sikh-Muslim feud brought death and rapine along the Punjab Frontier. Between 7 to 10 million refugees flocked from West Punjab into India, and from East Punjab into Pakistan. For the most part, they were penniless, terrified, and starving, and their immediate relief and ultimate rehabilitation presented a problem which would have been colossal for any government, least of all a new government with

virtually no resources. West Punjab became one huge refugee camp, and the indigent floating population represented a deadly drag on national economy.

(*c*) Partly because of Islamic tradition, partly because of lack of ability and inclination, the Muslims of British India took far less advantage of the opportunities for Western education than did the Hindus, with the result that the Muslims remained cultivators and soldiers and menials. The Hindus became administrators, lawyers, and merchants. When the Hindus went, the commercial prosperity of the Punjab went with them, and the poor-grade Muslims who comprised the immigrant refugees could not replace them.

With every new migration, Pakistan loses Hindu capital and acumen, and gains unemployable Muslim dross from India.

(*d*) As the Indianized magistracy,[1] and almost all the clerks and accountants, government and commercial, were Hindu, the new state lacked trained administrators and clerks. For a time the situation was chaotic, and necessitated the over-rapid promotion of junior officials and the recruitment of new officials, often quite unqualified and temperamentally unsuitable. The Muslim League created Pakistan, and naturally the Muslim League was now the Government of Pakistan. Thus these new officials tended to be nominees of the Muslim League, which meant in too many cases that they were fanatical young Muslims,

[1] Of the 100 senior civil servants of East Bengal, all but 9 elected to serve India; the same proportion prevailed throughout the services.

who formed a solid wedge of intolerance and reaction between the people—simple, industrious, and good-hearted—and the Karachi Government—sincere, enthusiastic, and tolerant. Moderate officials, those who had been British trained or followed the example of Jinnah, were swamped and gradually ousted. The cry of the *mullah* was heard in the land; the Public Safety Acts were misused; corruption,[1] nepotism, and injustice crept into the public services. Pakistan began to turn from the tolerant Westernized state envisaged by Jinnah to the Shariat theocratic principles beloved of the *mullahs*.

These tendencies were noticeable even in the lifetime of Jinnah. When he died in 1948, they increased unchecked until in 1950, when the cold war with India reached its peak, and the Bengal anti-Hindu riots broke out again, it was difficult to decide who ruled in Pakistan—the tolerant, urbane Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in Karachi, or his fanatical junior magistrates and half-educated village politicians in the districts. The result was unfortunate, and was mirrored in the premature resignation of senior British officials and service officers,[2] who had remained after 1947 at the request of Jinnah, but found their tasks distasteful and unprofitable under his successors.

Despite these factors, despite the death of Jinnah, despite

[1] As early as 1948, the Prime Ministers of West Punjab and Sind were tried for peculation and gross malpractice, and in 1950 senior ministers in East Bengal. Dr. Khuro of Sind was convicted; the Khan of Mamdot in Punjab secured a verdict which amounted to not proven.

[2] For example, Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of the West Punjab, Sir Frederick Bourne, Governor of East Bengal, and Sir Charles Dundas, Governor of the N.W.F.P.

the exceptionally unfortunate feud with India, Pakistan *did* settle down and established itself. The saving factors were the enthusiasm of the common people, and the circumstances which (so long as the water flows in the West Punjab canals) makes the country self-supporting in foodstuffs. In addition, the incidence of the Korean War bolstered the national economy at a time when the commercial war with India and the over-valuation of the Pakistan rupee had brought it to collapse. A capital was established at Karachi; office accommodation found in the provincial centres; the gaps in the administrative services were filled somehow, and a Commission established to select a proper Pakistan Administrative Service in the traditions of the former Indian Civil Service. Refugee camps became less crowded; trains began to run again; commercial houses reopened, although even in 1952 public confidence had not recovered from the bankruptcies of 1947, and there was no adequate banking system throughout the country.

The N.W. Frontier of British India was a constant source of trouble to the viceregal government, and necessitated the maintenance of considerable garrisons. This frontier is now the northern frontier of Pakistan, and its settlement is one of Mr. Jinnah's major achievements. Pathan, Mohmand, Afridi, and Waziri tribesmen appear to have accepted Muslim Pakistan as they would never British India, and although the annual "subsidies" (in effect bribes) are still paid, no garrisons are kept in the forts of the tribal areas. With Baluchistan and parts of the N.W. Frontier Province they are still ruled directly without elected representation.

The Indo-Afghan Frontier was demarcated in British days along the Durand Line. This is now repudiated by

the Royal Afghan Government, which claims Pathan territory down to Peshawar, a situation which has caused most tense relations between Kabul and Karachi, despite common ties of Islam. This tension prevents Pakistan taking the lead which she would like in a Pan-Islamic bloc, a lead to which she considers her size and population entitle her. The Pan-Islamic Conference in Karachi in 1950 was by no means successful, and the subsequent state visit of the Shah of Iran did nothing to further Pakistan-Persian relations, nor has Pakistan attempted, or been allowed, to subscribe to the Saadabad Pact.

The distant and detached province of East Bengal is not only the most densely populated [1] but also the most fertile and prosperous. East Bengal produces jute, tea, and rice, all exportable commodities; its economy is, however, entirely agricultural. East Bengal (Pakistan) grows the jute, West Bengal (India) manufactures it. In consequence, the economy of East Bengal is linked, not with West Pakistan, but with West Bengal (India). The small port of Chittagong (Pakistan) is hopelessly inadequate as an outlet compared with Calcutta (India).

This was proved quite decisively in 1907 when Lord Curzon's first partition of Bengal had to be rescinded, and that division was far less absolute than the present one. Bengal is also poles apart from the Punjab in culture, language, and tradition. The Bengali has as much in common with the Pathan as the Rumanian with a Highland Scot. Moreover, unlike West Pakistan, East Bengal has still a 40 per cent Hindu population, and a high proportion of

[1] East Bengal: 775 per square mile. West Pakistan: 92 per square mile.

this minority will certainly remain as long as it can. If it does not, it will be an evil day for East Bengal, since the Hindus have the brains and the money, and the Muslims (in many cases forcibly converted centuries ago from low-caste Hindus) are agriculturists and menials. A good deal of Hindu capital and energy has already been driven from East Bengal by the bigotry and wrong-headedness of junior administrators, and the provincial economy has demonstrably deteriorated accordingly. Prosperous towns have become mere overgrown villages. Whatever the Muslim majority (a very small majority) may wish, the fate of East Bengal is tied to Calcutta and not to Karachi.

The situation is not improved by the tendency of the central government to treat East Bengal, richest and most populated province, as a poor relation. Few Bengalis find appointments in the public service or commissions in the army,[1] and the economic policy of Karachi in declining to devalue the rupee was disastrous for Bengal. It is in consequence at least tenable that East and West Bengal may draw together again, the more so since West Bengal is by no means in sympathy with the Congress Government of New Delhi. There are separatist movements in East Bengal, West Bengal, and Assam; none of these is happy in its relations with its federal rulers. In addition, Bengal, always the most politically precocious of the provinces, is strongly impregnated with Communism. It is not impossible that the future may see a second reversal of the partition of Bengal and the establishment of an autonomous republic. A glance at Map 3 will show the contiguity of Bengal and

[1] Despite the fact that Khwaja Nazimuddin, the present Prime Minister and former Governor-General of Pakistan, is a Bengali princeling.

Assam with Communist dominated Tibet, China, and North Burma.

Like India, Pakistan is at the cross-roads. The synthesis of Indian Islam with the West has never been complete, by no means as complete as that of Hinduism.[1] Westernized Pakistanis there are, in the Jinnah tradition, and none the worse Muslims for that; indeed, probably the better, since toleration belongs to the Prophet himself,[2] and bigotry and persecution to the Caliphs his successors. But they are not regarded as good Muslims by the orthodox, for too often orthodoxy in any creed means ignorance, obscurantism, reaction, and just plain stubborn stupidity. One part of Pakistan is looking to the West and a bright future; to industrialization; to the emancipation of women and the abolition of *purdah*; to cleanliness, sanitation, and increased prospects of human life; to cordial understanding with India, and world co-operation within the British Commonwealth. Another part of Pakistan looks back to the tenth-century Caliphate; to the exaltation of the *mullahs*, the oppression of the many, and the ignorance of all; to withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, and retrogression as a Central Asiatic Shariat state; even (in moments of high optimism and peculiar stupidity) to a second Muslim conquest of India. It is by no means certain that the first party will have their way since, as the years roll by and the influence of British India recedes, the incredibly tenacious hold of the worst features of Islam is renewed. (This tendency was very greatly increased by the murder of the moderate Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in October

[1] REFERENCE: W. Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (1947).

[2] The Koran says: "Cherish the alien stranger within your gates."

1951.) Should this become so, Pakistan, founded with such high hopes by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, but by no means united in Islam, and far less stable than Pakistanis like to believe, may well fall a victim very early to either of her powerful neighbours to north or south.

Indo-Pakistan Relations.

The Indo-Pakistan sub-continent occupies the central and strategic position in Asia. As such, its importance to the world in general and to the British Commonwealth in particular is incalculable. A settled India and Pakistan represents no small part of the defence of the Western democracies, and unfortunately, since 1947, the relations between India and Pakistan have been very far from settled.

The two states owe their very separate existence to the religious, social, and cultural differences between Muslims and Hindus, which have been dealt with already. It might have been hoped that, once the countries separated, these differences would have been forgotten. Unfortunately, the Indian Congress only accepted Pakistan with bad grace as a temporary unpleasant necessity. Few Hindus really expected the northern dominion to establish itself, and most of them hoped that it would not. The more extreme at least were prepared to take action, overt and otherwise, to prevent its doing so. Pakistan, on the other hand, is absurdly sensitive and over-suspicious, and ready to see a Hindu plot in every trivial incident. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that trouble soon arose over the integration of the princely states.

The enforced accession of Junagarh to India was perforce tolerated by Pakistan, but when a similar situation arose in

the much more important state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Karachi government proposed more positive action. Kashmir is a considerable principality in the Himalayas, large enough to be a viable unit. It is mountainous, but the Vale of Kashmir is fertile indeed, and has traditional associations with Islam as the summer resort of the Moguls, and a Muslim population numerically superior to the Hindu. There is also some mineral wealth, but the real importance of the state lies in its strategic position. It touches Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China, and Tibet, and its existence outside the Indian Union would bring a hostile frontier right down to the East Punjab plain, uncomfortably near to Delhi.

At the end of the First Sikh War (1845), after the death of the great Maharajah Ranjit Singh, the Sikhs, unable to pay the indemnity imposed upon them, ceded Kashmir to the East India Company, who promptly sold it to the Dogra Rajah of Jammu. Thus Muslim Kashmir was united with Hindu Jammu under a Hindu ruler. The Maharajah Sir Hari Singh acceded to India in 1947, and secured the assistance of Indian troops and aircraft to enforce the accession. His Muslim subjects rebelled and set up an Azad (free) Kashmir Government in the north, aided by considerable numbers of Pathan tribesmen, who were given transit across Pakistan territory for this purpose.

When these tribesmen made no headway against trained Indian regiments, regular Pakistan units were moved into Kashmir (1948), and for a time India and Pakistan were actually fighting, although neither would admit a state of war. Two U.N.O. missions failed to evolve any solution, although they did secure a cessation of hostilities, which left

the north under Pakistani, and the south under Indian control. The U.N.O. suggested a referendum, to which Pakistan agreed (as it could; it would win), but which India refused, unless it be conducted under the rifles of Indian troops. The result was stalemate, and the Kashmir episode was forced into the background overseas by the greater menace (1950) of the Korean War. It remained, however, a constant source of irritation between India and Pakistan, and gave no time for the bitterness of partition, with its attendant atrocities on both sides, to evaporate.

In September 1949, Great Britain devalued the pound against the U.S. dollar. This action was followed by most of the world, and all the Commonwealth except Pakistan. The intention was to cheapen the price of British goods in the United States, thus to increase British exports and reduce Britain's dollar deficiency. The Government of Karachi considered that Pakistan's exports (of jute and cotton), being of the type of non-elastic demand, would not be increased by devaluation, while the internal condition of the country could not stand the rise in prices which devaluation might reasonably be expected to cause. The Pakistan rupee was not devalued, and stood at 2*s.* and more against the Indian rupee's 1*s.* 6*d.* This meant that Indian merchants were required to pay a 40 per cent premium on Pakistan goods. They refused to do so. Pakistan's exports proved to be anything but elastic,[1] raw jute piled up in the godowns of East Bengal, and the mills of Calcutta lay idle. Coal

[1] In 1950, the accidental incidence of the Korean War and the immense extension of the Anglo-U.S. armaments programme reversed the situation, and recognition by the International Monetary Fund of the Pakistan rupee at 9·8 to the £1 appeared to justify Karachi's policy, but not before eighteen months of commercial chaos had embittered still further Indo-Pakistan relations.

exports from India stopped, and the whole economy of East Bengal came to a standstill. No currency transfers were possible across the frontiers, and to all intents and purposes intercourse between the adjacent and complementary provinces ceased.

With its greater size and resilience, India came out of this commercial war better than Pakistan, and inevitably the economic plight of Bengal was blamed upon Hindu intention to "down" Pakistan. Anti-Hindu riots began again in East Bengal, unchecked, even incited, by biased local subordinate officials, and naturally reprisals were taken against Muslims in West Bengal. The weary lines of refugees began again, 5000 a day in May–June 1950, and, as before, the better Hindus left Pakistan and the worse Muslims came in. The inter-racial situation was not improved by the breakdown of the U.N.O. attempt to settle the Kashmir issue, and the failure of the Bagge Commission to adjudicate the Sylhet-Assam frontier dispute exclusively in the interests of Pakistan.

In April 1950, Pandit Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan,[1] the two Prime Ministers, met in New Delhi and hammered out an agreement designed to end the commercial war and reassure the minorities in both the Bengals. The intention was good, the language grandiloquent, but neither minister had the means to implement the pact among his minor officials. Ignorance and hatred at the bottom cannot be checked overnight by a few fair words at the top. Hindu

[1] The two leaders had much in common. They were both cultured, Westernized aristocrats, sincere patriots, and moderates in policy. Both were tyrannized by extremist supporters. Ironically enough, the personal fortune of Nehru is (or was) in Karachi, and some of Liaquat Ali Khan's estates in India.

baiting in East Bengal went on, and the migrations continued. A subsequent meeting in Karachi in 1951 (August) had little more success, and the situation was regrettably worsened by the assassination of Nawab-zada Liaquat Ali Khan on 16th October 1951. He had been Jinnah's lieutenant and was pre-eminently of the school of that great man. With his death Pakistanis seemed to lose faith in their destiny, as well they might, having been subjected to the premature demise of their two greatest men within four years of the foundation of the State. Worse, there was no one adequately to replace Liaquat Ali. He represented almost the last bastion against Islamic reaction and his own fiery generals.

Yet withal the Indo-Pakistani feud is at once insoluble and soluble in half an hour. The religious issue is a symptom, not a cause: Muslims and Hindus have lived side by side before, and can do so again. In 1937–42, the unionist Muslim-Sikh-Hindu administration of the Punjab did well under Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, until it was blasted by the bigotry of the Muslim League. The economic battle is an effect, not a cause. If other things were settled, sheer desire for trade and profit would compose it in a week. Kashmir itself is no more than a side issue, although a sincere gesture from India thereon would go far to solving the trouble.

What then is at the root of Indo-Pakistan animosity? The root is Pakistan's stark fear of starvation. Western Pakistan is an arid desert. The canal waters of the five rivers of the Punjab transform that desert into an area so fertile that, *so long as the canal waters continue to flow*, Pakistan is self-supporting in foodstuffs. The Sutlej Dam between Lahore and Ferozepore alone irrigates more than 3 million acres, about the total area of the land at present irrigated

in the U.S.A. Once the canal waters cease, Pakistan starves, and the *head-waters of all five rivers are in Indian territory*.[1] If she so desired, India could destroy Pakistan by cutting the head-waters of the canals of the Punjab.[2] She did indeed cut off the water supply of the Ravi canal for a fortnight in 1948, and since then the Pakistan Government has been haunted by fear of a large-scale repetition of this, every Pakistani being convinced (not without reason) that India is plotting his destruction, for the Hindu is as sly as a fox, and does not forget the Mogul conquest.

This is the crux of the whole matter. The Pakistani is a soldier and an agriculturist, who despises the Hindu *vakilraj*, government of lawyers and clerks. Yet he knows that those same lawyers hold his life in their hands. It is understandable that many hotheads counsel an attack on India while there is yet time to ensure that those vital head-waters are never dammed. So long as the present Indian Government is in the saddle, it is inconceivable that such an action would be taken, but Nehru is sixty-five years old, and anyway he may not always win elections. Similarly, the Pakistan Prime Minister may not always be able to control his generals, for the military rising of 1951 was almost successful, and the bigoted, militant Muslim League is steadily outliving the moderates.

The solution lies with India. Pakistan would of necessity respond with alacrity to any genuine gesture of *rapprochement* over Kashmir. The lawyer politicians of New Delhi would do well to ponder just how far they can safely drive

[1] The Sutlej, Ravi, Chenab, and Indus actually rise in India and the Jhelum in Indian-controlled Kashmir. See Map 1.

[2] Similar need to control the head-waters of the Nile is behind the Egyptian demand for the sovereignty of the Sudan.

their northern neighbours. Any hunter will tell them of the danger of cornering a tiger. West Pakistan is a tiger, and, if cornered, like a tiger she will spring. If that happens, it will be the end of Pakistan, but it may also very well be the end of resurgent Asia, and probably of the whole Western world.

Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.[1]

Nepal is an independent state in the High Himalayas with an area of some 55,000 square miles and an estimated population of 5½ millions, between Tibet and the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) of India. Its people are Mongolian by race, Hindu or Buddhist, or a mixture of both, by religion. The dominant tribe are the famous and war-like Ghurkas, and the ruling dynasty (since 1303) Rajput Hindus.

In the nineteenth century, Ghurka expansion brought them first up against the Chinese in Tibet, secondly against Ranjit Singh's Sikh kingdom, and thirdly against the East India Company. Defeat by China necessitated their withdrawal from Tibet, which forms the basis of Chinese claims to Nepal to-day. The Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–16 resulted in a treaty limiting Nepal to her present boundaries, and establishing a British resident at Katmandu.[2] Since then the military proclivities of the Ghurkas have been exercised as mercenaries first in the Indian, and now in the British armies, where they make first-rate troops renowned for courage and loyalty.

The administration of Nepal is peculiar. There is a hereditary King (Maharajadhiraja) and a hereditary Prime

[1] REFERENCE: W. B. Northey, *Land of the Ghurkas* (1937).

[2] After 1920, he became ambassador.

Minister (Maharajah), the real power being in the hands of the latter. This sometimes causes confusion in Europe, but the situation is not isolated in Asia, where kings are sometimes regarded as too sacred for common affairs. Until the late nineteenth century, the Japanese Emperor was similarly kept completely in the background by hereditary Shoguns. In Nepal, the Shamsher family have ruled for the kings since 1850, on a basis of military feudalism, and in close alliance with Great Britain.

The grant of independence to India, and the spread of democratic ideas generally in Asia, led to revolt against this autocracy in 1950. An organization modelled on the Indian Congress and based in neighbouring Assam sought to force the resignation of the Prime Minister, Sir Mohun Shamsher Jang Bahadur. Seeing his chance to be rid of the Shamsher domination, and possibly realizing that the day of feudalism was done, King Tribhubana supported this movement, with the result that he was compelled to take refuge in the Indian Embassy, and eventually fled to Delhi, where he abdicated in favour of his infant son. After some weeks of open fighting, in which the Indian Government supported the Nepalese Congress insurgents, the Shamsher "dynasty" resigned in favour of a more broadly based administration, considerably under Indian influence. It is at least doubtful whether this government will have either the stability or the integrity of the former military autocracy, or whether Indian support will be of any real value in a state threatened on three sides by Asiatic Communism.

Sikkim is a small state between Tibet, Nepal, and Bengal, which has been a British protectorate since 1890,[1] and was

[1] REFERENCE: Lord Ronaldshay, *Lands of the Thunderbolt* (1923).

in June 1949 taken over by the Indian States Ministry " at the request of the Maharajah ".

Bhutan is larger, and is still technically independent, but receives an annual subsidy from New Delhi.

The importance of all three areas is as buffers between the Indian Republic and Red Asia, and they form points where at any time a Communist thrust may be expected to embarrass both India and Pakistan.

Ceylon.

Area: 25,332 square miles
Population: 6·5 millions

Ceylon was taken from the Dutch by Great Britain in 1796, and became a Crown Colony in 1798, the last native king (of Kandy) being deposed in 1815. The island developed independently of India, and constitutionally without some of the difficulties of the mainland. In 1833, an official legislative council was set up. Ceylonese [1] were admitted to this in 1910. In 1920–24, non-official members were permitted a majority in the council of 34 elected members, with a cabinet of 10, in which the three chief portfolios were still held by non-Ceylonese officials. Further concessions were granted in 1945; in 1947, the Ceylon Independence Act received the Royal Assent, and in February 1948, Ceylon became a Dominion.

Possibly because of this gradual development, possibly because of its smaller size, Ceylon shows less of the symp-

[1] The noun *Singhalese* more pedantically used refers to only one element in a mixed population, comprising the coast Ceylonese who had 300 years of the Dutch, the up-country Kandians, and Indians of two migrations.

MAP 4

ASIA : 1939

SHOWING COLONIAL AREAS

MILES 0 900

GREAT BRITAIN *Islands underlined*

HOLLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FRONTIERS

FRANCE

PORTUGAL

JAPAN

OTHER BOUNDARIES



ASIA : 1952

SPHERES OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE

MILES 0 900

- *COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS*
- *AREAS WITH COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN ARMED REVOLT*
- *BRITISH COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES Islands underlined*
- *PORTUGUESE*
- *INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS*
- *OTHER BOUNDARIES*
- *SPHERES OF INFLUENCE*
- *NON-COMMUNIST SOVEREIGN STATES*

INDIA, PAKISTAN, CEYLON, KASHMIR WITHIN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

toms of national adolescence than either India or Burma. Relations with Great Britain have remained fairly harmonious, and there is still a British Governor-General. In its attitude towards India the case is somewhat different, and the new government has discriminated against immigrant Indians resident in Ceylon. The situation is complicated by a division within the Indian population itself. There are Tamil peasant cultivators who settled in the north in the twelfth century, and labourers imported in the last few decades to work the tea and rubber plantations. Between these and the Singhalese (only 69 per cent of the population) there is communal friction, and in 1951 government not only checked further immigration, but also forced all resident aliens to adopt Ceylonese citizenship or leave. The result has not been happy, but moderation has been imposed on both parties by the economic dependence of Ceylon on India for foodstuffs and as a general supplier. As in Burma, the Ceylonese are more than suspicious of Indian Imperialistic aims, since the subjective anti-Imperialism of Indian Congress leaders seems to bear no relation to their objective actions, as in Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Nepal.

Ceylon is an island of rubber and tea, with a geographical position on the ocean routes to Australasia and the Far East which ensures the prosperity of Colombo. Extensive projects of jungle clearance and irrigation under the Western sponsored Colombo Plan are also contributing in no small way to the increased prosperity of the hitherto neglected interior. Ceylon's economic future does not therefore present the problems of its larger neighbours. Internally, the two religions of Buddhism [1] and Hinduism, although different,

[1] See page 121.

are not antagonistic. As regards external relations, Ceylon, being an island, is not so subject to alien pressure and infiltration as, say, Burma or Nepal. Taken by and large, the new dominion has settled in comfortably enough. It has its problems, but, in comparison with some other parts of Asia, they are of the minor sort.

CHAPTER IV

South East Asia

South East Asia:[1] General.

S.E. Asia is now taken to cover the Indo-Pacific peninsula of Burma, Siam, Indo-China, and Malaya, and the Indonesian and Philippine Archipelagos. The area is most rich in natural wealth, and the Malacca Straits represent (with Suez and Panama) one of the three great meeting places of trans-oceanic routes. As the link between the Asiatic mainland and Australasia, S.E. Asia has been from the earliest times subject to colonization.

In pre-Christian times came the Malayas to push the negroid and pre-Dravidian aborigines into hills and remote islands. Then came Indian traders to Burma, Siam, Cambodia, and Java, and Chinese along the reverse route to India. These peoples established political states and a belt of civilization along the ocean routes, and to it were attracted numberless land migrations from the north: the Tibeto-Burmans; the Annamites, a mixture of South Chinese and early Malays; and the Thai-Shan folk, who settled in Siam and between Burma and China.

This ethnic complexity was matched in religion. Hinduism and Buddhism followed the traders, and, in the thir-

[1] REFERENCE: F. T. Jesse, *The Story of Burma* (1946).
L. A. Mills, *The New World of S.E. Asia* (1950).
G. E. Harvey, *The British Rule in Burma* (1946).

teenth century Arab merchants brought Islam to Sumatra, to Malacca, and thence to Java. The states of the mainland followed Buddhism, often admixed with Confucianism. The more advanced peoples of Malaya and Indonesia became at least nominally Muslim, with strong relics of animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

These disunifying tendencies were increased by the European colonization of the area in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Portuguese and Dutch, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth by the British and French. The aims and methods of these powers differed widely, and the frontiers imposed by their domination were largely artificial. Before 1942, when the Japanese threat became an unpleasant fact, there was no co-operation between the Western powers, and the age-long disunity of S.E. Asia was perpetuated until 1942–45 when, for the first time in its history, the whole area was subject to one political power—Japan.

The whole plans of the Japanese for unification and centralization came to nought because of the shortness of their occupation and their inability to maintain communications.[1] The Japanese occupation none the less constituted an important unifying influence, accelerated social change, and finally brought about a nationalist reaction against all forms of alien rule. The complete collapse of France and Holland in 1940 gave a brief period of autonomy to their Asiatic possessions, and the ejection of the British from Burma and Malaya (and very nearly from India) destroyed for ever the legend of the essential superiority of the white man.

[1] Despite the Siam-Burma Railway and the Korea-Singapore motor road, communications by sea were essential, and these after 1943 the Japanese had not.

The consequent xenophobia also extended to alien Asiatics, Indians, and Chinese, who formerly exploited S.E. Asia no less than Europeans. Present-day nationalism in S.E. Asia is simply a determination of the underdogs in the plurality of races to reverse the economic pyramid and, by getting rid of alien exploiters, to bring the lowest elements to the top. In the case of fanatical extremists this very natural desire takes the form of complete isolationism. Most people, however, realize that because of the weakness of S.E. Asia in defence, and the large gaps in the distribution of its population, co-operation with India, with the West, and between the component states themselves is essential. The new states of S.E. Asia are cast in Western moulds, and the frontiers demarcated by European colonization remain. Within these frontiers the most advanced indigenous elements have taken the lead, but these are by no means numerically the greatest, so that unity of purpose against the European is off-set by splinter nationalities within the states. In Indonesia, the lead of the Javanese is disputed; in Indo-China, of the Annamese; and in Burma, the Shans, Karens, Kachins, and others are in open revolt against the Rangoon Burmese. This is particularly so in Malaya, with its large urban population,[1] where Indians look to New Delhi, Chinese talk of China's nineteenth province, and Malays have vague plans for joining the Republic of Indonesia. Post-war events have shown that strong nationalism in S.E. Asia by no means guarantees internal security, but rather provides scope for disruptive forces coming from without.

It is very doubtful if one S.E. Asian in ten thousand has any conception at all of the tenets of Marxian Communism.

[1] Five times greater than any of the other territories.

He has, however, a very keen appreciation of the difference between his standard of life and that of British planter, French administrator, Chinese banker, and Indian merchant. His idea of Communism is a reversal of these standards, and so long as there are Karens to fight in Burma, French to eject in Indo-China, British to harass in Malaya, Dutch to negotiate in Indonesia, and Chinese and Indians everywhere, the Kremlin has no need to consider movement of Red troops to S.E. Asia.

Burma.

Area:	Burma	192,158 square miles
	Shan States ..	57,816 square miles
	Karen States ..	4,519 square miles
	Total	254,493 square miles

Population: approximately 18 millions

Buddhism is the third great religion of the Orient which it is very necessary to try to understand. Buddhism sprang from Hinduism, and like Hinduism (and Christianity) it has different meanings in different lands. The Buddha himself (Prince Siddhartha Gautama) was a Himalayan Brahmin born probably 567 B.C., in the century when Confucius and Lao-Tse in China were also asking the eternal why of life. Brought up to revere the Hindu gods, he came to the conclusion that the whole system of priests, ritual, and theology was a drag on man's progress, and, at the age of thirty, he left his princely estate to become a wandering ascetic and preach the Essential. He taught a hard religion with no personal God, that as a man sows so shall he reap. He thought that everything which is normally

most attractive in this world must be given up to attain a Good Life, and that such attainment meant Nirvana—perfect bliss. This is also a postulate of Hinduism, the difference being that the Buddha claimed that Perfection was attainable in this world, Hinduism that Perfection could only be realized by endless weary incarnations of the soul.

The Four Noble Truths of Buddhism show that existence is suffering caused by worldly craving after success. Freedom can be reached by the Eight-fold Path,[1] the Middle Way between extreme asceticism—self-torture—and self-indulgence. Buddha admitted the theory of *karma*, that sin must be paid for because that is the natural law, but he preached goodness, charity, purity, and kindness,[2] holding as a reward for these possible immediate release from incarnation, or at least a shortening of the cycle of reincarnate lives. Like Christianity and Islam, Buddhism is a missionary religion, and through the conversion of the Indian Emperor Asoka (261 B.C.) it spread rapidly through India,[3] China, Ceylon, Burma, Tibet, Japan, and S.E. Asia.

In Burma, Buddhism developed characteristic form, the pure reason of the Gautama being humanized. All over Burma figures of the Buddha squat serene beneath jewelled and gold-leafed pagodas, no more idols than the Crucifix is an idol, but representations of the spirit of the Buddha in a form comprehensible to simple man. Because it is the nature of the Burmese to make festivals, the pagoda Holy Days are

[1] Right views, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture.

[2] Compare the Sermon on the Mount (*Matthew* v, 1–12).

[3] In India, the simplified creed went down before the opposition of the Brahmins. In the country of its origin there are few Buddhists to-day, but in other countries it flourished.

days of rejoicing, and there is always a fair-ground near the pagoda. Burmese Buddhism is full of superstition and more than tinged with animism. The prohibitions against taking life and against enjoyment are sensibly compromised (except for the *pongyis* [monks]) with the desirability of eating well and dancing and playing. Yet every Burmese has engrained in him the tenets of Buddhism. If he cannot attain the immediate Perfection of a Buddha, he is not anxious to earn eternal reincarnation by absolute disregard of The Way. This has a two-fold effect on character. It renders the Burman[1] non-belligerent, and makes him peculiar prey to the unscrupulous who are not handicapped in matters of this world by the Eight-fold Path. Such people are not necessarily always aliens; they may well be Burmans themselves, which is why the mass of the people in modern Burma are so subject to undesirable political leaders from King Thibaw to the present day. It also accounts for the Burmese genius for compromise, which the unkind call treachery. The Middle Way can so easily become the line of least resistance. Hence the ready subjection of the Burmese to their own brutal kings, to British and Indians, and latterly their by no means reluctant collaboration with the Japanese.

The forests and mountains of Assam and Thailand have from the earliest times kept Burma apart. There are Talaings in the south, and Mongoloid Burmese in the north, eighth-century migrants from S.E. Tibet. To the east, there are the half-Chinese Thai-Shans, and various tribes such as Kachins and Karens. But some form of Buddhism is com-

[1] The word Burman indicates any inhabitant of Burma; Burmese the migrants from S.E. Tibet of the eighth century.

mon to almost all;[1] there is no caste system and very little admixture of blood. In this Burma differs essentially from India. The Burman has also from his geographical seclusion become arrogant; it is only in the last century that he has had opportunity to compare himself with other races, and this he does entirely to his own advantage, frequently with insufficient reason.

The Talaings shared the Irrawaddy Valley with Burmese or Shan overlords until they were finally crushed in 1757 (the year of Plassey) by the Burmese King Alompra, who founded the last Burmese dynasty, and drove the Talaings into Siam and S. Burma around Moulmein. The history of this dynasty is bloodstained even by oriental standards, and the arrogance of its rulers inevitably brought them into conflict with the British, by now well established in India.

The war of 1824–26 claimed Arakan and Tenasserim for India and established a British resident at Ava. The Second Burmese War (1852) saw Lord Dalhousie's annexation of Lower Burma. The Third Burmese War was against the bloodthirsty King Thibaw who, amongst other endearing tricks, massacred eighty of his royal relatives to celebrate his succession and make it secure. Thibaw reigned for seven years, during which time he so alienated his people that, when he was so ill-advised as to murder the British resident,[2] the punitive expedition of 1885 met with no opposition, and Upper Burma joined Lower as an Indian province, and as an Indian province administered from Delhi Burma remained until 1937, although the Burmans received semi-parliamentary government in 1923.

[1] Buddhists, 85 per cent: Animists, 5 per cent: Muslims, 4 per cent: Christians, 3 per cent.

[2] Sir Louis Cavagnari.

The British administration of Burma, like all British administrations, was just and efficient, but the connexion with India was a fatal error. Whilst the senior posts in government were held by Britons (which might not have been resented), the majority of the junior ones were given to Indians, which was indeed resented, since Burma is not India, and the Burman is by no means inferior to the Indian, rather the reverse. Trade and commerce passed almost entirely into Indian and Chinese hands, and Rangoon became an Anglo-Sino-Indian cantonment.[1] The Burmese saw their country's wealth passing into the hands of foreigners, their religion undermined, and their national integrity threatened. When they rebelled (1930–32), the rebellion was suppressed with Indian bayonets, and the hatred for India grew.

Yet the grant of separation from India and complete parliamentary independence found Burma unprepared. The transition from Thibaw's kingdom to British Dominion was too rapid. In the process, Burmans lost their martial nature and gained nothing but fluid groups of corrupt and ineffective politicians. Ba Maw, the first premier under the 1937 Constitution, became the Burmese Quisling under the Japanese. U Saw, his successor, who was imprisoned (quite rightly) by Mr. Winston Churchill in 1940, also saw salvation and personal gain in Japanese victory.

This view was shared by no few Burmans who saw in British defeat at least the end of the Indian connexion and possible complete independence. The Japanese entered Burma in 1942, when 400,000 refugees, mostly Indians,

[1] Indians and Pakistanis, 800,000: Chinese, 300,000: Europeans and Anglo-Burmans, 10,000.

made the dreadful jungle trek on foot up the Irrawaddy and across the mountains into India.

Admiral Lord Mountbatten reconquered the country by May 1945. The expulsion of the Japanese was welcome, but this did not mean that the return of the British was popular. Defeat had meant immense loss of " face ", and the damage done by British and U.S. aircraft, greatly exceeding any depredations of the Japanese, did not add to the popularity of the " liberators ".

A constituent assembly, elected in April 1947, resolved in favour of complete independence outside the British Commonwealth, a decision which became a fact on the 4th January 1948. Probably the other thing which would have kept Burma within the British Commonwealth would have been the withdrawal of India.

Burma is a rich, self-sufficient country (rice, teak, petroleum, rubies, silver) and would normally very soon have recovered from the war, but in 1947 the numerous arms and munitions scattered by the retreating armies of 1942 and 1945 provided the means of much violent crime: communications were disrupted, land had gone out of cultivation owing to the war-time impossibility of exporting rice, and mineral production had entirely ceased. Independence also saw the rise of a number of political parties, full of promises and no achievement, led by corrupt, inefficient, unscrupulous, and worthless politicians.

In March 1948, the Burmese Communist Party went into open revolt against the middle-class government of Rangoon. In August of the same year, the People's Volunteer Organization started a second and separate revolt, and these were joined by mutinous elements of the army. A

Democratic-Front Government was established at Prome. At the end of January 1949, the Karens rebelled and set up a Separatist Government at Toungoo.

These insurgent elements are by no means all Communist. They include Karen and Kachin nationalists, liberals, agriculturists, indeed anyone with a grievance against the urbanized, Europeanized, corrupt politicians in Rangoon, who are in no way representative of Burma. The situation was further complicated by the infiltration of scattered Chinese troops, Nationalist and Red, in the East, and by armed bandits from Viet Nam and Viet Minh. In 1952, the country was still dominated by insurgents; road, rail, and river communication was either impossible or highly dangerous; trade came to a standstill; and the writ of Thakin Nu's government ran no farther than the suburbs of Rangoon and Mandalay, and sometimes not there.

Premier Thakin Nu and the Japanese-trained General Ne Win appeared to take this disruption of the country somewhat light-heartedly. Little real action was taken, and no progress made, against the various bodies of rebels. Even in the urban areas supposedly controlled by the government, public order was very dubious and dacoity rife. The government existed from hand to mouth on state lotteries and small American and Commonwealth loans. Despite these *ex gratia* acts of generosity against no security, Burmans generally no longer took care to conceal their dislike for Europeans and Americans, and the government continued to take discriminatory action against Indians.

Attempts were made to intimidate the Burmah Oil Company and the European Teak and other trading corporations, with the result that almost all their activities ceased and the

quays of the great port of Rangoon stood empty and idle. The currency was inflated, prices became prohibitive, goods went into short supply and were hoarded, and black-market activities were universal; many of the European and Indian stores closed.

In mid-1951, Premier Thakin Nu showed signs of a more realistic approach to the situation, which could hardly have been more dangerous. The Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Court's discriminatory decision against Burmah Oil, and the government expressed a desire to participate in the oil company, "provided they could borrow the money to finance their share",[1] a different proposition from previous bold talk of expropriation. In the same month (June 1951) a treaty was concluded with India, to follow a similar treaty already signed with Indonesia. In October 1951, attempt was made to conciliate the Shans by offering them autonomy within the Burmese Union.

At the same time, the internal situation remained exceedingly unstable, and materially deteriorated since the success of Marshal Mao in China. The hundreds of thousands of resident Chinese in Burma form a potential Fifth Column; Communists continue to filter in increasing numbers into the Shan States and Burma proper. The well-fed, smiling Burman is not such a good target for Communism as the lean and hungry Bengal peasant, but he is incurably lethargic and easy-going, and has his own ideas on faith and contracts. Should the Kremlin dictate a direct push south-east into Burma, there can be no doubt at all that the average Burman would find collaboration as easy as he did in 1942.

[1] In December 1951, £2½ million was borrowed from Britain against a £5 million half-share in the oil undertaking.

Thailand (Siam).[1]

Area: 198,247 square miles
Population: 17¼ millions

Unlike most of S.E. Asia, Thailand is not over-populated. The land is very fertile, and, even with its present population, only one third is developed, so that there are considerable future possibilities. The economy of the country is based on rice; it is not only self-sufficient, but there is no small export. The result is prosperity, and a placid existence for the peasants away from the cares of the world.

Since 1932, Siam, with a long and largely legendary history, has been a constitutional monarchy, developed since the nineteenth century under British influence. This connexion was broken in 1941 by the Japanese occupation of the country and its enforced declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States. This interlude had little effect either on Siam or the course of the war, and since 1945 the country, under Marshal Pibul Songgram, has suffered less internal dislocation than some other parts of Asia. Pibul Songgram is representative of, and supported by, the Elder Statesmen, and is the founder of the Pan-Thai movement, whose aims, if implemented, could only lead to renewal of the Burma-Siam-Annam-Cambodia conflicts, which occupied the Indo-Pacific peninsula from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries. Latterly, however, he has shown his intention of forming in Siam the core of an anti-Com-

[1] REFERENCE: Sir J. Crosby, *Siam: the Cross-roads* (1945).
R. le May, *An Asian Arcady* (1926).

munist S.E. Asian bloc, for which he seeks the support of the Western Democracies. Such support would be more than essential, since the military resources of Siam are small, and made smaller by divergence of political allegiance between the army and the navy, which, somewhat peculiarly, has on at least two occasions taken the form of open conflict between the two forces. There have been in addition several palace revolutions, the assassination of a king, and changes of ministries, while Pibul Songgram has himself been unseated in one combination (December 1951), only to appear almost immediately as leader of another. The present monarch returned from study in Switzerland in December 1951, since when he has virtually disappeared from the political scene.

Thailand, like Burma, is subject to infiltration of subversive elements from China and Viet Nam. Despite all this, Siam has remained rather more outside the sphere of Euro-Asiatic power politics than its neighbours. That this situation can continue seems unlikely, for the future may see the whole of S.E. Asia become a larger Korea, with the Anglo-American bloc hanging on to the sea-coast and the islands, and Communism, Chinese and otherwise, already well advanced in Burma and Viet Nam, dominating the mainland.

Only in close co-operation can the weak and retarded states of S.E. Asia resist either Communism or the remains of Western colonization, and as yet there are few signs of awareness to the need for such association, and possible regrouping of newly independent areas to meet the double thrust from East and West.

French Indo-China.[1]

Area: 286,000 square miles

Population: 28 millions

Indo-China comprises now the three states Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. On 22nd May 1949, the French National Assembly ended the colonial status of Cochin China, and set up the three provinces of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China as the independent state of Viet Nam within the French Union. Of the great colonial powers, France has been the most reluctant to loosen the ties of her dependencies. In Viet Nam, nominally independent, she established Bao Dai as head of the state. Bao Dai was formerly Emperor of Annam. He is a young man whose previous record has been mainly distinguished by his subservience to his French masters and his fondness for the comforts of their capital—Paris.

His rule in Viet Nam was from the first opposed by very considerable " Communist " elements. These, the Viet Minh Front under Ho Chi Minh, recognized (and possibly aided) by Soviet Russia and Red China, have since 1949 been waging a not unsuccessful guerilla war against French troops trying to maintain the puppet Bao Dai. As in the case of other Asiatic " Communists ", it is at least doubtful whether these rebels are Communist at all. They most certainly include nationalists,[2] unimpressed by Bao Dai's record and French background, and large numbers of

[1] REFERENCE: V. Thompson, *French Indo-China* (1937).
N. Lewis, *A Dragon Apparent* (1951).

[2] Ho Chi Minh himself said: " If we can only attain freedom by becoming Communist, then we will become Communist.

malcontents of all kinds, who make good material for Communist mischief-making.

By and large, it is quite certain that Asia has had enough of European domination, and the French administration would be well advised to face this situation realistically as have the British and the Dutch, the more so since the French, utterly defeated by the Germans in 1940, have, of all the powers, lost most " face " in the East.

In Cambodia and Laos nationalism is far less active. Here Buddhism, which in Annam is almost nominal, still governs conduct. To work more than necessary, to accumulate wealth, is impious. At the same time, there are no poor, conditions which make for political stability, and both Cambodia (since 1863) and Laos (since 1893) remain as constitutional monarchies within the French Union. Inevitably, however, they will follow Viet Nam, whatever the future of that province may be.

British Malaya and British Borneo.

Total Area: approximately 132,733 square miles

Population: approximately 7 millions

The remaining British territories in S.E. Asia consist of five separate units as undernoted, (*a*) and (*b*) forming British Malaya, (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) forming British Borneo.

(*a*) The Federation of Malaya (the nine British protected Malay states of Johore, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis; and the two British settlements of Penang and Malacca).

(*b*) The Colony of Singapore.

(*c*) The Colony of Sarawak.

(*d*) The Colony of North Borneo.

(*e*) The Protected State of Brunei.

The five units are politically and administratively separate but combined in the sphere of influence of the Commissioner-General for S.E. Asia, an office held for a considerable period by the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Macdonald.

The Treaty of London (1824) allocated to Great Britain the Malay Peninsula,[1] and to Holland all the islands east. For a time the area was loosely administered from India, until treaties were negotiated with the various native Sultanates, and the Colonial Office in London took over. In 1914, Malaya had three constitutions:

(*a*) The Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) were a Crown Colony.

(*b*) The Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang).

(*c*) The Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Johore).

After the defeat of Japan and the end of the Japanese occupation (1942–45), Malaya was divided into two divisions only:

(*a*) The Colony of Singapore.

(*b*) A Union of all the rest, which Union was in 1948 changed into a Federation of Malaya.

Up to 1945, the Malays and the Straits Chinese were probably the only Asiatics who really *liked* the British. The Japanese occupation strengthened this sentiment, and the

[1] REFERENCE: Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (1948).
V. Purcell, *Malaya: Outline of a Colony* (1946).

return of Britain was rapturously received—really rapturously. Subsequent political changes have done much to destroy this amity. The Federation of Malaya was arbitrarily dictated by the British Government in Whitehall, without consulting the Sultans. Aimed at centralization, it cut away the powers of the rulers and humiliated a proud people. Aimed at democracy, it gave unfair preponderance to the Indians and Chinese, so that the Malays saw their country threatened by immigrant aliens, who already reigned supreme in the commercial sphere.[1] There were always guerillas in Malaya, and British retreat, Japanese advance, Japanese defeat, and British return did not decrease their numbers. The success of Communism in China put the tag "Communist" on to existing Chinese bandits in Malaya, and the wisdom of Marshal Mao in permitting what he chooses to call beneficial capitalism has brought the prosperous commercial Chinese in Malaya to his support, so that they now speak openly of Malaya as China's Nineteenth Province.

As the focus of S.E. Asia and the home of an incredibly mixed population, Malaya was bound to suffer disintegrating influences consequent upon the Second War and the general advance of successful nationalism in Asia as a whole. These disintegrating influences could have been minimized by a wise approach to political change in 1945. Unfortunately,

[1] Colonies of expatriate Indians, wherever they settle, in South Africa, in the Seychelles, in Mauritius, in E. Africa, in Ceylon, in Burma, in Malaya, in Indonesia, as far afield as Fiji and the West Indies, are always sources of jealousy and discontent. They work exceedingly hard, and they live on very little, so that they tend to become rich. They breed exceedingly fast, so that they tend to swamp (especially in Fiji) indigenous peoples. They retain their own religion and caste system, so that they form alien enclaves perpetually foreign. Their commercial methods are frequently not above suspicion. There is every reason for the animosity which they arouse. In addition, in Malaya, there are more than 500,000 "squatter" Chinese.

a new and inexperienced administration in Whitehall, ill-informed and harassed by larger problems elsewhere, pushed through a comprehensive " planned " scheme which, like so much post-war " planning ", looks excellent on paper, but in effect has produced in Malaya discontented rulers and frustrated Malays, by no means disinclined to lend an ear to propaganda from the north-east, and far less reliable than they might be in the jungle war against guerillas (mostly young Chinese), which has been occupying British regiments and taking toll of British lives since 1948. The Federation of Malaya produced not union, but disunity, to add to the Balkanization of S.E. Asia caused by post-war independence. Very strong action in 1952, following the personal tour of Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary, and the strengthening of the military command, under Sir Gerald Templer, did something to remedy this anarchy. Moreover, in 1951, a movement sponsored by responsible Malays and approved by His Majesty's Government to form a united Malay-Sino-Indian front aimed at eventual Dominion status gained considerable ground. The odds against success seem large, but this may well be the way out of the tri-racial imbroglio. Such would be a consummation greatly to be desired, for the Malays are a smiling people, albeit feckless, whose former loyalty to the British Crown alone entitles them to restoration of their one-time placid happiness.

Sarawak, in British Borneo, has an area of 50,000 square miles and a population of half a million. It passed in 1841 under the rule of a British sea captain, who became Sir James Brook, the White Rajah. The rule of the Brook family in steamy jungles among head-hunting Dyaks is one

of the romances of British Colonial history. It was terminated in 1946 by a Colonial Office to which romantic anachronisms were anathema, very much against the will of the bulk of the population, but with the consent of the last White Rajah. Sarawak is now a Crown Colony.

Indonesia.[1]

Area: 735,000 square miles

Population: 75 millions

Indonesia (Island India) is a name connoting all the islands of the Malay Archipelago, most of which, since the early seventeenth century, have been under Dutch control. The Dutch make good colonists. They are efficient and hardworking, quite as good administrators as the British, if not better, and lacking the air of conscious superiority which makes so many British colonial servants insufferable. Unlike the British, they did not frown on mixtures of European and Asiatic blood, and they tended to settle in the islands rather than to regard them as temporary and unpleasant resting places necessary for a career, as do French colonial administrators.

The East Indies prospered under Dutch direction, but they did not escape the general Asiatic move towards independence of the twentieth century. There were nationalist risings in Java and Sumatra in 1926, after which relations between Dutch and Indonesians rapidly deteriorated.

The collapse of Holland in Europe in 1940 left the Indies practically autonomous, but quite unable to withstand the

[1] REFERENCE: J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (1944).
B. H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (1943).

Japanese invasion of 1942. With the defeat of Japan, as the Dutch had no troops readily available, British soldiers took over, and by allowing the Indonesian Republican Government to assume control over Sumatra and Java, seriously prejudiced the ultimate return of the Dutch.

The reluctance of the Netherlands to abandon Indonesia in the manner in which Britain so easily surrendered India is understandable. It is estimated [1] that the loss of Indonesia would reduce the standard of living in Holland by 35 per cent. Consequently, virtually writing off Java and Sumatra, the Dutch concentrated on holding the less politically active islands to the east, and succeeded (Mallino Conference, July 1946) in forming semi-autonomous states in East Indonesia and Borneo.

From these bases, the Dutch undertook armed action against the Indonesian Republic in 1947, and made deep inroads into Republican territory. Sporadic fighting took place throughout the archipelago, the situation being complicated by the continued presence of Japanese troops. The United Nations Organization twice intervened (July 1947, December 1948), and the Dutch were finally constrained to come to terms with the more moderate elements in Republican Indonesia.

A round-table conference at The Hague finally recognized the Republic in Java and Sumatra, the creation of a United States of Indonesia comprising this republic, Borneo, and the Great East (see Map 6), and the formation of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. Sovereignty was transferred to the new states by Queen Juliana on 27 December 1949.

[1] *The Economist* (26th July 1947): " Indonesia and the Real Issue ".

New Guinea was excluded from this arrangement, it being agreed that a joint Dutch-Indonesian Commission should consider the facts and report back to the two governments within a year. As this Commission was unable to agree, New Guinea still remains under Dutch sovereignty, to the considerable satisfaction of the many Eurasians there.

In the meantime, the federal structure of the new Union led to frequent internal discord, so that a new constitution was proclaimed on 15th August 1950. The federal system was abolished, and the whole area (save New Guinea and Timor) integrated as the Republic of Indonesia, comprising the ten provinces shown on Map 6.

From an administrative point of view this brought improvement, but the economic situation of the new state still gave rise to great concern. Foreign trade declined, and a conspicuous increase in money circulation was accompanied by an equally conspicuous shortage of goods. Frequent waves of industrial strikes (in July 1951 there were 26 in Jakarta, the capital, alone), the irresponsible claims of labour, and the government's ineffectual handling of them, threatened to drive foreign capital from the country. This is the familiar pattern of newly emancipated Asiatic states, and it is too early to estimate to what extent these factors, and the dangerous counsels of extremist elements will jeopardize the stability of Indonesia, and from Indonesia of all S.E. Asia.

MAP 6

S. E. ASIA : INDONESIA : 1952

MILES 0 500

1 *WEST JAVA*
2 *CENTRAL JAVA*
3 *EAST JAVA*
4 *NORTH SUMATRA*
5 *CENTRAL SUMATRA*
6 *SOUTH SUMATRA*
7 *BORNEO*
8 *CELEBES*
9 *LESSER SUNDA ISLES*
10 *THE MOLUCCAS*

BRITISH
DUTCH
PORTUGUESE

The Philippine Islands.[1]

Area: 114,834 square miles
Population: 19 millions

The Philippines were discovered by the explorer Magellan in 1521. Indeed he was killed there. In 1565, they were conquered by Spain and held by that country, save for a brief British occupation (1762–64), until the Spanish American War of 1898, after which they were ceded to the United States of America. The Filipinos did not exactly relish this second occupation, and from 1899 to 1902 the islands were in revolt against their new masters, but after that they settled down to a gradual process of Americanization. A considerable degree of independence was granted by the Jones Act of 1916, and the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 gave what amounted to Dominion status within the American Union.

On 13th December 1941, the Japanese landed in the islands in force and completely overwhelmed the U.S. garrison, and on 9th May 1942, the last point—the Fortress of Corregidor—surrendered to the Japanese. By Presidential command, the American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, escaped to Australia through the Japanese lines, with the promise that he would return. He did, in October 1944, and recaptured the islands with remarkably light losses.

Throughout the Japanese occupation, Filipino guerillas opposed the Japanese occupation, and in reward an independent Republic was declared on 4th July 1946. The

[1] REFERENCE: J. R. Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (1942).

Philippines are somewhat out of the main Asiatic trend. Although racially Malay, there is a strong admixture of Spanish and Chinese blood, and 90 per cent of the population are Roman Catholic. In addition, independence has not destroyed social and economic dependence on the United States, so that the disruptive influences so apparent elsewhere in S.E. Asia are less noticeable here. There is a small Communist opposition, the Hukbalahap, mostly in Central Luzon, whose activities are a thorn in the side of the government, and likely to be so for some considerable time. These inevitably have been encouraged by Communist success in China proper, but, taken by and large, the Philippines have better prospect than most other areas of cohesion, and prosperous development within the Western democratic bloc.

CHAPTER V

The Far East

Japan.[1]

Area (excluding war losses): 146,000 square miles
Population: 78 millions

It was just under a century ago in 1853 that the American Commodore Perry opened up Japanese ports to world trade, and ended a long period of self-imposed Japanese seclusion.

It became immediately apparent after this that the impact of the West could no longer be avoided. Absolute Japanese feudalism was overthrown, and the country began a planned rise to the status of a great power. The army was reorganized on the Prussian model, a fleet built on British lines, the law codified, European teachers and technicians imported, factories established, communications improved, and agricultural feudalism replaced by industrialism.

This development was accompanied by an increase in population at the rate of a million a year, and even at its pre-war extent, including Korea and Manchuria, the 263,051 square miles of the Japanese Empire was totally inadequate for a population (1940) of 105 millions, the more so since only one fifth of this area is fit for cultivation, giving a density per square mile of cultivated land of 3000. Territorial expansion became an economic necessity, and was

[1] REFERENCE: G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (1931).

achieved in a series of wars with China and Russia (1904–5), resulting in the acquisition on the mainland of Korea (1910) and Manchuria (1932), and of numerous islands.[1]

Throughout the nineteen thirties it became increasingly clear that Japan was contemplating the absorption of the whole of Eastern Asia, and in 1941 she challenged the United States by a shattering attack on Pearl Harbour without declaration of war. A period of successes in rapid sequence followed until Japan controlled (1942–45) all Asia from Korea to Burma, including Indonesia and the Philippines, and very large areas of China proper.

Heavy shipping losses and a series of military and naval disasters, culminating in the devastation wrought in the main island of Japan itself by the explosion of two atomic bombs, brought about the surrender, in August 1945, of the Japanese Empire, to the British in S.E. Asia and to the Americans in Japan.

Japan was occupied by Commonwealth and American troops under the command (until June 1951) of General Douglas MacArthur. Partly because of his enormous prestige with the common people, partly because he appeared to be co-operative, the divine[2] Emperor Hirohito was not deposed, but incorporated into the Constitution of 1946, which also sought to achieve the emancipation of women, and general improvement of conditions of labour. At the same time, the American occupation authorities undertook the re-education of the Japanese, in an attempt to replace

[1] Kuriles (1875); Bonins (1876); Ryukyus (1878); Pescadores and Formosa (1895); S. Sakhalin (1905); Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Groups (1919).

[2] The Japanese Emperor, traditionally descended (660 B.C.) from the gods, was before the war himself regarded, and treated, almost as a god.

ideas of militarism and servitude with the American conception of democracy. As the Japanese are remarkably good mimics, and clever enough to know on which side their bread is buttered, these efforts met with considerable superficial success.

Defeat brought an end to most of the industrial and commercial activity of Japan, and part of the problem of occupation was to provide for the support of an enormous population, which must necessarily depend upon foreign trade and urban industry. The aim of the American administration was to make Japan the workshop of the East, by 1953 if possible, and to this end peace treaties were drawn and signed between the United States and the British Commonwealth and Japan in August 1951.[1] These treaties were extraordinarily liberal, being designed to enlist Japan's help in the attempted encirclement of Communist Asia. Japan lost Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kuriles, the Ryukyus, and South Sakhalin, as well as the mandated areas in the Pacific and control over Manchukuo, but there were no restrictions on trade or industry, nor even on the right to rearm.

Very naturally, this treaty aroused bitter opposition in the Philippines, which suffered so much from Imperial Japan during the war, and to a lesser extent in Australia and New Zealand, sparsely populated Dominions, which might expect to bear the brunt of future Japanese aggression. In consequence, therefore, as an essential corollary to the Japanese Treaty, a Pacific Defence Pact was concluded between the United States and Australia-New Zealand.

[1] Russia entered the war against Japan a few weeks before its conclusion, but declined to participate in the Anglo-American treaties.

The Japanese themselves, characteristically and not unnaturally, failed to appreciate the substantial loss of territory of the treaty. It was, however, lenient in the extreme, after a fashion which would have seemed impossible in 1945 when the bestial conduct of Japanese commanders and troops during the war was fresh in mind.

Since then the cold war between Soviet Russia and the Western Democracies has completely changed the picture, and it has become the first point of American policy to keep Japan as a prosperous non-Communist entity, the beginning of the chain of Asiatic islands with which she hopes to fringe and contain Communism in the East.

That the Americans will succeed in Japan, if not elsewhere, seems likely. A strong autocratic tradition and habits of diligence and self-sacrificing obedience survive in Japan from feudal days, and these, with the Japanese willingness and ability to accept an incredibly low standard of life, should bring a ready return to prosperity. Japan, unlike most Asiatic countries, is a nation as well as a state, with a high degree of ethnic, religious, and linguistic unity. The Anglo-American settlement has not flouted this nationality, and American aid is rapidly leading to new prosperity. There would, then, seem to be little fertile soil for Communist growth, since Communism is essentially a creed for the have-nots, a philosophy of government which feeds on want and despair. Whether the liberal treatment, amounting to cosseting, of Japan, rendered absolutely unavoidable by U.S.-Soviet antagonism in the Far East, will lead to a revival of Japanese aggressive nationalism remains to be seen. It is very difficult to believe that even General MacArthur has succeeded in grafting any real democracy upon Japan in

six short years, but this is a risk which must be taken against the very present fact of Communist imperialism.

China.[1]

Estimated Area: 4,300,000 square miles
Estimated Population: 450,000,000

The People's Republic of China (Ta Chung-Hua Jen-Min Kung-Ho Kuo) claims sovereignty over many ill-defined territories, notably Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet in High Asia, but this section refers to the Eighteen Provinces of China proper, plus Manchuria. Even with these limitations, the great extent and vast population make it remarkable that there is any degree of political unity at all. But such unity there has been and is, based on a common written language[2] and a common religion which is an eclectic mixture of animism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. The basic idea is that man should go about his life without expectation of reward, and should try to bring himself into harmony with the Great Tao, the Universal Spirit. Lao-Tse (604 B.C.) and Confucius (551–479 B.C.) taught that to do this mortals should copy a pattern of dignity, honesty, and respect for their ancestors which make up the Superior Man. It is a system of philosophy rather than a religion, and its higher forms are essentially remote from common life, but its effect on the Chinese has been to produce a

[1] REFERENCE: O. B. Van Der Sprenkel, *New China: Three Views* (1950).
H. Rattenbury, *Understanding China* (1942).
G. F. Hudson, *The Far East in World Politics* (1937).
W. R. McAuliffe, *The Making of the Modern World* (1938).
W. Eberhard, *A History of China* (1950).

[2] Although literacy is rare, and written Mandarin has little relation to the many spoken dialects.



CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN : 1932–1952

MAP 7

continuity and sense of compromise unknown elsewhere, and to spare the country the religious wars and persecutions which have disfigured history in the name of God almost everywhere else.

China was a powerful state when the Egyptians were building the Pyramids, twenty-seven centuries before the birth of Christ. Since then, Chinese history has followed a pattern of cycles of prosperity and decay, of defeat and supremacy, the periods of conquest being marked by an extraordinary capacity to assimilate and make Chinese the conquerors. Always the immense country with its teeming millions and age-long culture has absorbed the invader, who comes for a short space but leaves no mark, so that China, but little deflected from her course, goes on, momentarily troubled perhaps, but always in the end serene.

The beginning of the most recent cycle was the Manchu (Manchurian) Empire, at its height about 1790, when China subjugated Mongolia, Turkestan, and Burma, and a Chinese army crossed the Himalayas and entered Nepal. But in the nineteenth century the Manchus fell into decay, and were compelled to tolerate European penetration round their coasts. Concessions were granted and Treaty Ports made over, and the Celestial Empire was reduced to semi-colonial status. Such humiliation naturally produced nationalist reaction, and in 1912 the decadent empire disappeared before a republic headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Kuomintang Nationalist Party. Dr. Sun was a man of great personal integrity, but he was unable to hold together the great sprawling country of which he was nominally the head. There followed the period of the war-lords, nominally governors of provinces, actually heads of independent

dministrations, sometimes little better than bandits, going heir own ways in north and centre, and frequently fighting ach other and the Nationalist Government in the south.

The situation was complicated by the intervention of hoviet Russia and of Japan. In 1921, the Chinese Comhunist Party was formed, and set up a Red Government in dankow. It is difficult to assess what help, if any, this early Communist Party received from Moscow, but in any event ts activities in the field were crowned with little success until after the Second War.

In 1932, after the Second Sino-Japanese War, the victorious Japanese set up Manchuria and Jehol into the puppet state of Manchukuo, under the young man Henry Pu-Yi, who, as a small child, had been the last Emperor of China. In the ensuing years, Japan developed a steady attack on China from this province, and, in 1941, when Japan went to war with the West, the Sino-Japanese War merged into the Second World War.

In this war, or rather wars, the Chinese resistance, such as it was, was led by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang Party, and of a little family group of bankers, industrialists, and politicians. In the difficult years of the war, when any friend was a friend indeed, the Marshal secured recognition for himself from the leaders of the other three great powers, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, with the result that Nationalist China emerged from the war with the status of a Great Power. Long before any treaty with Japan was even discussed, China reassumed Formosa, the Pescadores, and Manchuria, although Russia retained very valuable concessions in the last. But the internal situation in victorious China was far

from happy. The economy of the country is 85 per cent agricultural, but even so it was ravaged by thirteen long years of war, and such industry as there was lay on the fringe, took the main brunt of the Japanese attack, and was largely laid in ruins.

At the end of the Second War, the Chiang Kai-shek Government threw away the best opportunity there has ever been for a genuine recovery programme for China. With credits in hand amounting to more than a thousand million United States dollars, almost anything could have been done. But nothing was. It is hard to believe that not a single piece of machinery was imported. The money went out in the purchase of luxury goods, in pure squander, and in the bottomless corruption of Kuomintang officialdom. Inevitably inflation followed, and a succession of natural disasters—drought, flood, typhoon, pests, and crop failures—sealed the fate of the extravagant, selfish, corrupt, and incompetent regime of Chiang Kai-shek, which had bled China for so many years.

Civil war broke out again between Communists and Nationalists, and despite very considerable American aid in arms and loans, Chiang Kai-shek was driven steadily south. In 1949 he resigned, and by January 1950 only the island of Formosa was left to the Kuomintang, and that only because of the presence of U.S. aircraft and a U.S. fleet. The People's Republic, under Marshal Mao Tse-tung, dominated all China. It was recognized by most world powers, including Great Britain, but excluding the United States. The Washington States Department declined to see anything but good in Chiang Kai-shek, and anything but Soviet Imperialism in the new administration. American

influence excluded Communist China from the United Nations Organization, a seat on which continued to be occupied by the representative of the shadow government in Formosa, a regrettable circumstance which gave some point to the Russian allegation that the United Nations Organization was no more than a cover for the Anglo-American alliance.

The success of Communism in China is certainly the most important political event of the post-war years. It has changed the entire balance of the world forces by establishing a Communist bloc from the Elbe to the Pacific, a collection of states capable of putting into the field at least 525 divisions,[1] which is exactly 500 more than the Western Democracies *hope* to be able to command. The question was also immediately raised as to whether the whole of resurgent Asia would become Communist, or whether the West would retain economic and political footholds in the south and south-west.

One point on which there is no doubt is that the new regime is accepted by all classes in China, and that Chinese Communism represents more than a radical scheme of land reform. It is also already clear that, although necessarily influenced by Soviet Russia, Chinese Communism will be run by the Chinese and not by the Kremlin. Russia had enough of interference in Chinese revolutions in 1926, and her relations with the new China have been strictly correct, although the continued support by the United States (and hence the United Nations) of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa has driven Mao closer to Russia, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty

[1] U.S.S.R., 215 divisions; Chinese People's Republic, 240 divisions; European satellites of Russia, 70 divisions.

of 1950 definitely linked China up with the U.S.S.R.

Continued wars from 1937 and before disrupted the old Chinese order by breaking up its institutions, the family and the commercial guilds, by shaking Confucianism to its foundations, and by uprooting masses of people and depositing them elsewhere. Such conditions were ideal for the propagation of Communism (well mixed with the traditional Chinese hatred of foreign devils) and nationalism. The Chinese required money in their pockets and rice in their bellies; they required peace, and like thousands of millions before them were prepared to tolerate totalitarianism to get it. And the Peking Government is certainly totalitarian. All Chinamen must submit or be left aside, and this they are prepared to do, provided the compensations of peace and comparative plenty come up to expectations.

But there are other Chinese traditions, particularly those of extreme individuality and of contempt for the military caste. Mao realizes this and has instructed his leaders to attempt to convince and convert, rather than to enforce ideological discipline. China is a country which has always in the past engulfed its would-be conquerors, and Marshal Mao has already proclaimed his intention of adapting Communism to the Chinese environment. It is very likely that Communism in China will be a compromise, as is fitting in the Land of the Middle Way, and it may very well emerge from modification unrecognizable by Lenin. Be that as it may, Communism in some form or another has come to stay in China.

Since Communism is a creed born of economic despair, new Communist states almost always start off in the worst possible circumstances, and China was no exception. Quite

naturally, since China is 85 per cent agrarian, land reform, and the reversal of the old relationship between land-owner and coolie—the establishment of universal peasant proprietorship—took pride of place in the party programme, together with schemes for collective farming, irrigation, fertilization, and other means for stepping up agricultural production. No such schemes, however, can ever alter the basic fact of China's gross over-population. As in India, there is too little land and too many tillers.

One answer to this, the only one at the moment, is large scale industrialization, which not only presents problems of its own, but is a lengthy process and one requiring vast capital investment. Now China is missing the U.S. credits squandered and peculated by Chiang Kai-shek. An essential preliminary to new loans or any capital investment is financial confidence, and the first stage to this is the establishment of a stable currency. The new government has moved in this direction by the withdrawal of inflated Nationalist and local banknotes, and by the issue of a new unified currency which, if not exactly as stable as the U.S. dollar, is at least an improvement on its predecessors. Further to encourage capital investment, Chinese Communism has already diverged from pure Marxism and recognized private capitalism, even on a large scale, differentiating with delightful hypocrisy between the " national bourgeoisie ", who are beneficial citizens, and capitalists, who are enemies of the people. Even if these measures be only temporary, they have had the effect of checking the flight of capital, and may even in time lead to foreign investment in Chinese industrialization.

In these matters Marshal Mao has shown so realistic an approach to his problems that it is possible to hope that he

also realizes that industrialization can only go ahead if China obtains overseas markets both in the East and the West. To achieve these, a very long period of peace is necessary, and it is therefore possible that Asia may have seen for a time the end of Red aggression.

The urgent need for foreign capital (which cannot be obtained in sufficient quantity, if at all, from the U.S.S.R.) is a further factor likely to narrow the breach between Communist China and the West. Internal developments in China and the tailing off (1951–52) of pressure in Korea would seem to suggest Mao's realization that liaison with the West is essential, that, in fact, to his mind, Chinese recovery comes first and Chinese Communism second. If this be so, the U.S. official view that Communist China is sold body and soul to the Soviet Union is sadly wrong. The British view (in consequence of which Great Britain has acknowledged the Peking Government, and China appears to condone British occupation of the commercial colony of Hong Kong) that China, although Communist, may yet be drawn into a peaceful comity of nations, is more optimistic and may prove more accurate. It is too early to say, but it is not too early to be sure that no useful purpose can be served by continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek, and consequent refusal to admit the representatives of 450 million people into the United Nations Organization.

Formosa.

Formosa is an island about the size of Holland, with a population of some 7 millions which has been increased since 1949 by 2 million Nationalists from the mainland, including Chiang Kai-shek's army of half a million men.

Without U.S. support the maintenance of this last outpost of the Kuomintang Government would be impossible. The Seventh U.S. Fleet; U.S. air patrols from Manila; loans, arms, equipment, and military advisers; these, together with the island's self-sufficiency in rice and brutal suppression of all opposition in 1949, have enabled the Kuomintang Government of Mr. K. C. Wu to establish itself.

But American aid cannot last for ever, and 70 per cent of the island's economy is absorbed by unproductive armed forces. Moreover, no army can be highly trained for a long period and then not be used, without an eventual collapse of morale and discipline. This particular army, cut off from the Chinese mainland, cannot even obtain normal replacements of man power, and must become a wasting asset within two years. Formosa, like Chiang Kai-shek, is an anachronism, and anachronisms cannot be maintained indefinitely even by an endless stream of golden dollars. The Republic of Formosa, unless it invades Red China, must have a limited expectation of life; and if it invades Red China, it will either commit immediate suicide or precipitate a second U.S.-Communist conflict in the East.

Korea.

The province of Korea (Chosen), with an area of 83,235 square miles and a population of 19½ millions, was retaken from Japan in 1945. Originally it was occupied by both U.S. and Soviet forces, with an agreed frontier at the 38th parallel North. Inability of Russia and the United States to agree as to the ultimate disposal of this territory led to the establishment of two governments, the South Korean

Republic under President Syngman Rhee, and the North Korean People's Republic under Marshal Kim Il-sun. From the first such an artificial division of so small an area presented dangers, and definite war broke out between the two republics in July 1950, with the south supported by armed forces, mostly from the United States but nominally from the United Nations Organization, and the north supported in arms by China and in sympathy by Russia. The war followed a ding-dong course for a year, with the United Nations forces almost driven out at one stage, until the enormous losses inflicted on the Chinese by the American technique of aerial and mechanized warfare brought about, in July 1951, virtual stalemate at the 38th Parallel. This position was accepted as a basis for discussion with a view to an armistice. The war, immensely costly in men,[1] may appear to have been fruitless. In effect, for the first time in world history an armed force, consisting of units from divers states representing, at least nominally, a world organization for the perpetuation of peace, took police action against a state branded as the aggressor. The absence of half the world (Soviet Russia and her satellites and Red China) from these deliberations rather weakened their moral effect, but at least the East saw that the West, and particularly the United States, was prepared to extend its opposition to Communist advance to actual arms, an example which had salutory reaction both in China and Russia.

Asia and Communism.

A glance at Map 5 will show to what extent Asia, even more than Europe, is a potential theatre of the world-wide

[1] By the end of 1951, U.S. losses alone exceeded 100,000.

conflict between the American ideal of capitalist individualism, and the Russian conception of Communist totalitarianism. At the moment, Communism has grasped the "heartland", the great land mass of Central Asia, Soviet Asia, High Asia, and China, with the Western bloc on the defensive from the fringes, from the Arab states of the Near East, from Pakistan and India, from S.E. Asia, and from Korea and Japan. The islands of Asia almost form a ring fence to mainland Communism, and danger spots are many: the Persian Gulf, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Assam, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Korea.

Should the outlook appear too black, it is useful to realize that, although Communism is by definition international, Russian Marxism is not necessarily exportable. Communism in Asia is based on economic depression largely due to overpopulation, and is intensely mixed with nationalism and desire for independence on native cultural lines.

The population of Asia is 1155 millions, and most of these, despite fiery leaders, jumped-up war-lords, and unscrupulous politicians, are "little people", simple at heart, simple in desire, and pacific in creed, who ask no more than peace and quiet to tend their crops, to feed themselves and their children, and to be free from want, oppression, and disease. If some extension of aid to Asia, such as is envisaged in the Colombo Plan, can give them these conditions, then Communism will halt at its present frontiers; if it cannot, then the Red tide will roll on, and no armed might of the West will be able to stop it. And it is right that this should be so. If the Western economy of industrialized individualism can feed the world adequately and give its peoples health and security, so much the better. If

it cannot, then Asiatics cannot be blamed for turning towards another possible solution of their problems, which, if it be not better, cannot possibly be worse than the devastation, starvation, and dislocation which followed the breakdown of Western Imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century.

INDEX

INDEX

(*The numbers refer to pages*)

ABADAN, 17, 20, 27, 43, 57.
Abdul Aziz. *See* Ibn Saud.
Abdul Ilah, 18.
Abdullah, King, 14, 20.
Aden, 15, 31.
Afghanistan, 1, 19, 60, 65, 102, 105.
Aga Khan, 10.
Ahimsa, 82.
Alexander the Great, 23.
Alexandretta, 37.
Amanullah, King, 60.
Anglo-Indians, 91.
Arab League, 14, 21, 22, 38, 47.
Arab Legion, 20.
Arabia, 1, 6 ff., 14.
Arabi Bey, 24.
Arabic dialects, 7.
Aryans, 70.
Asoka, 122.
Ataturk, Kemal. *See* Kemel Pasha.
Azerbaijan, 56.

BA MAW, 125.
Bacha-i-Saqao, 61.
Bagge Commission, 108.
Bahrain, 31, 45, 54.
Baku, 44.
Balfour Declaration, 13, 40.
Bao Dai, Emperor, 131.
Barbar Shah, 74.
Baring, Sir Evelyn, 24.
Bekr Sidqi Pasha, 18.
Ben Gurion, David, 42.
Bernadotte, Count Folke, 42.
Bharat. *See* India.
Bhutan, 111.
Bose, Subhas Neterji, 84.
Brahmins, 71 ff.
British East India Company, 75.
Brook, Sir James, 135.
Buddha, 64, 121.
Buddhism, 3, 73, 116, 119, 121 ff., 132.
Burma, 1, 3, 120, 121 ff.

CAIRO CONFERENCE, 17.
Caliph, 14, 16, 32, 38.
Cambodia, 118, 131.
Catroux, General, 38.
Ceylon, 1, 3, 113.
Chasidim, 40.
Chiang Kai-shek, 2, 149 ff.
China, 1, 64, 68, 105, 111, 146 ff.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, 125.
Clive, 75.
Communism, 4, 56, 64, 92, 103, 113, 120, 127, 130, 131, 134, 141, 145, 149, 151 ff.
Confucius, 3, 119, 146.
Congress, 26, 81, 93, 105, 116.
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 84.
Curzon, Marquess, 45, 50, 81, 102.

DARIUS, 7, 53.
Devaluation, 107.
Dravidians, 70.

Druses, 38.
Dupleix, 75.
Durand Line, 61, 101.
Dutch, 75, 119, 136.

EAST BENGAL, 97, 102, 103.
Eden, 6.
Egypt, 6, 22 ff., 42, 47, 109, 148.
El Azhar, 8.
Elizabeth I, 75.
Elizabeth II, 91.

FAROUK, KING, 21, 24 ff.
Feisal I, King, 14, 17 ff.
Feisal II, King, 18.
Formosa, 150, 154.
France, 1, 13, 75, 91, 95, 119, 131.
Fuad, King, 25.

GANDHI, 71, 81 ff., 84, 87.
Ghazi, King, 18.
Ghurkas, 111.
Glubb Pasha, 13, 21.
Goa, 91.
Gobi Desert, 65.
Golden Square, 19.
Gordon, General, 23.
Greeks, 7, 23.
Gulf Sultanates, 30.

HADRAMAUT, 15, 31.
Haifa, 19.
Hammurabi, 6.
Harijans, 71, 81.
Hastings, Lord, 76.
Hastings, Warren, 76.
Herzl, Theodor, 40.
Hindu Mahasabha, 92.
Hinduism, 71 ff., 116, 122.
Hindustan. *See* India.
Histadrut, 40.
Hitler, 19, 55, 60.
Ho Chi Minh, 131.
Hukbalahap, 141.

IBN SAUD, 14 ff., 22, 31, 46, 47.
Ikhwan, 15.
India, 3, 63, 65, 70 ff., 105 ff.
Indian Civil Service, 80, 101.
— Constitution, 89 ff.
— Mutiny, 77.
— Princes, 79, 88.
Indo-China, 2, 95, 121, 131 ff.
Indonesia, 121, 136 ff.
Inönü, Ismet, 36.
Iran, 19, 27, 32, 43, 46, 51 ff., 65.
Iraq, 6, 17 ff., 20, 22, 42, 45, 47.
Islam. *See* Mohammedanism.
Ismail, Khedive, 23.
Israel, 21, 39 ff., 47.

JAINISM, 73.
Jammu, 88, 106.
Japan, 1, 65, 68, 84, 119, 129, 137, 140, 142 ff.
Java, 118.
Jebel Druse, 37.
Jedda, Treaty of, 15.
Jerusalem, 21, 47.
Jesus, 8, 122.
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 85, 96 ff.
Jordan, 20, 42, 47.
Junagarh, 88, 105.

KASHANI ABOLGHASSEM, 59.
Kashmir, 88, 106.
Kemal Pasha, 33, 60.
Khazal of Mohammerah, 54.
Khuro, Dr., 100.
Khwaja Nazimuddin, 103.
Kim Il-sun, Marshal, 156.
Kirkuk, 19.
Kitchener, Lord, 24, 28.
Koran, 8.
Korea, 57, 101, 107, 142, 154.
Kshatriyas, 71.
Kuomintang, 148.
Kuriles, 68.
Kuwait, 15, 31.

LAOS, 131.
Latakia, 37.
Lawrence, T. E., 13, 20.
Lebanon, 37, 42.
Liaquat Ali Khan, 100, 104, 108, 109.
Linlithgow, Lord, 84.
Louis XIV, 75.
Lyttleton, Oliver, 135.

MACARTHUR, GENERAL, 140, 143.
Macdonald, Rt. Hon. Malcolm, 133.
MacMahon Correspondence, 11, 17, 40.
Mahdi, 28.
Malaya, 118, 120, 132.
Malthus, 3, 34.
Mamdot, Khan of, 100.
Manchukuo, 149.
Manchuria, 142, 146.
Manchus, 148.
Mao Tse-tung, Marshal, 95, 128, 134, 150, 152.
Marx, Karl, 4.
Mecca, 16.
Medina, 16.
Mehemet Ali, 11, 23, 28.
Mehmed VI, 33.
Middle Eastern Pact, 37.
Millspaugh, A. C., 51.
Mohammed Reza Shah, 56 ff.
Mohammedanism, 3, 7 ff., 32, 74 ff., 104.
Mongolia, 64.
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 83.
Morrison, Herbert, 58.
Mossadeq, Dr., 44, 57.
Mosul, 45, 47.
Mountbatten, Earl, 85, 125.
Mufti, Ex- (Amin el Husseini), 22, 41.
Muslim. *See* Mohammedanism.
Muslim League, 83, 96, 99, 110.

NADIR SHAH, KING, 61.
Nahas Pasha, 26.
Nazibullah Khan, 63.
Nehru, Pandit, 82, 87 ff., 91, 108.
Nepal, 111.
Nizam, The, 31, 76, 89.
N. W. Frontier, 97, 101.

OIL, 43 ff.
Oman, 15, 31.
Orthodox Church, 10.

PACIFIC PACT, 144.
Pakistan, 62, 96 ff., 106 ff.
Pan-Arabia, 47.
Pan-Islamism, 10, 46, 63, 101.
Patel, Vallabhbhai, 82, 90.
Persia. *See* Iran.
Peter the Great, 69.
Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 85.
Philippines, 1, 140.
Pibul Songgram, Marshal, 129.
Pirate Coast, 31.
Plassey, Battle of, 76, 124.
Portugal, 1, 75, 91, 119.
Punjab, 87, 98, 109.
Pu-Yi, Emperor, 149.

QATAR, 31.

RADCLIFFE COMMISSION, 85.
Rajagopalachari, 82, 87.
Rashid Ali, 19.
Reza Shah Pahlevi, 50 ff., 60.
Romans, 7, 23.
R.S.S., 92.

SAADABAD PACT, 19, 47, 64, 101.
Sarawak, 132, 135.
Saudi Arabia, 14 ff., 32.
Sèvres, Treaty of, 33.

Shah Mahmoud, Marshal, 61.
Shamshers, 112.
Shiahs, 10, 17.
Siam. *See* Thailand.
Siberia, 65.
Sikander Hyat Khan, 109.
Sikhs, 73, 87, 93, 98, 106, 111.
Sikkim, 111.
Simon, Sir John, 83
Sind, 97.
Singapore, 132.
Sinkiang, 65.
Siva, 72.
Someil massacre, 18.
Stalin, Marshal, 69.
Sterling balances, 25.
Sudan, 25, 28, 109.
Sudras, 71.
Suez Canal, 17, 19, 23, 24, 27.
Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 148.
Sunnis, 10, 17.
Sykes-Picot Pact, 13, 17.
Syngman Rhee, 156.
Syria, 20, 22, 37, 42, 47.
Syro-Malankarans, 77.

TALAINGS, 124.
Talal, King, 22.
Tamils, 70, 116.
Teheran Conference, 56.
Templer, Sir Gerald, 135.
Thailand, 3, 129 ff.
Thakin Nu, 127.
Thibaw, King, 123.
Tibet, 63, 105, 111.
Transjordan. *See* Jordan.
Tudeh Party, 56.
Turkey, 1, 11, 19, 32, 47, 49.

U SAW, 125.
Umma Party, 29.
Uniate Churches, 11.
U.S.A., 1, 51, 59, 68, 140, 151 ff.
U.S.S.R., 5, 51, 56, 60, 65 ff., 105.

VAISYAS, 71.
Viable states, 90.
Victoria, Queen, 77, 80.
Viet Minh, 131.
Viet Nam, 131.
Vishnu, 71.

WAFD, 25 ff.
Wahhabism, 10, 15.
Wali Shah, Marshal, 61.
Wavell, Earl, 84.
Wellesley, Lord, 76.

YALTA AGREEMENT, 68.
Yemen, 30.

ZAHIR SHAH, KING, 61.
Zionism, 39.
Zoroastrianism, 54.

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

115 887

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY